Packing Co v. Haydel

• Decision Date: 15 October 1928
• Docket Number: FOSTER-FOUNTAIN,No. 68,68
• Citation: 278 U.S. 1,49 S.Ct. 1,73 L.Ed. 147
• Parties: PACKING CO., Inc., et al. v. HAYDEL et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

278 U.S. 1

49 S.Ct. 1

73 L.Ed. 147

FOSTER-FOUNTAIN PACKING CO., Inc., et al.

v HAYDEL et al.

No. 68.

Argued April 18, 1928.

Decided Oct. 15, 1928.

[Syllabus from pages 1-3 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Wm. H. Watkins, of Jackson, Miss., W. Lee Guice, of Biloxi, Miss., and Gustave Lemle, of New Orleans, La., for appellants.

Messrs. M. M. Irwin, John Dymond, Jr., A. Giffen Levy, and Percy Saint, all of New Orleans, La., for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 3-5 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants, plaintiffs below, are engaged in the business of catching and canning shrimp for shipment and sale in interstate commerce. Appellees, defendants below, are public officers in Louisiana charged with the duty of enforcing Act No. 103, known as the 'Shrimp Act,' passed in July, 1926; so far as material here, it is printed in the margin.¹ Plaintiffs sued to enjoin enforcement of certain of its provisions on the ground, among others, that they violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The district judge granted a restraining order pending application for a temporary injunction. There was a hearing before the court, consisting of three judges, organized as required by section 266 of the Judicial Code, U. S. C. tit. 28, § 380; it set aside the restraining order and denied the injunction. Then the court allowed this appeal, found that the plaintiffs will sustain irreparable harm and damage, and stayed the enforcement of the act pending determination here.

The case has not been tried and the sole question is whether, having regard to the particular facts and circumstances, the lower court's refusal to grant a temporary injunction was contrary to some rule of equity or the re- sult of improvident exercise of judicial discretion. Meccano, Ltd., v. John Wanamaker, 253 U. S. 136, 141, 40 S. Ct. 463, 64 L. Ed. 822.

A brief statement of the allegations of the complaint follows. The Foster Company is a Louisiana corporation and operates a shrimp hulling plant in that state. It gets shrimp from the tidal waters in the 'Louisiana marshes.' The Sea Food Company is a Mississippi corporation and cans and packs shrimp in its plant at Biloxi in that state. Its product is shipped and sold in interstate commerce. The Foster Company and the Sea Food Company have a contract by which the former agrees to catch in Louisiana waters and deliver to the latter in Biloxi a carload of raw shrimp per month during specified periods. The sup- ply is intended for the interstate and foreign business of the Sea Food Company; and, if prevented from obtaining such shrimp, the business of that company will be destroyed and its plant will be of no value.

There are located at Biloxi plants comprising about one-fourth of the shrimp canning industry in the United States. The waters of Mississippi do not contain an adequate supply of shrimp and practically all that are packed there come from the Louisiana marshes. Shrimp are taken by nets dragged by power boats, and are then put on larger vessels and transported to Biloxi. To prepare the meat for canning, the heads and hulls are picked off; most of them are thrown into the water where they are consumed by scavengers of the sea. But some are made into 'shrimp bran,' which is used to a small extent in the manufacture of commercial fertilizer.

The act declares all shrimp and parts thereof in Louisiana waters to be the property of the state, and regulates their taking and reduction to private ownership. It grants the right to take, can, pack, and dry shrimp to residents and also to corporations, domiciled or organized in the state, operating a canning or packing factory or drying platform therein. Section 4. It is made unlawful to export from the state any shrimp from which the heads and hulls have not been removed. But, in order that all its inhabitants 'may enjoy the state's natural food product,' the act declares it lawful to ship unshelled shrimp to any point within the state. Whoever shall lawfully take shrimp from the waters is granted a qualified interest which may be sold within the state. And, when the tail meat is removed within the state, the taker or possessor has title and the right to sell and ship the same 'beyond the limit(s) of the state, without restriction or reservation.' It is declared unlawful to export from the state any raw shells or hulls and heads 'as they are required to be manufactured into fertilizer or used for an element in chicken feed.' But, when they have been 'conserved for the purposes herein stated, the right of property therein theretofore existing in the state shall pass to the lawful taker or the possessor thereof.' Section 13. Penalties are prescribed for violations. Section 19.

