Board of Ed. v. Purse

• Decision Date: 05 August 1897
• Citation: 28 S.E. 896,101 Ga. 422
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. PURSE et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

28 S.E. 896

101 Ga. 422

BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. PURSE et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia

August 5, 1897

1. A board of education having the charge and control of a system of free schools established by law, and supported by taxation, has the right to suspend from attendance school children whose parent, whether father or mother, in undertaking to call in question or interfere with the discipline of a teacher over one of these children, enters the school room of such teacher during school hours, and, in the presence of the scholars there assembled, uses offensive or insulting language to such teacher.

2. This is true, though none of the children so suspended had in fact been guilty of any violation of the rules of school.

Syllabus by the Court.

Error from superior court, Bartow county; A. W. Fite, Judge.

Petition by J. M. Purse, as next friend of her three children, against the board of education and another, for a writ of mandamus. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendants bring error. Reversed.

John W Akin, J. M. Neel, and A. M. Foute, for plaintiffs in error.

A. S Johnson and J. W. Harris, Jr., for defendants in error.

COBB J.

The official report states the facts. When a parent goes to the school room of a lawfully established public school, and, in the presence of his or her children and other pupils, publicly calls in question the justice or correctness of a decision made by the teacher in a matter of discipline relating to such children, uses offensive and insulting language to such teacher, and acts in such a manner as to interrupt the exercises of the school, and conducts himself or herself in such a manner as to bring the teacher and the discipline of the school into contempt in the eyes of the pupils, it is not only lawful but it is the duty of the authorities of the school, in the protection of the teacher whom they have placed on duty, as well as to sustain the character and discipline of the school, to exclude from the school room the children of such parent, and this, too, although those thus excluded had not been guilty of a violation of any rule of the school. The constitution of the state provides that "there shall be a thorough system of common schools for the education of children in the elementary branches of an English education only, as nearly uniform as practicable, the expenses of which shall be provided for by taxation or otherwise. The schools shall be free to all children of the state, but separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored races." Civ. Code, § 5906. The general assembly in the act intended to carry out this mandate of the constitution, and provide a system of common schools outside of incorporated towns and cities, declared that "admission to all common schools shall be gratuitous to all children between the ages of six and eighteen years, residing in the subdistricts in which the schools are located." Pol. Code, § 1378. It is also provided in the constitution that "authority may be granted *** to municipal corporations, upon the recommendation of the corporate authority, to establish and maintain public schools within their respective limits, by local taxation; but no such local law shall take effect until the same shall have been submitted to a vote of the qualified voters in each *** municipal corporation and approved by a two-thirds vote of persons qualified to vote at such election; and the general assembly may prescribe who shall vote on such question." Civ. Code, § 5909. By an act approved Dec. 24, 1888, the general assembly, under the authority of the section last quoted, made provision for the establishment of a system of public schools in the city of Cartersville, to be maintained by local taxation. Acts 1888, p. 323. The election which the constitution required having resulted in favor of the establishment of the schools, the act went into effect, and the schools thus established went into operation. The government of the schools was vested in a board of commissioners, who had "authority to establish, and from time to time modify, a system of public schools for said city of Cartersville, to be open not less than six nor longer than ten scholastic months in each year," and also "to purchase, build, enlarge, and rent buildings, appurtenances, and furniture for school purposes, to employ a superintendent or principal and other teachers, to suspend or discharge them for good causes, to prescribe the terms upon which students are to be received into said schools, and to establish such rules, regulations, and by-laws as they may deem right and proper in maintaining a system of public schools in said city: provided, the same are not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this state." It was declared that "all children between the ages of six and eighteen years, whose parents, guardians, or natural protectors bona fide reside within the corporate limits of said city, shall be entitled to the benefit of said schools." That municipal schools thus established are a part of the common-school system provided for by the constitution there can be no question, and they must therefore conform in all respects to the requirements of the constitution. It follows that the act creating the school system for the city of Cartersville must be construed as establishing schools which shall be free to all children who may lawfully enter the same in that municipality. Irvin v. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605, 13 S.E. 120.

The board of commissioners of the city of Cartersville (hereafter referred to as the board of education) adopted the following rule in reference to the admission of children into such schools: "All children residing within the limits of the city, who are not otherwise disqualified by these regulations, and who are between the ages of six and eighteen years, shall be entitled to attend the public schools of the city, the parents or guardians furnishing to the principals evidence of their citizenship, giving name and age of pupil and name of street on which they reside." Under such a system as that above outlined, beginning with the constitutional provision for a system of common schools and ending with the rule of the local school board, is the right to attend school inherent in the child? or is the purpose of the law simply to provide a place where parents may discharge the obligation which they owe to their children to give them an education? At common law it was the duty of parents to give to their children "an education suitable to their station in life,--a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the greatest importance of any." 1 Bl. Comm. 450. "The education of children in a manner suitable to their station and calling is another branch of parental duty, of imperfect obligation generally in the eye of the municipal law, but of very great importance to the welfare of the state. Without some preparation made in youth for the sequel of life, children of all conditions would probably become idle and vicious when they grow up, either from the want of good instruction and habits and the means of subsistence, or from want of rational and useful occupation. A parent who sends his son into the world uneducated, and without skill in any art or science, does a great injury to mankind as well as to his own family; for he defrauds the community of a useful citizen, and bequeaths to it a nuisance. This parental duty is strongly and persuasively inculcated by the writers on natural law." 2 Kent, Comm. 195, 196. In the case of Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, Mr. Justice Walker in the opinion says: "Parents and guardians are under the responsibility of preparing children intrusted to their care and nurture for the discharge of their duties in after life. Lawgivers in all free countries, and, with few exceptions, in despotic governments, have deemed it wise to leave the education and nurture of the children of the state to the direction of the parent or guardian. This is, and has ever been, the spirit of our free institutions. The state has provided the means, and brought them within the reach of all to acquire the benefits of a common-school education, but leaves it to parents and guardians to determine the extent to which they will render it available to the children under their charge." While the common law recognizes this as a duty of great importance, there was no remedy provided for the child in case this duty was not discharged by the parent. The child, at the will of the parent, could be allowed to grow up in ignorance, and become a more than useless member of society, and for this great wrong, brought about by the neglect of his parents, the common law provided no remedy. Not only no remedy was given to the child, but no punishment was inflicted upon the parent. In attempting to give a reason for this defect in the common law, Sir William Blackstone says: "Perhaps they thought it punishment enough to leave the parent, who neglects the instruction of his family, to labor under those griefs and inconveniences which his family, so uninstructed, will be sure to bring upon him." 1 Bl. Comm. 781. While the common law provided for apprenticing poor children, and thereby giving them some of the advantages of an education, "that rich, indeed," says the same writer, "are left at their own option whether they will breed up their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their family." This part of the common law became a part of the law of this state. Civ. Code, § 2501. The section cited declares that the father shall provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of his child, but relatively to the matter of education no provision is made for the punishment of a parent who fails to discharge this duty, or for the relief of the child who is the victim of such failure. It will...