Hatten v. White
| Decision Date | 03 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-3093,01-3093 |
| Citation | 275 F.3d 1208 |
| Parties | (10th Cir. 2002) TIMOTHY HATTEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOE WHITE, Employee, USP Leavenworth; JUSTIN C. HARSHA, Employee, USP Leavenworth; A. FEKEKTE, Employee, USP Leavenworth, Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Submitted on the briefs.*
Timothy Hatten, appellant, Pro se.
Before: HENRY, BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Appellee's motion to publish the order and judgment filed on November 29, 2001 is granted. The published opinion is attached to this order.
Plaintiff Timothy Hatten, a prisoner in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, appeals the district court's ruling on his Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), actions against various prison employees. Hatten sought declaratory judgment and damages for the alleged mishandling of his property. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and dismissed Hatten's complaint in its entirety. We affirm.
In 1995, Hatten was transferred on a federal writ from the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, to the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida. While at the detention center, he requested that his legal property be forwarded to him. However, his counselor completed the request as one for "personal property." Because the Federal Detention Center does not accept the forwarding of personal property, it was returned to Leavenworth.
Hatten returned to the penitentiary at Leavenworth in March of 1996. However, in the interim, the Federal Bureau of Prisons had issued a new policy, No. 5580.04, which reduced the amount of personal property inmates could retain. Hatten was notified that, pursuant to the policy, he could not pick up the bulk of his personal property and that it would be mailed outside the prison. Hatten was involved in several disagreements with prison officers regarding his property, leading to the issuance of an incident report and Hatten receiving fifteen days of disciplinary segregation. While in the Special Housing Unit as the result of this charge, Hatten was involved in a second incident when he refused to consent to a strip search, which led to another fifteen-day disciplinary segregation sentence. Ultimately, all of Hatten's personal property was mailed to the address Hatten had provided for his mother.
On appeal, Hatten alleges that the district court erred in not reaching the ultimate issue of his claims -- that prison officials prematurely applied Policy No. 5580.04 because it was not in effect when he returned to prison and requested his property. The district court did not reach this issue because it dismissed part of Hatten's claims based on jurisdiction and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.
We agree with the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Hatten's FTCA claims against defendants. Hatten's complaint alleged that defendants were acting within the scope of their employment. The United States Attorney similarly certified that defendants were acting within the scope of their employment during the incidents at issue. As a result, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2679, the United States is substituted as the sole defendant for purposes of the claim.
28 U.S.C. 2680(c) provides that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to "any claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." We hold that the district court did not err in finding that 2680(c) applies where a prisoner alleges that defendant prison officials detained his personal property and mailed it outside the prison. See Crawford v. U.S. Department of Justice, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1013 (S.D. Miss. 2000). Therefore, absent...
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