State v. Higgins

• Decision Date: 10 December 1894
• Citation: 28 S.W. 638,125 Mo. 364
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MANNING v. HIGGINS, Recorder of Voters.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

28 S.W. 638

125 Mo. 364

STATE ex rel. MANNING v. HIGGINS, Recorder of Voters.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

December 10, 1894.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT — APPLICABILITY TO ONE CITY ONLY — LEGISLATURE — DELEGATION OF POWER TO JUDGES.

1. Act April 23, 1891, providing for the division of cities containing 300,000 inhabitants into 14 districts, to be fixed by the majority of the judges of the probate court, criminal court, criminal court of correction, and the circuit court, and for the election of justice of the peace in each district, though it was intended to apply only to St. Louis, is constitutional.

2. The act of dividing a city into a certain number of election districts is ministerial, and therefore a delegation by the legislature of such authority to the judges of certain courts is not unconstitutional, on the ground that the judicial department thereby exercises a power properly belonging to the legislative.

Mandamus proceedings by the state, on the relation of John G. Manning, against Charles P. Higgins, recorder of voters. Writ denied.

N. C. Dryden, for relator. W. C. Marshall, for respondent.

BLACK, C. J.

John G. Manning, intending to become a candidate at the November, 1894, election, for the office of justice of the peace in the Ninth district of the city of St. Louis, as that district was established by the act of April 27, 1877, obtained a certificate of nomination, signed by the requisite number of electors, and presented the same to the respondent, in his capacity of recorder of voters. Respondent refused to receive or file the certificate, assigning as a reason therefor that the act of 1877 had been repealed by the act of April 23, 1891 (Acts 1891, p. 175), and that a new district had been created. Thereupon the relator commenced this mandamus proceeding. The controversy turns upon the validity of the act of 1891, the relator insisting that it is a "special act," within the meaning of those clauses of the constitution which provide that "the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law * * * creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, townships, election or school districts"; and "in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable no local or special law shall be enacted." The first section of the act of 1877 provides that "the city of St. Louis is hereby divided into fourteen election districts for the election of justices of the peace." The same section creates the 14 districts by designating the wards which shall compose each district. The second provides for the election of justices in the several districts so created. The first section of the act of 1891 provides: "In all cities which now contain or may hereafter contain 300,000 inhabitants or more there shall be elected on the general election day of 1894 and every four years thereafter, one justice of the peace and one constable for each district in said cities, which districts shall be determined, fixed and located as hereafter provided." The third section makes it the duty of the "judges of the probate court, criminal court, criminal court of correction and the circuit court, or a majority thereof," to divide their respective cities into districts upon the basis of population as specified in the second section. All inconsistent acts and parts of acts are repealed. A majority of the judges of the designated courts performed the duty thus imposed upon them in due time. In the case of State v. Walton, 69 Mo. 556, the act of 1877 was assailed, on the ground that it was a special law, within the meaning of the constitutional clauses before quoted; but this court held it could not be a special act, because other provisions of the constitution had so separated the city of St. Louis from the former county of St. Louis as to give it an organization different from that of any county...