Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pate

Citation290 Ala. 110,274 So.2d 291
PartiesJEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, v. Linda Hall PATE. SC 57.
Decision Date08 March 1973
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Spain, Gillon, Riley, Tate & Ansley and Ollie L. Blan, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.

Wheeler & Christian, Birmingham, for appellee.

McCALL, Justice.

Linda Hall Pate, the appellee, brought this action on the double indemnity agreement attached to and forming a part of a life insurance policy, issued by the appellant Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company to her now deceased husband, Thomas Attaway Pate, the named insured. He died from a shotgun wound inflicted in the upper area of the right chest. The appellant paid the appellee as beneficiary under the policy the face amount thereof but declined to pay under its double indemnity agreement. This, in essence, provides that the company will pay the beneficiary an additional amount equal to the face amount of the policy, if the death of the insured should result in consequence of bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent, and accidental means. The agreement further provides that this additional amount shall not be payable if the death of the insured results directly or indirectly from suicide or any attempt thereat whether sane or insane. The gravamen of the appellee's single count complaint is that the insured died as a result of an accident which was effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means. The insurance company pleaded in short by consent the general issue, contending that death was the result of intentional suicide. After the close of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellee for the full amount sued for, with interest added. The appellant appeals from the judgment entered on that verdict.

The appellant insists that there was not even a scintilla of evidence upon which to submit the case to the jury and that its requested affirmative charge should have been given. However, the appellant states that the real issue is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the burden of proof cast on the appellee to establish that Thomas Attaway Pate met his death as the result of accidental means and its motion for a new trial should have been granted. The issue so made necessitates our setting out a resume of the circumstances attending the insured's death.

At the time of his death, the insured was thirty-four years of age, married to the appellee, and residing with her and their three minor children at Empire, Alabama, in a neighborhood where his younger brother, another relative and several friends lived close by. There was a mortgage on his home and automobile, and he owed a loan of $1200. He had no financial troubles. He was gainfully employed by South Central Bell and had been recommended for promotion. So far as is known he was physically and mentally well, was of good personal habits, had manifested no depression or despondency, or emotional stress and had no marital or domestic bothers. On the morning prior to his death that afternoon, he returned to his home about 1:00 a. m. from his employment and went to bed. He arose around six or seven a. m. and after a visit and an automobile drive about the crops with his neighboring brother, who operated a farm adjoining him, he had some breakfast. He then sat around his house, after which he went back outside while his wife was canning corn and doing some washing. At sometime during the morning he had a can of beer, or two or three drinks of whiskey. He telephoned his employer that he would not be in for work that Saturday afternoon. He had an arrangement which allowed him to select his two off days each week. He told his wife that he was going to farm. He had his own garden and had also on occasions voluntarily helped his younger brother in his farm operation. He went fishing and hunting, during season, whenever he had an opportunity. After the telephone call to his employer, he sat in the den of the house and smoked. His wife was preparing lunch about 11:30 or 12:00 o'clock, and later about 1:00 or 1:30 p. m. while she and their nine year old son were at the table eating, the insured walked by them and went into his and his wife's bedroom. Within a few minutes, she heard a muffled sound. She was only able to crack the door and through this, she saw part of her husband's legs extended on the floor. No one was in the room when the fatal shot was fired and there were no eye witnesses to the shooting. The insured was gasping for breath and near death when the first person reached him. He was partly sitting and partly leaning against the wall with his shotgun lying along his right side with the barrel pointing toward the wall against which his back was leaning. The exact position of the gun with relation to his body varies with the testimony of the witnesses. The breach was partly open with an exploded shell sticking out of the chamber. There were powder burns on the side of the wound nearer the center of his chest. Such indicated a contact wound where the muzzle of the gun barrel was against the chest on the outward side and slightly away from the chest on the inward side toward the chest center. A live shell was found in the magazine and was ejected by rearward action of the breach lever. There was testimony that he kept his 16 gauge automatic Browning loaded on the right side, in the bedroom closet behind his wife's clothes. He kept his work clothes hung on a nail inside the closet door. Within the previous two weeks he had shot at something killing his chickens and disturbing his garden, and that morning he had said that he was going to try to catch some rabbits in his garden before he went to work. There was some testimony of a previous malfunction and misfiring of his shotgun. The coroner and detective investigating the case were unable to find anything wrong with the gun. While they were in the insured's bedroom the detective found a notebook lying on the bed. It was of a sort furnished by his employer, a number of which the insured had given his family. On the first page appeared the partly written and partly printed words 'Don't forget God.' The death certificate which was in evidence gave suicide as the cause of death and described the injury as: 'Shot self with shotgun.' The coroner and detective testified orally that in their opinion suicide was the cause of death. There was entire absence of motive shown for suicide.

