Crabell v. Wapello Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1886 |
| Citation | 28 N.W. 56,68 Iowa 751 |
| Parties | CRABELL, ADM'R, v. WAPELLO COAL CO. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Wapello district court.
Action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's son, who was killed in the coal mine of the defendant because of the alleged negligence of the defendant. Trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.McNett & Tisdale, for appellant.
Stiles & Beaman, for appellee.
There was an entry or slope into the mine which was several hundred feet in length. When cars were loaded in the rooms they were drawn by mules to the slope, and from six to ten cars were then hitched together, and drawn out of the mine to the dump by an engine located outside the mine. The train, when so made up and hauled out, was known as the “trip,” and the person in charge was called the conductor of the trip. At the time the plaintiff's son was killed he was acting as such conductor, and was riding on the front car, which was loaded with coal.
1. It is insisted that the plaintiff cannot recover because there was, at the time of the accident, a statute in force which prohibited all persons from riding on such cars, and making it a misdemeanor to do so. The statute in question is chapter 202 of the Acts of the Eighteenth General Assembly, entitled “An act to regulate mines and mining.” It provides for the appointment of a state mine inspector, and defines his duties. The act also provides the manner of opening new mines and operating those in existence, and its primary object is the protection of mines, miners, and operators. Section 15 of the act is as follows: “Any miner, workman, or other person, who shall knowingly injure or interfere with any air-course or brattice, or obstruct or throw open doors, or disturb any part of the machinery, or disobey any order given in carrying out the provisions of this act, or ride upon a loaded car or wagon in a shaft or slope, or do any act whereby the lives and health of the persons, or the security of the mines and machinery, is endangered; or if any miner or person employed in any mine governed by the provisions of this act shall neglect or refuse to securely prop or support the roof and entries under his control, or neglect or refuse to obey any order given by the superintendent in relation to the security of the mine under his charge or control,--every such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,” and punished as prescribed in the statute.
Counsel for the appellant contend that there is no ambiguity in the statute, and that the deceased clearly comes within the language of it. They further contend that while in construing a statute the intention of the legislature should be sought, yet that no construction can be adopted which conflicts with, or renders nugatory, the language, or a material portion of it, used to express the legislative thought. On the other hand, the counsel for the appellee contend that the statute should not be so construed as to apply to a personwho is engaged in the performance of a necessary duty, and that the context and whole statute should be considered for the purpose of determining its meaning
It appears from the evidence that some person always accompanied the cars when trips were made. This was not only proper, but essential. The cars frequently got off the track, and other accidents were liable to occur, and it was the duty of the person in charge to prevent such accidents if he could, and promptly give notice to the engineer in charge of the engine, and other employes, when one occurred. At the time he was killed the deceased was employed in the discharge of such duty as directed by defendant's superintendent. The language of the statute is broad and comprehensive, and the deceased was clearly within the letter, but this does not conclusively establish that he was within the intent, of the statute. One of the cardinal rules for the construction of statutes is to search out the intent of the legislature, and adopt the sense which will be in harmony with the statute as a whole. The meaning of certain words, when read alone, may be entirely clear, but when the context is read, and the object of the statute is ascertained, there may not only be ambiguity in the particular words, but an entirely different meaning correctly adopted than would have been proper if the particular words stood alone. Another rule of construction is that a “thing within the intention is within the statute, though not within the letter, and a thing not within the letter is not within the statute unless within the intention.” Potter's Dwar. St. 144. The inquiry, therefore, is whether it was the intent of the legislature that although the decedent was in the performance of a necessary duty which the defendant required him to perform, he should be punished criminally for such act. It will be observed that a person who disturbs any part of the machinery is guilty of a misdemeanor. Does this apply to the engineer who makes necessary repairs? Clearly not. No one who obstructs or throws open doors is guilty of a crime, it matters not how necessary or essential it may...
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