Tate v. Renault, Inc.
Decision Date | 07 September 1967 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 2088. |
Citation | 278 F. Supp. 457 |
Parties | Hazel TATE, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Peggy Jean Minton, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. RENAULT, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
M. Lacy West, and T. R. Bandy, Jr., Kingsport, Tenn., for plaintiff.
H. E. Wilson, Kingsport, Tenn., for defendant.
This is a products liability action, based on the diverse citizenship of the parties, for damages for wrongful death, personal injuries and injury to property, purportedly resulting from a one-vehicle traffic accident which occurred within the jurisdiction of this Court while the plaintiff's decedent was operating an allegedly defective Renault automobile. Substituted service of process was undertaken on the defendant Renault, Inc. under T.C.A. § 48-923 et seq. By amendment to her complaint, the plaintiff seeks to assert jurisdiction in this Court under T.C.A. §§ 20-235 and 20-236, the so-called Tennessee "long arm" statutes.
The defendant appeared specially through its motion of May 1, 1967 to attack the service of process, the venue of this action and the jurisdiction of this Court, Rule 12(b) (2), (3) and (5), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff has moved to strike the defendant's aforementioned motion. The Court has permitted the parties to file affidavits and counter-affidavits on the factual issues thus placed in issue. Hereinafter, Regie Nationale des Usines Renault is referred to as Regie; Renault, Inc. is referred to as Renault; Eastern Auto Distributors, Incorporated, is referred to as Eastern; and C. M. Taylor, doing business as Downtown-Rambler-Renault as a dealer in Kingsport, Tennessee in Renault automobiles, is referred to as the dealer.
The plaintiff purchased a 1966 Renault automobile from the dealer in Tennessee. The dealer purchased this vehicle from Eastern, a Virginia corporation, which is the regional distributor of Renault automobiles in Tennessee. Eastern purchased it from Renault, a New York corporation, which is the exclusive importer in the United States of Renault automobiles. Renault purchased the car from Regie, a French corporation, which manufactured the vehicle. Renault is the wholly-owned subsidiary of Regie. Renault owns no property, has no office or employees, and neither sells nor services automobiles, in Tennessee. The plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she has been damaged as aforesaid by the negligent manufacture of this automobile and the defendant's breach of implied warranty of the vehicle.
Whether this Court has jurisdiction of the corporate person of Renault depends on Tennessee law. 28 U.S.C. § 1652. The law on the precise point does not appear to have been declared by the highest court in Tennessee, but strong dicta by the Tennessee Supreme Court is indicative that the decisional law of Tennessee will follow Restatement (2d) Torts (1965), § 402A(1) and (2). This text provides, in part, that the seller of any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused thereby to the ultimate user or his property, if the product is expected to, and does, reach the user without substantial change in the condition in which it was originally sold, even though the user has not bought the product from, nor entered into any contractual relation with, the seller. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonan (1966), 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240, 248-250 3; cf. Lee v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., D.C.Tenn. (1966), 262 F.Supp. 232, 234-236, 237 1.
T.C.A. § 20-235(b) and (d)1 provides, in pertinent parts:
This Tennessee statute is substantially identical to the Illinois "long arm" statute, Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 110, § 17. Temco, Inc. v. General Screw Products, Inc., D.C.Tenn. (1966), 261 F.Supp. 793, 797 3. Illinois courts have specifically held that the negligent manufacture of a product constitutes the doing of a "tortious act" within Illinois, where the resulting injury occurred in Illinois, that where a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another state, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products, and that the fact that the...
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...261 F.Supp. 145 (E.D.Tenn. 1966); Temco, Inc. v. General Screw Products, Inc., 261 F.Supp. 793 (M.D. Tenn.1966); Tate v. Renault, Inc., 278 F.Supp. 457 (E.D.Tenn.1967); But Cf. Fayette v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 273 F.Supp. 323 (W.D.Tenn.1967).5 Second, the Tennessee Act is substantial......
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