There is a presumption of law against a normal and sane person committing suicide, Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Wigley, 248 Ala. 676, 29 So.2d 218 (1947); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Wetherington, 245 Ala. 313, 16 So.2d 720 (1944); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason, 229 Ala. 140, 155 So. 530 (1934); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Swink, 222 Ala. 496, 132 So. 728 (1931); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Roper, 5 Cir., 44 F.2d 897 (1930); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 213 Ala. 286, 104 So. 643 (1925); Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cobbs, 23 Ala.App. 205, 123 So. 94 (1929); Law of Evidence, McCormick, § 309, p. 643, but there are situations when the presumption is applicable and on the contrary, there are situations when the presumption has no field of operation. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Wigley, 248 Ala. 676, 29 So.2d 218; Fleetwood v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 246 Ala. 571, 21 So.2d 696, 159 A.L.R. 171. When the presumption has applicability, we have said this about its force:

'* * * It is a substantive right and not a mere 'technical incident of the trial wrought for administrative purposes.' It does not spend its force as substantive evidence until the testimony in the case is sufficient, in the judgment of the jury, to overcome it. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 213 Ala. 286, 104 So. 643.' Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n of Omaha v. Reid, 279 Ala. 136, 141, 182 So.2d 869, 873; Fleetwood v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, 246 Ala. at p. 574, 21 So.2d 696.

We have observed however that when the evidence as to suicide does not otherwise show a conflict, or conflicting inferences, the presumption against suicide is not sufficient of itself to create such a conflict. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N Y. v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383. Nor may the presumption be indulged in where evidence of suicide is direct and undisputed, and no two inferences can be reasonably drawn therefrom, if the jury believe it. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Hackworth, 200 Ala. 87, 75 So. 463.

We stated the rule more concisely in Fleetwood v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 246 Ala. 571, 574, 21 So.2d 696, 698, as follows:

'* * * If there is direct and positive evidence of suicide and there is no conflicting inference from any evidence as to suicide, then the presumption against suicide has no field of operation. On the contrary, if there is direct and positive evidence of suicide and there is a conflicting inference from any evidence as to suicide, then the presumption against suicide has a field of operation. If the evidence is all circumstantial, then the presumption against suicide has a field of operation. We may add that inference means reasonable inference and not mere speculation or conjecture. Alabama Power Co. v. Watts, 218 Ala. 78, 117 So. 425; Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Hackworth, supra (200 Ala. 87, 75 So. 463).'

The above rule is also quoted in Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Wigley, 248 Ala. 676, 678, 29 So.2d 218.

The appellant insists in brief that there was direct and positive evidence of suicide because of: (1) the certified copy of the death certificate listing the insured's death as suicide, (2) the testimony of Detective Graham and Coroner Butler expressing their opinions that suicide was the cause of death, (3) the nature of the wound, (4) the note found on the bed, 'Don't...

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4 cases
  • Brackett v. Coleman
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • May 6, 1988
    ...refused charge is substantially covered by another given charge. Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129 (Ala.1982); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pate, 290 Ala. 110, 274 So.2d 291 (1973); Nashville Broom & Supply Co. v. Alabama Broom & Mattress Co., 211 Ala. 192, 100 So. 132 (1924). Therefore, ......
  • Ott v. Smith
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1982
    ...jury charge is not error where the refused charge was fairly and fully covered by another given charge. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Pate, 290 Ala. 110, 274 So.2d 291 (1973). Plaintiff's requested charge thirty-six was also denied by the trial court. Appellant contends that this......
  • McCoy v. McCoy
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1989
    ...See Independent Life & Accident Co. v. McGee, [McGehee] 284 Ala. 394, 225 So.2d 805 (1969), and Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Pate, 290 Ala. 110, 274 So.2d 291 (1973). "The Court is further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that as of the date of plaintiff's birth as shown o......
  • Ex parte Orton
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 10, 1981
    ...an opinion but a statement of fact open to ordinary observation," and thus admissible. Moreover, in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company v. Pate, 290 Ala. 110, 274 So.2d 291 (1973), quoting Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Dennis, 17 Ala.App. 642, 87 So. 616 (1920), this Court "A witness, who......

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