Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, CIV
| Citation | 276 F.3d 539 |
| Decision Date | 10 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No.CIV,CIV |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2002) CARL T.C. GUTIERREZ, GOVERNOR; Y'ASELA A. PEREIRA; GOVERNMENTOF GUAM; DOES 1 THROUGH 10, PETITIONERS, v. VICENTE C. PANGELINAN, SENATOR; JOSEPH C. WESLEY, MAYOR, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED, RESPONDENTS. 00-70447 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Counsel Eric A. Heisel, Hagatna, Guam, for the petitioners.
Stephanie G. Flores, Michael F. Phillips, Phillips & Bordallo, Hagatna, Guam, for the respondents.
Samuel J. Taylor, Hagatna, Guam, for the amicus.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Guam Guam Sup. Ct. No. CV-99-00020
Before: Betty B. Fletcher, William C. Canby, Jr., and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.
At the end of the 24th Guam legislative session, the Legislature passed Substitute Bill No. 495 ("Bill 495") and adjourned. The bill was presented to Governor Carl T.C. Gutierrez during the Legislature's adjournment, and he neither vetoed nor signed it. Instead, he returned the unsigned bill to the Legislature stating that he "allowed[ ] Bill No. 495 to go into law without benefit of the signature of the Governor." Opponents of Bill 495, Senator Vicente C. Pangelinan and Mayor Joseph C. Wesley, brought this action in the Superior Court of Guam against the Governor, Treasurer Y'Asela A. Pereira and the Government of Guam, seeking a declaration that Bill 495 did not lapse into law and an injunction against implementation and enforcement of its provisions. Plaintiffs argued that the Legislature's failure to adopt procedures for receiving gubernatorial messages during its adjournment resulted in a "pocket veto." The superior court rejected Plaintiffs' arguments and entered judgment for Defendants, upholding the validity of the bill.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Guam reversed. Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, 2000 WL 263216, at *9 (Guam Mar. 10, 2000). The court held that under section 19 of the Organic Act of Guam (codified at 48 U.S.C.§§ 1423i), the Legislature's failure to adopt adequate procedures for receipt of gubernatorial messages before it adjourned resulted in a pocket veto, despite the Governor's intent to allow Bill 495 to become law without his signature. The Guam Supreme Court also held that subsequent duly-enacted laws did not ratify Bill 495.
We conclude, as an initial matter, that the Governor has Article III standing to seek relief in this court. On the merits, we agree with the Guam Supreme Court that there was a pocket veto of Bill 495 and that the bill was not ratified. Accordingly, we affirm.
On February 7, 1998, the 24th Guam Legislature passed Bill 495, with 11 votes in favor and 10 votes opposed. Bill 495 contained provisions meant to update Guam's Solid Waste Management Plan. A rider attached to Bill 495 reorganized the judicial branch of Guam's government. Later that day, the Legislature adjourned.
On February 10, 1998, Bill 495 was presented to Governor Gutierrez. On February 22, 1998, the Governor sent the bill, unsigned, to the Speaker of the Legislature. In a letter accompanying the bill, the Governor indicated he was allowing Bill 495 to lapse into law without his signature. The Legislature received the letter on the following day. The record does not reflect who received the letter.
The Legislature reconvened on February 26, 1998, nineteen days after it had adjourned. As of March 12, thirty days after Bill 495 had been presented to the Governor, he had not signed it.
The Legislature subsequently enacted two laws, both signed by the Governor, that referred to Bill 495 as a public law,1 that is, as an enacted law.
On March 18, 1998, Vicente Pangelinan, one of the ten senators who had voted against Bill 495, and Joseph Wesley, the mayor of Santa Rita, Guam, filed suit in the Superior Court of Guam, seeking a declaration that Bill 495 had not been duly enacted and an injunction enjoining its implementation. The complaint named Guam's Governor and Treasurer and the Government of Guam as defendants. The complaint alleged that the Guam Legislature, by adjourning and failing to properly designate an agent for receipt of the Governor's veto or signed bill, had "prevent[ed]" Bill 495's return by the Governor within the meaning of §§ 1423i; therefore, under §§ 1423i, the Governor's inaction resulted in the pocket veto of Bill 495.