And the complaint alleges that for years shrimp taken from Louisiana waters has been shipped out of the state unshelled; that only a negligible amount of hulls and heads of such shrimp as are consumed within the state has ever been used as fertilizer; that the declared purpose to conserve them is a subterfuge. And plaintiffs state that, notwithstanding their willingness to pay all charges, licenses and taxes imposed and to comply with all the valid requirements, defendants, if not enjoined, will prevent plaintiffs from taking or acquiring shrimp from Louisiana waters to their great and irreparable loss.

At the hearing on their motion for a temporary injunction, plaintiffs presented affidavits which tend to show the facts following. By reason of favorable topographical, climatic, labor and other conditions, shrimp taken from the Louisiana marshes may be more conveniently and economically canned at Biloxi than in Louisiana near to the source of supply. The Biloxi plants have long constituted an important center of the industry, and they are largely dependent upon the Louisiana marshes for their supply. The enforcement of the act would injure or destroy the shrimp business of plaintiffs and the industry at Biloxi. About 95 per cent. of the shrimp obtained from the waters of Louisiana, when taken, is intended for consumption outside the state. Some shrimp bran is made from the hulls and heads in Louisiana; but all of it is shipped to Biloxi, where it is used to make fertilizer. It is worth less than 1 per cent. of the value of the shrimp. Not more than half the hulls and heads removed in Louisiana is used for any purpose. They have no market value, cannot be sold or given away, and often constitute a nuisance.

The facts alleged in the complaint, the details set forth in plaintiffs' affidavits and the provisions of the act to be restrained show that the conservation of hulls and heads is a feigned and not the real purpose. They support plaintiffs' contention that the purpose of the enactment is to prevent the interstate movement of raw shrimp from the Louisiana marshes to the plants at Biloxi in order through commercial necessity to bring about the removal of the packing and canning industries from Mississippi to Louisiana. The conditions imposed by the act upon the interstate movement of the meat and other products of shrimp are not intended and do not operate to conserve them for the use of the people of the state.

One challenging the validity of a state enactment on the ground that it is repugnant to the commerce clause is not necessarily bound by the legislative declarations of purpose. It is open to him to show that in their practical operation its provisions directly burden or destroy interstate commerce. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 319, 10 S. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 81, 11 S. Ct. 213, 35 L. Ed. 862. In determining what is interstate commerce, courts look to practical considerations and the established course of business. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518; Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50, 59, 42 S. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 458; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 309, 44 S. Ct. 96, 68 L. Ed. 308; Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 198, 200, 45 S. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed. 909. Interstate commerce includes more than transportation; it embraces all the component parts of commercial intercourse among states. And a state statute that operates directly to burden any of its essential elements is invalid. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 290, 42 S. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239; Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., supra, 268 U. S. 199 (45 S. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed. 909). A state is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the state. Penna. v. West Vir- ginia, 262 U. S. 553, 596, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117, 32 A. L. R. 300; Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 255, 31 S. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1193.

The authority of the state to regulate and control the common property in game is well established. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, and cases cited at page 528 (16 S. Ct. 600, 604, 40 L. Ed. 793). These and many other cases show that the state owns, or has power to control, the game and fish within its borders not absolutely or as proprietor or for its own use or benefit but in its sovereign capacity as representative of the people. In Geer v. Connecticut the court, speaking through Mr. Justice White, said (161 U. S. at page 529 (16 S. Ct. 604)):

'Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game rests have undergone no change, the development of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit...