Schomer v. Scott
| Decision Date | 22 June 1937 |
| Docket Number | 8073. |
| Citation | 274 N.W. 556,65 S.D. 353 |
| Parties | SCHOMER v. SCOTT et al. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Original proceeding by Joe Schomer, as a resident citizen and taxpayer of Stanley county, S. D., to enjoin C. H. Scott and others as members of and constituting the board of county commissioners of Stanley county, S. D., from issuing bonds to raise money with which to discharge obligation allegedly imposed on county to refund certain sums to the permanent school and other educational funds of the state and to enjoin Ben Strool, as commissioner of school and public lands of South Dakota, and W. H. Hinselman, as state treasurer, South Dakota, from demanding or receiving payment of the purported debt.
Decree in accordance with opinion.
Sutherland & Payne, of Pierre (H. W. Markey, of Huron, R. B. Palmer, of Woonsocket, A. F. Schleher, of Redfield, Stanley R. Voas, of McIntosh, H. F. Ricketts, of Mitchell, G. F. Sherwood, of Clark, and P. C. Hvistendahl, of Mobridge, of counsel), for plaintiff.
James F. Callahan, of Fort Pierre, Clair Roddewig, Atty. Gen., and D. C. Walsh and R. F. Drewry, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants.
Andrew S. Bogue, of Parker, amicus curiae.
Deeming itself obligated to the permanent school and other educational funds of the state in the aggregate sum of $214,255.61, Stanley county undertook to issue and sell its negotiable bonds in order to raise money with which to forthwith discharge its obligation. The plaintiff, as a taxpayer and citizen of said county, seeks to restrain enjoin, and prohibit the officers of said county from issuing bonds for such purpose, and also to restrain and enjoin the commissioner of school and public lands and the treasurer of South Dakota from demanding or receiving payment of said purported debt. Because of the importance of the issues involved to the state at large, the matter has been entertained as an original proceeding. We deal with the questions presented for solution in the order of their importance.
Does article 8 of the Constitution of the state of South Dakota which deals with these school and educational funds, impose an absolute liability on the several counties of the state for the payment of semiannual interest on, and for the repayment of losses to, the principal of such funds apportioned to them for investment? The officers of the county and state assert that such is the liability of Stanley county in the instant case, while the plaintiff-taxpayer contends that the county is only liable as a trustee, and that therefore no liability accrues until it be shown that the county has violated its trust.
There is no issue here dealing with loss suffered through the defalcation, negligence, mismanagement, or fraud of the county or its officials or agents. It is manifest that the losses admitted in this litigation are the fruits of an extended period of inflation followed by sharp deflation and drought. It is common knowledge that loans heretofore made on real estate throughout large sections of the state on a basis that most minds would have then agreed was conservative and secure, have resulted in absolute loss and in the ownership of unmarketable lands solely because of the unforseeable, sharp decline in the value of all agricultural lands.
It is very probable that the framers of the Constitution who devised the plan by which the state would attempt to safeguard its educational endowments for the benefit of future generations, failed utterly to visualize the possibility that practically all of the funds apportioned to certain of the counties of our state might become lost through such a chain of circumstances without fault or mismanagement on the part of the county, and that therefore they did not consider the hardship which such a loss might impose on the taxpayers of certain sections of our state. It is perhaps equally probable that if the article in question were now to be framed, in the light of the experience of the last two decades, a more equitable system would be adopted to safeguard these sacred educational funds. However, if the meaning of the words used in the Constitution as adopted by our people is clear, and we think it is, our duty to declare the meaning as it there appears is plain. Constitutions will become but "scraps of paper," and "government of law" will become a matter of history, if courts fail in the discharge of this duty.
"The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it." Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) Vol. I, p. 124. Intent cannot be completely known until there is understanding of the full purpose which has prompted the framing of any document. In the instant case, there is no room for doubt as to the purpose which prompted the framers of our Constitution in using the language contained in article 8 thereof. They have stated their purpose in clear and unmistakable language, and that purpose has been approved by the sovereign people through the adoption of our fundamental charter. They state:
Article 8, § 1: "The stability of a republican form of government depending on the morality and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all; and to adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education."
And thereupon they state:
It becomes apparent at the outset that this purpose to devise a plan rendering it impossible for funds dedicated for sacred educational purposes to ever become lost or diminished, pervades the whole of the constitutional provision on that subject and must override and set aside any mere technical argument based upon particular words or even upon what may seem to be literal meanings.
The present controversy must be resolved by placing construction upon the following provisions of article 8 of the Constitution:
Section 3: "The interest and income of this fund, together with the net proceeds of all fines for violation of state laws and all other sums which may be added thereto by law, shall be faithfully used and applied each year for the benefit of the public schools of the state, and shall be for this purpose apportioned among and between all the several public school corporations of the state in proportion to the number of children in each, of school age, as may be fixed by law; and no part of the fund, either principal or interest, shall ever be diverted, even temporarily, from this purpose or used for any other purpose whatever than the maintenance of public schools for the equal benefit of all the people of the state."
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