In the superior court, Defendants challenged Plaintiffs' standing to bring this action. Defendants also challenged Plaintiffs' interpretation of §§ 1423i, arguing that the Governor's inaction had the effect of permitting Bill 495 to pass into law. The superior court determined that Plaintiffs had taxpayer standing under title 5, section 7103 of the Guam Code. Addressing the merits, the superior court identified the central question as "whether . . . the Legislature authorized an appropriate agent for the return of bills when they adjourned on February 7, 1998." The superior court held that the Legislature had authorized an appropriate agent and therefore had not "prevented" the return of Bill 495. The superior court entered judgment for Defendants.
The Guam Supreme Court reversed. Pangelinan, 2000 WL 263216, at *9. Rejecting the superior court's reasoning, the Guam Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had not established adequate procedures for the return of bills during its adjournment. Id. at *6. Thus, the Governor's failure to sign Bill 495 resulted in a pocket veto. Id. The Guam Supreme Court also rejected Defendants' alternative argument that, by acknowledging Bill 495 as a law in later enactments, the Legislature had ratified the bill. Id. at *8. Defendants then sought rehearing en banc, which the Guam Supreme Court denied. Defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this court, which we granted.
We have the authority to review decisions of the Guam Supreme Court under 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424-2. However, we must first address the threshold question of whether the Governor has Article III standing to pursue this petition in federal court.
It is doubtful that Plaintiffs would have had standing to seek relief in federal court at the outset of this case. Defendants, on the other hand, allege sufficient injury from the Guam Supreme Court's ruling to confer standing in this court.
As the Superior Court of Guam noted, state courts (and by extension, territorial courts) are not bound by Article III requirements and in state courts "standing is a self-imposed rule of restraint." Relying on a special provision of the Guam Code that confers broad taxpayer standing, the court held that Senator Pangelinan and Mayor Wesley had standing to bring this action in the territorial courts of Guam based solely on their status as taxpayers and on the fiscal effect of Bill 495. Taxpayer status alone ordinarily does not confer Article III standing to challenge general exercises of governmental power. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982). The record discloses no other basis for Plaintiffs' standing.
This does not end the standing inquiry, however. The Governor contends that his Article III standing stems from his allegations of injury from the Guam Supreme Court's decision. We agree.
In Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, the United States Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation arising from its review of the final decision of a state's highest court. 490 U.S. 605 (1989). The plaintiffs in Asarco brought a civil action in the Arizona courts, which, the United States Supreme Court concluded, the plaintiffs would not have been able to bring in the first instance in federal court. 490 U.S. at 616-17 ( ). The plaintiffs prevailed in the Arizona Supreme Court.
The defendants, petitioners before the United States Supreme Court, argued that the decree of the state's highest court had created an injury cognizable in federal court, although none had existed before the state court proceedings were complete. The Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 617-18.
The Court explained that what matters is whether"the parties first invoking the authority of the federal courts" can establish each prong of the constitutional standing requirements at the time federal court jurisdiction is invoked. Id. at 618-19. Summarizing its holding, the Court stated:
When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also met.
For purposes of determining whether a case or controversy exists here, it does not matter then whether Plaintiffs could have met federal standing requirements at the time they brought this civil action in the territorial courts of Guam. 2 Rather, we have jurisdiction if Defendants allege a specific injury from the decision of the Supreme Court of Guam.
We conclude that the Guam Supreme Court's decision causes a sufficiently "direct, specific, and concrete injury" to Governor Gutierrez to establish his standing to bring this petition.3 Our conclusion follows from the Supreme Court's decisions in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), and Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). In Coleman, members of the Kansas Senate brought a civil action challenging the...
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