Amador v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. PD-0144-08.,PD-0144-08.
• Citation: 275 S.W.3d 872
• Parties: Justin AMADOR, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

275 S.W.3d 872

Justin AMADOR, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-0144-08.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

January 14, 2009.

W. Troy McKinney, Houston, for Appellant.

Gail Kikawa McConnell, Assistant District Atty., Conroe, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

HOLCOMB, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., and PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HERVEY, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. We reverse.

The Controversy¹

On June 24, 2003, an assistant district attorney in Montgomery County presented an information in the trial court charging appellant with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated (DWI). The information alleged that, on or about June 3, 2003, appellant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while he "did not have the normal use of [his] mental and physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into [his] body."²

On January 6, 2004, appellant filed a written motion to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained as a result of an illegal, warrantless arrest "made without probable cause to believe [he] was engaged in criminal activity."³ In support of his motion, appellant cited the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.⁴

On May 7, 2004, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to suppress. At that hearing, appellant called to the witness stand the arresting officer, Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper Angela C. Fountain, and played for the court a portion of Fountain's patrol-car videotape.⁵ The State cross-examined Fountain but presented no evidence of its own. According to Fountain's testimony, on the early morning of June 3, 2003, she "work[ed] radar" in her patrol car on Interstate Highway 45. At approximately 2:30 a.m., she observed appellant's car traveling onto the Interstate "at a high rate of speed," in excess of the posted speed limit. She followed him on the Interstate about a quarter-mile, until the next exit, where they both turned off. She then activated her patrol car's overhead emergency lights. Appellant pulled into a parking lot and stopped, and Fountain stopped behind him. Fountain then exited her patrol car, approached appellant's car, and asked him for his driver's license and proof of insurance. He "was extremely slow" in responding to her requests. "He fumbled through [his wallet] and passed over his driver's license on more than one occasion, and it took some time for him to provide . . . his driver's license and insurance." In addition, "his speech was mumbled, real under his breath and mumbled." Fountain returned to her patrol car briefly to check for outstanding warrants, after which she again approached appellant's car and asked him to step out. Appellant complied but "was slower than normal" in doing so. Once appellant was out of his car, Fountain "smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his breath." She then had appellant perform three field sobriety tests, those tests being the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg-stand test.⁶ On the basis of appellant's performance on the tests, Fountain arrested him for driving while intoxicated.⁷

Fountain testified further that she did not have a warrant for appellant's arrest, that "speeding [was] not an arrestable offense" in this state,⁸ that she had been "trained in administering standard field sobriety tests," and that she had videotaped her encounter with appellant.

The portion of the patrol-car videotape that appellant played for the trial court corroborated Fountain's testimony about how appellant turned off the Interstate and pulled into a parking lot, and about how he was slow in exiting his vehicle when asked to do so. But, the portion of the tape played for the court did not depict Fountain's administration of the field sobriety tests or the manner in which appellant located his driver's license and proof of insurance and gave them to Fountain. Nor did the videotape corroborate Fountain's testimony that appellant's speech was "real under his breath and mumbled." Indeed, from what one could hear by listening to the tape, it seemed that appellant's speech was fairly normal.⁹,¹⁰ On the other hand, the portion of the tape played for the court revealed facts about which Fountain had not testified, to wit: Once appellant exited his vehicle and was standing next to Fountain, she asked him how much he had had to drink that night. He responded by denying that he had had anything to drink that night. She then asked him whether there was any reason she could smell alcoholic beverage "coming from [his] breath." He again responded by denying that he had had anything to drink.

At the close of the evidence at the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued to the court that it should grant appellant's motion to suppress because he had been arrested without a warrant and without probable cause. Defense counsel complained in particular that:

"[T]he State failed to show you other than in conclusory terms that [appellant] failed [the] field sobriety tests. They are undescribed field sobriety tests. How he did on those tests was not described to you. It wasn't my burden. It's [the State's] burden. All you heard was that he did—she did an HGN, a walk and turn test, and a one leg stand. You never even heard he failed them. I know you didn't hear why he failed them."

The State argued to the court that it should not grant appellant's motion to suppress because Fountain had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving while intoxicated:

"[Appellant] was speeding. The officer stopped him for suspicion of speeding . . . When she asked him for his driver's license, he was slow in producing it. His speech was mumbled. She asked him to step out of the car. He had an odor of alcohol on his beverage [sic]. Based on that, she had him perform field sobriety tests, and as a result of that, she had probable cause to arrest [him] for driving while intoxicated."

At the close of the parties' arguments, the trial court took appellant's motion to suppress under advisement. On June 16, 2004, the trial court informed the parties by letter that it had denied appellant's motion to suppress. The trial court did not issue any findings of fact or conclusions of law.

On September 29, 2004, appellant filed a written motion asking the trial court to reconsider its denial of his motion to suppress. On October 12, 2004, the trial court heard appellant's motion to reconsider. At that time, appellant argued:

"[T]he court reviewed the videotape, which was placed before this court in the hearing. And there is no mumbled speech on the tape. There is no slow reaction.[¹¹] So, no matter what [Fountain] said she observed or heard, it just wasn't there."

The State argued in response:

"[Fountain] said [appellant] was slow to respond, seemed to be fumbling for his license, and I think that coupled with what she perceived that evening [was] slurred speech. Now, did we hear it on the video? I can't recall if we did or not, but the quality of the video is not as good as her ears right there that night when she said she perceived fumbling with the license, slurred speech. She said when she was handing [his driver's license and proof of insurance] to him, she smelled alcohol."

After hearing these arguments, the trial court denied appellant's motion to reconsider. Immediately thereafter, appellant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, to the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated, as charged in the information. The trial court assessed appellant's punishment at confinement in the county jail for 180 days, probated for one year, and a fine of $600.

On direct appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. With respect to that claim, both appellant and the State reiterated the arguments that they made in the trial court.

The court of appeals accepted appellant's argument, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Amador v. State, 242 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007). The court of appeals, without citing any relevant authority, explained its decision as follows:

"At the suppression hearing, the trial court heard the testimony of Trooper Fountain and viewed a portion of the videotape. The videotape viewed by the court depicts the stop, but does not include the field sobriety test [sic]. We have reviewed the pertinent portion of the videotape, and find that Amador's behavior depicted in it is insufficient to demonstrate probable cause for Amador's arrest.

"Thus, the issue in this case becomes whether the State met its burden of proof through Trooper Fountain's testimony about Amador's field sobriety test [sic].

* * *

"Trooper Fountain did not expressly testify that Amador failed the field sobriety test [sic]. The State argues that we should infer that he failed the tests from Trooper Fountain's statement that she decided to arrest Amador for DWI. But, to do so would require that we speculate that the field sobriety test [sic] revealed clues that tended to show that Amador was intoxicated. We decline to do so.

"The testimony elicited by the parties at the hearing fails to demonstrate that Trooper Fountain had reasonable facts to support her decision to arrest Amador. Determining whether a reasonable police officer would conclude that Amador was intoxicated would likely require the trooper to articulate at least some of the relevant details about Amador's performance on the field sobriety test [sic].

* * *

"We conclude that the record from Amador's suppression hearing does not contain sufficient facts to demonstrate probable cause for his warrantless arrest. This record contains neither the trooper's statement of an opinion that Amador failed the field sobriety tests, nor articulable facts to demonstrate how, in...