Healy v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 07 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.00-CV-10862-JLT.,CIV.A.00-CV-10862-JLT. |
| Citation | 275 F.Supp.2d 40 |
| Parties | Janet Frances HEALY, Plaintiff, v. William J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General of the United States of America, and Andrew Sacco, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Kevin J. Macdonald, Jamaica Plain, MA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew L. Freeman, U.S. Attorney's Office, North Windsor, CT, Barbara Healy Smith, Boston, MA, Cynthia W. Lie, U.S. Attorney's Office, Boston MA, Robert J. Stevens, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
Robert J. Stevens, Boston, MA, for U.S., William J. Henderson, Defendants.
The Plaintiff seeks relief under the Family Medical Leave Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and federal and state laws prohibiting sex discrimination, alleging that her employer and supervisor subjected her to harassment and discriminatory treatment.
In the context of the current Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, and determine whether the Plaintiff can recover under any cognizable legal theory.1
Janet Frances Healy ("Plaintiff") began her employment with the defendant United States Postal Service ("USPS") as a distribution clerk on August 24, 1987.2 Plaintiff continued in this position until February 1996 when she was transferred to a full-time, maintenance position.3 Plaintiff alleges that approximately one year after her transfer within the USPS, she was subjected to harassment and abusive treatment by various supervisory personnel of the USPS that continued until the filing of this complaint.4
In December 1996, Plaintiff was chosen from a group of four applicants for a 120 day higher-level detail to the "In Plant Support" division of the USPS.5 Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff's supervisor, Frank Lydon ("Lydon"), advised Plaintiff that he would not release Plaintiff from her current position, telling her, "I did not hire you to go on details."6 Lydon further stated, in an insulting manner, that "if `In Plant Support' wanted you for the detail, they would have waited for you and besides I heard the other girl interviewed very well."7 Upon being informed of the decision to keep her from the higher-level detail, Plaintiff requested to see a union steward.8
Plaintiff alleges that after her complaint regarding Lydon's decision, she became the target of constant criticism and vague allegations of poor job-performance from her supervisors, Lydon and Dale Horsman ("Horsman").9 Believing this behavior to be harassing and unprofessional, Plaintiff spoke to their manager, defendant Andrew Sacco ("Sacco"). Sacco informed Plaintiff that he would instruct Lydon to speak to Plaintiff in a more professional manner.10 Despite this assurance, Sacco allegedly informed another USPS employee that if the Plaintiff did not improve her attitude, he would see to it that she would be denied the opportunity to join any future details.11
After this meeting with Sacco, Plaintiff states that there was increased scrutiny of her every action. For example, Lydon and Horsman would stare at Plaintiff and constantly question her as to routine matters.12 Plaintiff's supervisors singled her out by issuing written assignments to her for each work shift, the only employee to be given such assignments.13 Her supervisors even warned other employees not to associate with Plaintiff.14
Plaintiff further alleges that this unprofessional treatment developed into sex discrimination. She claims that she was denied requested schedule changes and opportunities to make up missed time, both of which were routinely offered to her male co-workers.15
Her supervisors, Lydon and Horsman, also began timing Plaintiff's trips to the ladies' room, questioning her as to the length of time spent in there, and threatening her with disciplinary action for taking too long or for using the ladies' room at the beginning of her shift. On one occasion, upon returning from the ladies' room, Horsman aggressively questioned Plaintiff as to why she had been gone for approximately twenty minutes.16 Unsatisfied with her answer, Horsman followed through on his earlier threats and disciplined Plaintiff.17
On March 26, 1999, Plaintiff submitted a request for leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") for a condition that was on file with USPS.18 Plaintiff even filed a re-certification from her physician regarding her condition. Sacco denied her request, however.19 Sacco explained that Plaintiff was a difficult employee and he did not care what evidence Plaintiff had to support her request for leave.20
As a result of her increasingly oppressive work environment, Plaintiff began suffering from severe depression, insomnia, nightmares, vomiting, a breakdown in her marital relationship, difficulties in her relationship with her children, and other manifestations of her emotional distress — all conditions of which USPS was aware.21 In an attempt to escape the stress and to alleviate these symptoms, Plaintiff voluntarily transferred herself to a part-time position in Waltham, Massachusetts. Despite her move, Plaintiff claims Sacco contacted Plaintiff's new supervisor in Waltham to encourage the continued harassment of her.22
Plaintiff now sues the USPS for violations of FMLA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against the USPS. Plaintiff also brings this suit against Andrew Sacco, individually, for sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation, in violation of both Title VII23 and Massachusetts General Laws.24 Defendants move to dismiss the Title VII and state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Rehabilitation Act claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Counts VIII, IX, X, and XI of the Complaint allege that Defendant Andrew Sacco's actions are in violation of Title VII prohibitions against sexual discrimination (hostile environment), sexual harassment, and retaliation. Before considering the merits of the allegations, the court must first determine whether an individual may be liable under Title VII.
Title VII prohibits "an employer to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex."25 "Employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person."26 This court has noted a split among jurisdictions on the issue of whether "by including the term `agent' in the definition of the word `employer,' Congress intended to impose individual liability on those employees of the employer entity who act in a supervisory capacity . . ."27
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to definitively address this issue.28 This court, therefore, must undertake its own analysis of the significance of the term "any agent" in the definition of "employer." Statutory interpretation must begin and end with the plain language of the statute if the language "speaks with clarity to an issue."29 Upon first reading the statute at hand, the phrase "and any agent" might appear to signify that an employer and an agent may be separately liable under Title VII.30 The Supreme Court, however, has also stated, "in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."31
As noted in Chatman, "the language [of the definition of "employer"] is far from clear when read in conjunction with other provisions of Title VII."32 Title VII has several provisions that require employers to perform certain record-keeping duties.33 If the definition of "employer" were to be read literally, agents, in addition to employers, would have to abide by these guidelines, a result that does not likely seem to have been intended by Congress.34
Title VII's remedy provisions are also inconsistent with the notion that an "agent" is to be included in the definition of "employer." Title VII provides for such possible remedies as "reinstatement," and "backpay."35 Ordinarily, an agent has neither the capability nor the authority to provide such remedies, as such activities tend to be solely the responsibility of the employer.36
The language of Title VII also manifests an intent to protect small employers, as it exempts companies with fewer than fifteen employees from liability.37 Several courts have deemed it "inconceivable" that Congress would want to protect small employers yet at the same time allow liability against individual agents.38
For these reasons, this court joins the other jurisdictions (including every circuit court that has interpreted Title VII's definition of "employer"39 and the majority of District Courts in the First Circuit40) that have concluded that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability upon agents of an employer. The phrase "and any agent of such a person," was intended by Congress to establish traditional respondeat superior liability. That is, "the phrase. . .simply means that an employer is liable for acts of those employees acting within the scope of their employment, but does not extend liability beyond the employer to the individual harasser."41 The court, therefore, rejects Plaintiff's argument that individuals may be held liable under Title VII and dismisses Plaintiff's claims of individual liability against Andrew Sacco.
With the federal claims against Andrew Sacco now dismissed, the court declines to extend its ancillary jurisdiction over the state law claims against him. These claims are, therefore, dismissed.42
In Count VII of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the ...
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Edsall v. Assumption College, Civil Action No. 04-40106-FDS.
...Circuit ... have concluded that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability upon agents of an employer." Healy v. Henderson, 275 F.Supp.2d 40, 44-45 (D.Mass.2003) (collecting cases). The phrase "and any agent of such a person" was intended by Congress to establish traditional res......
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Marchant v. Tsickritzis, Civil Action No. 05-11317-NMG.
...language. Fantini v. Salem State College, No. 05-12348-RWZ, 2007 WL 922883, at *3 (March 26, 2007) (citing Healy v. Henderson, 275 F.Supp.2d 40, 45 n. 39 (D.Mass.2003) (collecting cases)). For the reasons detailed in those cases, this court recommends that the claims against the individual ......
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Martin v. Sa It Servs., Inc.
...the scope of their employment, but does not extend liability beyond the employer to the individual harasser.'" Healy v. Henderson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 (D. Mass. 2003); (quoting Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D. Mass 2000)). Here, although the Complaint alleges that ......
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Mukherjee v. Blake
...Title VII's definition of 'employer' and the majority of District Courts in the First Circuit . . . ." Healy v. Henderson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 40, 44-45 (D. Mass. 2003) (collecting cases). The court in Fantini reasoned that "[i]f Congress did not intend to protect small entities from the costs ......