Riggins v. Walter

• Decision Date: 05 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-3124.,93-3124.
• Citation: 279 F.3d 422
• Parties: Cortez RIGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew WALTER, Russell Ticer, T. Thomas, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

279 F.3d 422

Cortez RIGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew WALTER, Russell Ticer, T. Thomas, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-3124.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted January 5, 1995^*.

Decided May 5, 1995.

Ordered Published November 30, 2001.

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Cortez Riggins, Hillsboro, IL, Pro se.

Robert G. Toews, Office of the Attorney General (submitted), Chicago, IL, Karen L. McNaught, Office of the Attorney General, Springfield, IL, for Defendant — Appellees.

Before BAUER, RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Cortez Riggins, an inmate formerly at Menard Correctional Center, appeals the judgment in favor of the defendants, who are prison officials, in his suit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After an administrative proceeding, the prison's Adjustment Committee found that Riggins had violated 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504 Table A Nos. 601 ("Aiding and Abetting, Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy") and 203 ("Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia"). Riggins claims that the magistrate judge erred by: (1) dismissing his due process claims concerning his initial segregation for failure to state a claim, (2) granting summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim, (3) denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings as untimely, (4) rejecting two more procedural due process claims after the bench trial and (5) failing entirely to address his claim that he was punished in retaliation for the exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights. We affirm.

On September 16, 1989, Acie McLaurin was found with a balloon filled with drugs in his mouth after associating with Riggins and his family on visitation day. McLaurin told Andrew Walter, a correctional officer, that Riggins had his visitors bring in the drugs. Mrs. Gray, McLaurin's mother, told Walter that Riggins had approached her son, that her son went to join Riggins and his family, and that he had abruptly terminated their visit after returning from the group with something in his mouth. Riggins was placed in segregation and subsequently received a copy of Walter's internal disciplinary report, which referred to McLaurin and his mother only as confidential sources. Mildred DeWitt, a hearing investigator for the Adjustment Committee, later filed a hearing investigator's report.

On September 20, 1989, the Adjustment Committee convened and then granted Riggins a continuance so that he could obtain McLaurin as a witness. On October 2, 1989, the committee, which was now made up of Theodore Thomas, Larry Phipps and chairman Russell Ticer, reconvened. Riggins refused to take a polygraph in response to Ticer's request. The committee found that Riggins had violated the regulations, and he received ninety days loss of good time credit, ninety days placement in "C" grade and ninety days segregation. However, he only served two additional weeks of segregation due to crowding. Riggins subsequently filed a grievance concerning these proceedings, which was dismissed. He then filed this suit in the district court, and the parties agreed to a trial by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

Riggins appeals the dismissal of two of his claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). First, Riggins claims that Walter violated his due process rights by improperly placing him in segregation without a predeprivation hearing. Riggins' amended complaint states that Walter "punished the plaintiff by placing him... into segregation." (R. at 4.) However, one of the exhibits that he submitted to support his claim states that "I was put in segregation under investigative status." See Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (holding that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), "affidavits and exhibits attached to the complaint are a part thereof for all purposes."). Temporary confinement pursuant to 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.40, which permits the shift supervisor to place the prisoner "in investigative status or in temporary confinement pending a disciplinary hearing," constitutes administrative, not punitive detention.

Thus, the magistrate judge properly dismissed the claim against Walter because even if § 504.40 did create a protectible interest, which it does not, Woods v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir. 1990), the postdeprivation hearing sufficed to meet the demands of due process, Gilbert v. Frazier, 931 F.2d 1581, 1582 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta).¹ Second, Riggins also claims that the magistrate judge erred by dismissing DeWitt from the suit. However, Riggins' amended complaint makes no reference to DeWitt in relation to any constitutional violation.² Thus, the magistrate judge properly dismissed the claims against her.

Riggins claims that the magistrate judge erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Ticer, Thomas, Phipps and Walter³ on Riggins' Eighth Amendment claim concerning the conditions of his segregation unit cell. The defendants supported their motion for summary judgment with a deposition of Riggins, in which he admitted that, to his knowledge, none of them worked in the segregation wing. In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Riggins failed to generate a factual dispute concerning their knowledge of the conditions with any affidavits or evidence of his own with respect to that point. Tobey v. Extel/JWP, Inc., 985 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that mere denials are not sufficient to create factual controversy in the face of motion supported by evidentiary materials). Instead, he based his claim on the fact that their abuse of the system had resulted in his placement in that cell.

Although a claim under the Eighth Amendment may be based on a deprivation that occurs at the prison official's direction or with his or her knowledge or consent, Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1006 (7th Cir.1982), Riggins has failed to link these defendants to the alleged constitutional deprivation, which involves the conditions of the cell and not the institutional process that placed him in it. Even construing the facts before the court in a light most favorable to Riggins, the record contains no evidence that these defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" toward or even knew of the conditions of the cell. Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1038 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir.1985) (citation omitted)) ("The minimum intent required is "`actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable.'" "). Thus, the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment.

More than twenty-six months after the close of pleadings, twenty months after the dispositive motions deadline and two weeks after the final pretrial order, Riggins moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).⁴ A flurry of motions ensued. The magistrate judge dismissed all of the motions as untimely. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b), a magistrate judge, when authorized by district court rule, may enter a scheduling order that limits the time to file motions.⁵ Rule 16(b) states that "[a] schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the ... magistrate judge." We review the denial of the Rule 12(c) motion that was filed after the motions deadline set in the scheduling order for an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Coleman Co., Inc., 39 F.3d 749, 753-54 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by permitting summary judgment motion after deadline for good cause, despite district court's prior denial of motion as untimely under Rule 16(b)); see also 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 at 514 (1990) (stating that judge has discretion to deny Rule 12(c) motion filed after excessive delay).

Rule 12(c) states that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Two courts have relied on this language to avoid denying a Rule 12(c) motion as untimely.⁶ However, Rule 12(c) does not restrict the court's discretion under Rule 16(b). Just as we have applied Rule 16(b) to a motion pursuant to Rule 56, which states that the motion may be brought "at any time" after certain criteria are met, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Jones, 39 F.3d at 753-54, we now hold that a Rule 12(c) motion may be brought after the dispositive motions deadline if the moving party complies with the requirements of Rule 16(b) and if it will not delay trial. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that in reviewing an attempt to amend pleading after scheduling order deadline, court must first find good cause for amendment under Rule 16(b) before considering propriety of amendment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15). Both cases permitting Rule 12(c) motions on the eve of trial do not dissuade us from this interpretation. Both courts referred to changed circumstances, which they in effect interpreted as good cause for the delayed filing.⁷

In this case, Riggins never filed for leave to amend the schedule. However, assuming arguendo that his filing of the motion may be construed as filing for leave to modify the schedule, see Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (discussing split of authority concerning need of formal motion to amend), he completely fails to show cause for why the schedule could not "reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension."⁸ Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 commentary to the 1983 Amendment. Since Riggins has failed to offer any reason why he could not have filed his motion before the deadline, we affirm the magistrate judge's denial of the motion.

After the bench trial, the magistrate judge held that the members of the Adjustment Committee did not violate due process because he found "some evidence" to support their decision.⁹ Riggins claims that not enough evidence exists to...