Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump

Decision Date20 November 2017
Docket NumberCase No. 17–cv–00574–WHO, Case No. 17–cv–00485–WHO
Parties COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff, v. Donald J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants. City and County of San Francisco, Plaintiff, v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Jennifer Lee Taylor, Morrison & Foerster LLP, John Watkins Keker, Cody Shawn Harris, Daniel Edward Purcell, Edward Andrew Bayley, Nicholas Samuel Goldberg, Robert A. Van Nest, Keker Van Nest & Peters LLP, San Francisco, CA, Adriana Lee Benedict, Danielle Luce Goldstein, Greta Suzanne Hansen, James Robyzad Williams, Julia Blau Spiegel, Julie Wilensky, Kavita Kandala Narayan, Lawrence Javier Serrano, San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff.

W. Scott Simpson, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, VA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

William H. Orrick, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

On April 25, 2017, I entered a preliminary injunction against Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, " Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,", 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (the "Executive Order"). Preliminary Injunction Order ("PI Order")(SF Dkt. No. 82), (SC Dkt. No. 98). I concluded that the County of Santa Clara and the City and County of San Francisco had pre-enforcement standing to protect hundreds of millions of dollars of federal grants from the unconstitutionally broad sweep of the Executive Order. The federal government argued for the first time at the hearing for the preliminary injunction that the Executive Order was meant to be far more narrow than I interpreted it, a mere directive to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") that does not seek to place any new conditions on federal funds. I concluded that this interpretation was not legally plausible in light of the Executive Order's plain language, as confirmed by the administration's many statements indicating the Executive Order's expansive scope. PI Order at 14.

A month later, the Attorney General issued a two page memorandum memorializing the DOJ's interpretation (the "AG Memorandum") and asked me to reconsider the injunction. Because the AG's Memorandum does not amend the Executive Order, is not binding on the Executive Branch and suggests an implausible interpretation of Section 9(a), I denied the federal government's motion on July 20, 2017. Order Denying Reconsideration (SF Dkt. No. 146), (SC Dkt. no. 145).

Now on summary judgment, the parties have shown that there are no material facts in dispute concerning the Executive Order. This Order plows no new ground: for the reasons summarized below, and as further described in my earlier Orders, I GRANT the Counties' motions for summary judgment on the Executive Order and permanently enjoin Section 9(a).1

SUMMARY

The Executive Order, in addition to outlining a number of immigration enforcement policies, purports to "[e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law" and to establish a procedure to make "sanctuary jurisdictions" ineligible to receive federal grants. In two related actions, the County of Santa Clara and the City and County of San Francisco challenge Section 9 of the Executive Order as facially unconstitutional and have brought motions seeking summary judgment. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump , No. 17–cv–0574–WHO; City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump , 17–cv–0485–WHO. San Francisco also seeks a declaration that its laws comply with Section 1373.

The Counties argue that Section 9(a) violates the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution because it improperly seeks to wield congressional spending powers. It is so overbroad and coercive that even if the President had spending powers, the Executive Order would clearly exceed them and violate the Tenth Amendment's prohibition against commandeering local jurisdictions. It is so vague and standardless that it violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and is void for vagueness. And because it seeks to deprive local jurisdictions of congressionally allocated funds without any notice or opportunity to be heard, it violates the procedural due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.

The federal government responds that the Counties' cannot demonstrate that Section 9 of the Executive Order is invalid under all circumstances, which the federal government contends is the proper standard for a facial challenge. It also claims that the grant eligibility provision in Section 9(a) is consistent with the Constitution's separation of powers; that it is a valid exercise of the Spending Power because it is not overly coercive, does not force the Counties to take unconstitutional actions to receive the funds, and the funds bear a relationship to immigration; that the AG Memorandum clarifies the meaning of Section 9(a), eliminating its vagueness (and alternatively, the Counties' vagueness challenge impermissibly relies on speculation); and, finally, in light of the AG Memorandum, Section 9(a) does not apply to funding in which the County might have a constitutionally protectable interest (and alternatively that the federal government will apply the applicable procedures).

