Rhea v. Smith

• Decision Date: 31 May 1927
• Docket Number: No. 199,199
• Citation: 47 S.Ct. 698,274 U.S. 434,71 L.Ed. 1139
• Parties: RHEA v. SMITH
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

274 U.S. 434

47 S.Ct. 698

71 L.Ed. 1139

RHEA

v SMITH.

No. 199.

Submitted March 4, 1927.

Decided May 31, 1927.

Mr. Thomas Hackney, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner.

Mr. W. R. Robertson, of Joplin, Mo., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the validity of a lien of a judgment of the federal District Court of the Western District of Missouri sitting at Joplin, upon land of the judgment debtor in Jasper county, in that district, of which Joplin is the county seat. It turns on the question whether the law of Missouri, providing for the registration, recording, docketing, and indexing of judgments of the United States district courts for the purpose of making them liens upon land in that state, conforms to the provisions of the state law upon the same subject in refer- ence to liens of judgments of the courts of record of the state. If it does, the lien and the title of the petitioner fail, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri must be affirmed. If not, then the case must be reversed.

The suit herein was brought in Jasper county by William A. Rhea, in one count to determine title to certain real estate in that county, and in another by ejectment to recover its possession. There was a judgment for the defendant in the trial court, and he appealed. The facts were as follows:

Blanche H. Whitlock was the common source of title of the plaintiff and the defendant, and in 1921, owned the property in dispute. As plaintiff, she had brought a suit in the United States District Court for the Southern Division of the Western District of Missouri at Joplin, in Jasper county. On January 10, 1921, the suit was dismissed and the costs of the case were adjudged against her in the sum of $8,890.20. On April 5, 1921, she conveyed the property in dispute to the defendant, Thomas C. Smith, for a consideration of $5,000. On July 22, 1921, execution was issued upon the judgment in the federal court, and under it the marshal sold part of the land and conveyed it by his deed to the plaintiff, Rhea, for $200. In December, 1921, another execution was issued, under which the marshal sold and conveyed to Rhea the remainder of the land in dispute for $25. The contention of Rhea is that the judgment of the federal court is a lien on the real estate from its rendition, that he acquired title to the fee through the execution sales, and that it was superior to any title acquired by subsequent conveyance of the judgment debtor. Smith, the respondent, contended that, in the absence of a transcript of the judgment of the federal court filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Jasper county, as required by the Missouri law, the judgment was not a lien, and the conveyance to Smith, the respondent, by the judgment debtor, was free from its incumbrance. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and heard by the Second Division. One of the judges having been absent and the two judges constituting the division differing in opinion, the case was heard en banc, and a majority of the court affirmed the judgment below, two of the judges dissenting.

In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 21, 22 (6 L. Ed. 253), this court said, through Chief Justice Marshall, referring to the effect of the last clause of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, authorizing Congress to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution powers vested in any department of the government:

'That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly conferred by this clause, seems to be one of those plan propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer. The terms of the clause neither require nor admit of elucidation. The court therefore will only say that no doubt whatever is entertained on the power of Congress over the subject.'

By section 3 of the Process Act of May 19, 1828, c. 68, 4 Stat. 278, 281, writs of execution and other final process issued on judgments and decrees, rendered in any of the courts of the United States, were to be the same as those used in the courts of the state, provided, that it should be in the power of the courts, if they saw fit in their discretion, by rules of court, so far to alter final process in said courts as to conform the same to any change which might be adopted by the Legislatures of the respective states for the state courts.

The effect of this statute was considered in Massingill v. Downs, 7 How. 760, 12 L. Ed. 903, in which the question was of the validity of a lien of a judgment obtained in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Mississippi in 1839. In 1841 the state of Mississippi had passed a law requiring judgments to be recorded in a particular way in order to make them a lien upon property. It was held that the statute did not abrogate the lien which had been acquired under the judgment of 1839, although the latter had not been recorded in the manner required by the state. Mr. Justice McLean, speaking for the court, said:

'In those states where the judgment on the execution of a state court creates a lien only within the county in which the judgment is entered, it has not been doubted that a similar proceeding in the Circuit Court of the United States would create a lien to the extent of its jurisdiction. This has been the practical construction of the power of the courts of the United States, whether the lien was held to be created by the issuing of process or by express statute. Any other construction would materially affect, and in some degree subvert, the judicial power of the Union. It would place suitors in the state courts in a much better condition than in the federal courts.'

It was held, therefore, in that case, that the plaintiffs in the judgment had acquired a right under the authority of the United States, and that that right could not be affected by subsequent act of the state. This principle was affirmed in Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 217, 19 L. Ed. 134, and Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107, 12 L. Ed. 1007.

Such was the state of the law until the passage of the Act of August 1, 1888, c. 729, 25 Stat. 357, which was the first formal act to regulate fully the liens of judgments and decrees of the courts of the United States. The whole act was as follows:

'An act to regulate the liens of judgments and decrees of the courts of the United States.

'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that judgments and decrees rendered in a circuit or district court of the United States within any state, shall be liens on properly throughout such state in the same manner and to the same extent and under the same conditions only as if such judgments and decrees had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction of such state: Provided, that whenever the laws of any state require a judgment or decree of a state court to be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or any other thing to be done, in a particular manner, or in a certain office or county, or parish in the state of Louisiana, before a lien shall attach, this act shall be applicable therein whenever and only whenever the laws of such state shall authorize the judgments and decrees of the United States courts to be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise conformed to the rules and requirements relating to the judgments and decrees of the courts of the state.

'Sec. 2. That the clerks of the several courts of the United States shall prepare and keep in their respective offices complete and convenient indices and cross-indices of the judgment records of said courts, and such indices and records shall at all times be open to the inspection and examination of the public.

'Sec. 3. Nothing herein shall be construed to require the docketing of a judgment or decree of a United States court, or the filing of a transcript thereof, in any state office within the same county or parish in the state of Louisiana in which the judgment or decree is rendered, in order that such judgment or decree may be a lien on any property within such county.'

The third section was amended by the Act of March 2, 1895, c. 180, 28 Stat. 813, to read as follows:

'Nothing herein shall be construed to require the docketing of a judgment or decree of a United States court, or the filing of a transcript thereof, in any state office within the same county or the same parish in the state of Louisiana in which the judgment or decree is rendered in order that such judgment or decree may be a lien on any property within such county, if the clerk of the United States court be required by law to have a permanent office...