E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente De La Autoridad

• Decision Date: 04 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-2478.,00-2478.
• Citation: 279 F.3d 49
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. UNIÓN INDEPENDIENTE DE LA AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS DE PUERTO RICO, Defendant, Appellant, Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto Rico, Rule 19 Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

279 F.3d 49

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. UNIÓN INDEPENDIENTE DE LA AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS DE PUERTO RICO, Defendant, Appellant, Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto Rico, Rule 19 Defendant, Appellant.

No. 00-2478.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard November 8, 2001.

Decided February 4, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marcos A. Ramírez-Lavandero, with whom Ramírez Lavandero, Landrón & Vera and Eduardo A. Vera-Ramírez, were on brief for appellant.

Susan L.P. Starr, Attorney, with whom Gwendolyn Young Reams, Acting Deputy General Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Associate General Counsel, and Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, were on brief for appellee Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Roberto Ariel Fernández, with whom Lespier & Muñoz-Noya, were on brief for appellee Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH,^* Senior Circuit Judge, and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

The appellant, a labor organization, challenges the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on a claim of religious discrimination. Because we conclude that the record evidence reveals a disputed issue of fact with respect to an element of the EEOC's prima facie case, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

In accordance with ordinary summary judgment protocol, we recite only the undisputed facts, unless otherwise noted.

A. Events leading to the claim of discrimination

David Cruz-Carrillo ("Cruz") is a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church who claims that the tenets of his religion prohibit him from joining a labor organization. Cruz was hired by the Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("AAA") as a temporary employee in 1986. When he applied for employment with AAA, he never disclosed that his religious beliefs forbid him from becoming a member of a labor organization. However, his application for employment at AAA reveals that Cruz attended Seventh-Day Adventist schools and graduated from a Seventh-Day Adventist college.

Defendant Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados ("UIA" or "Union") is a labor organization created in accordance with the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Act, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 61-76. UIA represents several categories of employees, including operations and maintenance workers of AAA.¹ UIA maintained a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with AAA that contains a union security clause, pursuant to which all permanent employees of the appropriate bargaining unit must belong to the Union.

On December 5, 1988, Cruz became a permanent employee of AAA. He was given written notification of the conditions under which he would be employed, including his obligation to join UIA and pay union dues. According to UIA, Cruz did not state his objection to union membership outright at that time. Instead, he objected only to specific union practices, each of which UIA contends it was willing to accommodate. For example, Cruz objected at various points to attending Saturday union meetings, joining union demonstrations or strikes, taking the Union's loyalty oath, and paying union dues. Through a series of correspondence, meetings, and administrative procedures, UIA expressed its willingness to exempt Cruz from Saturday meetings and public strikes or picketing, to paraphrase its loyalty oath to an affirmation, and to transfer his dues to a nonprofit organization (but retain the share used to pay his fringe benefits). Only after Cruz rejected these proposals, contends UIA, did he assert his objection to union membership in any form. Cruz disputes this version of events and maintains that his opposition to union membership was steadfast and unqualified.

On March 27, 1991, the Board of Directors of UIA initiated disciplinary proceedings against Cruz for his refusal to become a UIA member. At the end of these proceedings, UIA requested that AAA suspend Cruz from employment in accordance with the union security clause. Cruz appealed the resolution to the Executive Central Committee of UIA, which affirmed the proposed disciplinary measures. Cruz avers that throughout the course of these proceedings he was declared "persona non grata" by the UIA.

In July 1992, Cruz filed a grievance with the Grievance Committee of the AAA to protest the Union's decision requiring him to join in order to keep his job. The grievance was denied and, on October 11, 1993, AAA discharged Cruz for failing to comply with the union membership requirement.² Shortly thereafter, Cruz filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC.

B. Proceedings below

The EEOC filed a complaint on December 27, 1996, alleging that UIA had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, by failing to provide reasonable accommodation to Cruz's religious beliefs and by causing AAA to terminate Cruz's employment. The complaint sought both monetary and injunctive relief from UIA. The complaint also named AAA as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 to ensure that complete relief, including Cruz's reinstatement, was available. AAA then filed a cross-claim against UIA, seeking reimbursement from UIA for any costs or damages AAA might be ordered to pay pursuant to the court's resolution of the Title VII claims.³

The EEOC moved for summary judgment as to liability, arguing that the undisputed evidence established that, after Cruz informed the UIA of his religiously based opposition to union membership, UIA secured his discharge from employment under the union security clause, and failed to present evidence demonstrating that accommodating Cruz's religious beliefs would cause UIA undue hardship. UIA opposed the EEOC's motion on the ground that there remained disputed issues of fact with regard to the prima facie case of discrimination. UIA also filed its own motion for summary judgment.⁴ On December 14, 1998, the district court granted the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment and denied UIA's motion. See EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos Y Alcantarillados, 30 F.Supp.2d 217 (D.P.R.1998).

On September 26, 2000, the district court ruled on the remaining issue of damages, awarding the plaintiff $133,136.42 "in compounded prejudgment interest and backpay." The court entered judgment on October 10, 2000, ordering that "the case be dismissed." On the same day, the EEOC filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 to vacate the judgment and to enter judgment "for injunctive relief in addition to the back pay previously awarded." On October 24, while the EEOC's motion was still pending, UIA filed its notice of appeal from the October 10 judgment. On November 14, 2000, the district court entered an order agreeing with the EEOC that injunctive relief should be added to the damages award previously ordered. The court entered an "Amended Judgment Nunc pro Tunc," ordering Cruz's reinstatement in his former or equivalent position and an injunction forbidding UIA from discriminating on the basis of religion or retaliating against any employee for filing a charge on the basis of religion. UIA did not file a separate notice of appeal following the entry of the amended judgment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdictional issues

The EEOC attempts to short-circuit UIA's appeal from the outset by pressing two challenges to our jurisdiction. Though we find neither challenge persuasive, we briefly address these threshold issues before moving to the merits of the appeal.

The EEOC first draws our attention to timing of UIA's notice of appeal. UIA filed its notice after the EEOC filed its Rule 59 motion, but before the district court acted upon it. Stating "it is not clear" that we have jurisdiction over this appeal under these circumstances, the EEOC seems to intimate that UIA's notice was nullified by the EEOC's subsequent filing of a Rule 59 motion. This argument is simply anachronistic, invoking a rule followed under the pre-1993 version of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4) (1988) (superseded) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of [a motion under Rule 59] shall have no effect"); Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 177, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (holding that notice of appeal filed during pendency of Rule 59 motion was ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction). Under the version of Rule 4 currently in effect,

[i]f a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment — but before it disposes of [a motion under Rule 59] — the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered.

Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i) (1998). The newer rule eliminates the prior rule's procedural "trap for an unsuspecting litigant who files a notice of appeal before a posttrial motion or while a posttrial motion is pending." Fed. R.App. P. 4, Advisory Committee Notes (1993). UIA's notice of appeal therefore properly invokes our jurisdiction, notwithstanding the EEOC's later motion under Rule 59.

The EEOC also suggests that we lack appellate jurisdiction because the district court's October 10, 2000, judgment designated in UIA's notice of appeal does not reflect the finding of liability in the district court's September 26, 2000, opinion and order. This argument is without merit. We have "uniformly held that a notice of appeal that designates the final judgment encompasses not only that judgment, but also all earlier interlocutory orders that merge in the judgment."⁵ See John's Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., 156 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir.1998). The October 10 order was accompanied by a docket entry ordering the case closed; this entry of judgment clearly disposed of the entire...