Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. of Rochester v. Emery

• Decision Date: 13 July 1937
• Citation: 275 N.Y. 14,9 N.E.2d 758
• Parties: GOOD HEALTH DAIRY PRODUCTS CORPORATION OF ROCHESTER, N. Y., v. EMERY. VANDEVILLE v. SAME.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

275 N.Y. 14

9 N.E.2d 758

GOOD HEALTH DAIRY PRODUCTS CORPORATION OF ROCHESTER, N. Y.,

v.EMERY.

VANDEVILLE

v.SAME.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 13, 1937.

Actions by the Good Health Dairy Products Corporation of Rochester, N. Y., and Edward Vandeville against Mary C. Emery and another. From orders of the Appellate Division (249 App.Div. 795, 293 N.Y.S. 498), affirming orders of the Special Term denying named defendant's motion to file an amended answer, she appealed to the Court of Appeals, to which the Appellate Division certified a question as to whether its order was properly granted as matter of law.

Orders reversed, motion granted, and question certified answered in the negative. Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Arthur V. D. Chamberlain, of Rochester, for appellant.

Eric P. Smith, of Rochester, for respondents.

FINCH, Judge.

An automobile, owned by the defendant appellant, Mary C. Emery, and operated by her son, William E. Emery, collided with a motortruck owned by the plaintiff Good Health Dairy Products Corporation of Rochester, N. Y., and operated by the plaintiff Edward Vandeville. Both vehicles were damaged and both drivers were injured as a result of the accident. William E. Emery instituted suit in the City Court of Rochester against Vandeville and the Good Health Dairy Products Corporation. Judgments were returned in his favor against both, which judgments have been affirmed by the County Court and the Appellate Division. After the actions had been commenced by William E. Emery, but before they were tried, the plaintiffs in this action (who were the defendants in the action brought by William E. Emery) instituted this suit in the Supreme Court against William E. Emery and Mary C. Emery to recover for personal injuries and property damage to the motor truck. Mary C. Emery entered counterclaims for the property damage to her automobile. After the City Court judgments in favor of William E. Emery had been affirmed, William E. Emery and Mary C. Emery made motions to amend their answers in the Supreme Court action, to plead as an additional defense the judgments in the City Court actions as res judicata. The order was granted as to William E. Emery but denied as to the appellant Mary C. Emery. She appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed on the law and not in the exercise of discretion, and certified the following question to this court: ‘On the record was the order of the Appellate Division properly granted as matter of law?’

Liability on the part of Mary C. Emery, as owner of the automobile, is derivative and is akin to that imposed on a master for the negligent acts of his servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Vehicle and Traffic Law [Consol.Laws, c. 71] § 59. Section 59 creates a liability, but, although not enlarging the rights of an owner, does not attempt to impose liability unless the operation of the automobile has been negligent. Such liability on the part of the owner or master can arise only if the operator of the automobile is negligent. Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N.Y. 228, 105 N.E. 423. It having been adjudicated in the City Court action that the operator of the automobile owned by Mary C. Emery was not negligent as to the plaintiff Good Health Dairy Products Corporation or the plaintiff Vandeville, that question is foreclosed and the plea of res judicata is available to Mary C. Emery in suits brought against her.

The doctrine of res judicata, as generally stated, is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other actions on the points in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Despite the frequent statement that the plea is available only to parties to the prior action or their prives, and that the estoppel of the judgment must be mutual, there are a number of cases holding that to this rule there are so-called exceptions. ‘An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality has been held to exist where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit upon the same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff. See Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence [C.C.A.] 158 F. 63 where the cases are collected. * * * The cases in which it has been enforced are cases where the relation between the defendants in the two suits has been that of principal and agent, master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee.’...