Austin v. Richardson
Citation | 278 S.W. 513 |
Decision Date | 25 November 1925 |
Docket Number | (No. 7442.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Parties | AUSTIN v. RICHARDSON et al. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; S. G. Tayloe, Judge.
Suit by E. W. Richardson and others against E. L. Austin and others for an injunction. Judgment for plaintiffs, and the named defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Leonard Brown, of San Antonio, for appellant.
W. B. Teagarden and Bruce W. Teagarden, both of San Antonio, for appellees.
Appellees sued appellant to enjoin him from further violating the terms of restrictions contained as covenants in a contract under which appellant held, owned and possessed certain premises in what is known as the Woods and Paschal subdivision, block 1752, facing south on East Park avenue, in the city of San Antonio. Under the covenants and restrictions in the deed under which appellant held it is alleged that the addition was platted out and put on the market for sale with the general plan and intention of making of it an exclusive residential district for private homes only, and that under these restrictions lots were sold to other persons, and expensive private residences were erected, used, occupied, and enjoyed as homes.
It was charged by appellees that during the ownership of the property in question by Rabe and Dreyfus the residence was converted into an apartment house, and that one of said apartments was continuously rented to families, thus locating two families in the building, and it was also charged against Austin that he, with his family, occupied the house, and had converted it into a boarding, lodging, and rooming house, which constituted an additional violation of the covenants.
The relief requested was a perpetual injunction against each and all defendants and their grantees, assigns, agents, and tenants, and all persons who may hold under them, from erecting or conducting an apartment house, boarding house, rooming house, or any other character of business in said house or on said lots, and from using, leasing, or renting said lots or premises for any other purpose except as a residence for a single family, and from violating any other of said covenants, and for costs, and for general and special relief.
The defendants, in separate answers, in substance, denied that the change in the building into a two residence or duplex house was a violation of the restrictions, and Austin denied that the use he was putting the house to violated any of the restrictions, and also asserted that, since the district was laid out and sold, there had been such a change in the community as would make it inequitable to enforce them.
There was a trial by the court without a jury, resulting in judgment for plaintiffs, with perpetual injunction against the things complained of, from which this appeal was perfected by defendant, Austin, only.
There were no requests made of the court to file findings of fact or conclusions of law, but that part of the decree pertinent to the issue is:
The covenants and restrictions contained in the deed were as follows:
This whole case revolves around the question as to whether or not appellant, or those under whom he holds, breached the covenant in respect to the "apartment house or other business enterprise" clause. The court found that said covenant was breached, under ample testimony.
When the house was first built it complied in all particulars with the covenants and restrictions. Subsequently Rabe began remodeling...
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