Rizzo v. United States
| Decision Date | 30 August 1921 |
| Docket Number | 2644. |
| Citation | 275 F. 51 |
| Parties | RIZZO v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
John Memolo, of Scranton, Pa., for plaintiff in error.
Rogers L. Burnett, U.S. Atty., and John M. McCourt, Asst. U.S Atty., both of Scranton, Pa.
Before WOOLLEY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, District Judge.
By the first count of the indictment, Nigro, Carroll and Polino were charged with a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act (36 Stat. 825, Comp. Stat. Secs. 8812-8819) in transporting three women from New York to Pennsylvania for the purpose of prostitution. By the second count, Rizzo was charged (under section 332 of the Penal Code, 35 Stat. 1152 (Comp. St. Sec 10506)), with the offense of knowingly aiding and abetting the principals in the transaction.
Upon evidence establishing both the fact and purpose of transporting the women, the three first named defendants were convicted. They submitted to sentence. Rizzo was convicted upon evidence that after the arrival of the women in Pennsylvania he received them in his house where later they engaged in prostitution, and upon an instruction by the Court that, if he thereby enabled the other defendants to accomplish the unlawful purpose for which they had transported the women, he became a participant in the crime by aiding and abetting its perpetration and was equally guilty, although, as it was conceded by the Government, there was no evidence that he had participated in or had any knowledge of the transportation of the women from New York to Pennsylvania. Thereupon Rizzo sued out this writ, raising the question whether one can unlawfully aid and abet the commission of an offense defined by the White Slave Traffic Act when he had no knowledge of the offense.
The answer to this question turns on several considerations, the only ones we need consider being the elements of the offense and when the offense is complete.
Obviously the elements are two: (a) The interstate transportation of women (b) for the purpose of prostitution. It would be a narrow construction of the Act to hold, in order to bring the plaintiff in error within its terms, that the offense is not complete when these elements are present but is complete only when the purpose for which women were transported has been accomplished.
As the Act denounces trafficking in women for immoral purposes and forbids the employment of interstate transportation as a facility of the wrong, we are of opinion...
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Malaga v. United States
...the transportation is undertaken is within the prohibition of the Act. United States v. Brand, supra, page 850 of 229 F.; Rizzo v. United States (C. C. A.) 275 F. 51. As to whether interstate transportation for the purpose of inducing or enticing a woman to engage in "immoral practices," if......
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United States v. Dimsdale, 26310.
...immaterial, Cholakos v. United States, 6 Cir., 1924, 2 F.2d 447, cert. denied 267 U.S. 604, 45 S.Ct. 464, 69 L.Ed. 809; Rizzo v. United States, 3 Cir., 1921, 275 F. 51. The real object of the trip is the controlling consideration, United States v. Jamerson, D.C., 8 Cir., 1944, 60 F. Supp. 2......
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United States v. Long, 14524.
...is complete if made for the purpose contemplated without regard to whether later the purpose is accomplished. Rizzo v. United States (C.C. A.3) 275 F. 51; Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 570, 34 S.Ct. 347, 58 L.Ed. I conclude from the facts, therefore, that the defendant transported ......
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Cholakos v. United States
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