Section 9(a), by its plain language, attempts to reach all federal grants, not merely the three grants listed in the AG's Memorandum. The rest of the Executive Order is broader still, addressing all federal funding. And if there was doubt about the scope of the Executive Order, the President and Attorney General erased it with their public comments. The President has called it "a weapon" to use against jurisdictions that disagree with his preferred policies of immigration enforcement, and his press secretary reiterated that the President intends to ensure that "counties and other institutions that remain sanctuary cites don't get federal government funding in compliance with the executive order." The Attorney General has warned that jurisdictions that do not comply with Section 1373 would suffer "withholding grants, termination of grants, and disbarment or ineligibility for future grants," and the "claw back" of any funds previously awarded. The AG Memorandum not only provides an implausible interpretation of Section 9 (a) but is functionally an "illusory promise" because it does not amend Section 9(a) and does not bind the Executive branch. It does not change the plain meaning of the Executive Order.

The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress, not the President, so the Executive Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on federal funds. Further, the Tenth Amendment requires that conditions on federal funds be unambiguous and timely made; that they bear some relation to the funds at issue; and that they not be unduly coercive. Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves. Because the Executive Order violates the separation of powers doctrine and deprives the Counties of their Tenth and Fifth Amendment rights, I GRANT the Counties' motions for summary judgment and permanently enjoin the defunding and enforcement provisions of Section 9(a).2

BACKGROUND
I. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." See RJN, Ex. J ("EO") (SC Dkt. No. 161–10). In outlining the Executive Order's purpose, Section 1 reads, in part, "Sanctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States." EO § 1. Section 2 states that the policy of the executive branch is to "[e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law." Id. § 2(c).

Section 9, titled "Sanctuary Jurisdictions," lays out this policy in more detail. It reads:

Sec. 9. Sanctuary Jurisdictions. It is the policy of the executive branch to ensure, to the fullest extent of the law, that a State, or a political subdivision of a State, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.
(a) In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary. The Secretary has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction. The Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law.
(b) To better inform the public regarding the public safety threats associated with sanctuary jurisdictions, the Secretary shall utilize the Declined Detainer Outcome Report or its equivalent and, on a weekly basis, make public a comprehensive list of criminal actions committed by aliens and any jurisdiction that ignored or otherwise failed to honor any detainers with respect to such aliens.
(c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is directed to obtain and provide relevant and responsive information on all Federal grant money that currently is received by any sanctuary jurisdiction.

Id. § 9.

Section 3 of the Executive Order, titled "Definitions," incorporates the definitions listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1101. Id. § 3. Section 1101 does not define "sanctuary jurisdiction." The term is not defined anywhere in the Executive Order. Similarly, neither section 1101 nor the Executive Order defines what it means for a jurisdiction to ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • City of S.F. v. Sessions
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • 4 Marzo 2019
    ...granted summary judgment to prevent the Executive Order from being enforced; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump , 275 F.Supp.3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump , 897 F.3d 1225 (......
  • Oregon v. Trump
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • 7 Agosto 2019
    ...challenge to an executive order which conditioned federal funds on compliance with Section 1373 ); Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump , 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1208-11 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (same); City of Seattle v. Trump , No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *5-7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (same). Wit......
  • City of Phila. v. Sessions
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 6 Junio 2018
    ...court opinions regarding recent attempts to impose immigration enforcement priorities on localities. In County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F.Supp.3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017),14 a later decision in a case discussed in this Court's preliminary injunction memo, the district court permanently enj......
  • City of Chi. v. Sessions
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 19 Abril 2018
    ...subsequently permanently enjoined. County of Santa Clara v. Trump , 250 F.Supp.3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ; County of Santa Clara v. Trump , 275 F.Supp.3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Shortly thereafter—in the face of the failure of Congress to pass such restrictions and the issues with the legality......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: IMMIGRATION, RACISM, AND COVID-19.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 169 No. 2, January 2021
    • 1 Enero 2021
    ...at 2-3; [section][section] 2-173-020,-030. (307) [section] 2-173-042(b)(1), (c)(4). (308) See e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1205-06 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (describing similar sanctuary policies in Santa Clara and San Francisco), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. C......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT