State v. Anonymous (1971-20)

Decision Date01 January 1971
Citation6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 583,280 A.2d 816
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

JACOBS, Judge.

This is a three-count information charging the defendant with (1) failure to keep drugs in original container (General Statutes § 19-464); (2) illegal possession of controlled drugs (§ 19-481(b)); and (3) reckless use of the highway by a pedestrian (§ 53-182).

The question raised by the motion to suppress (§ 54-33f) falls into the category of 'stop and frisk' cases which has a background of controversy and inconsistent judicial treatment. The words 'stop' and 'frisk' are convenient ways of describing certain limited intrusions. 1

The United States Supreme Court for the first time confronted the 'stop and frisk' issue in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917; and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1912, 20 L.Ed.2d 917. 2 In Terry, the anticipated crime was armed robbery; in Peters it was burglary-both serious offenses and not infrequently attended by violence; in Sibron, on the other hand, the anticipated crime involved possession of narcotics.

'Stop and frisk' has been referred to as a 'low visibility' police procedure, and it was so characterized in Sibron v. New York, supra, 392 U.S. 52, 88 S.Ct. 1889. Stop and frisk practices were investigated by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which recommended that state legislatures enact statutory provisions prescribing the authority of law enforcement officers to stop persons for brief questioning. 3 The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders agreed that guidelines for 'field interrogation' and its incidents were needed and that it was imperative for police and others to distinguish legitimate investigative procedures from somewhat similar actions of dubious legality and efficacy (often called 'aggressive preventive patrol'). 4

In Sibron v. United State, supra, the court said (p. 59, 88 S.Ct. p. 1901): 'The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case.'

The facts in the instant case are as follows: The state trooper who stopped the defendant had no arrest or search warrant. At the time, the officer had no knowledge of specific narcotic offenses or similar violations in the vicinity. The multiple-lane limited-access highway on which the trooper was driving is, in the vicinity in question, used exclusively for passenger motor vehicles; no commercial or pedestrian traffic is allowed in the area. As the trooper was proceeding northbound in the police cruiser, he 'observed the accused crossing the southbound lane * * * he was crossing the lanes, and he went on the median divider.' The officer testified, 'When he (the accused) got on the median divider, he crossed the guardrail, he crossed over; then, he crossed the northbound lanes.' The officer thereupon pulled his vehicle over to the right-hand shoulder of the northbound lane and got out of his cruiser. He was about twenty to twenty-five feet from the defendant. The officer 'called him over,' and asked him what he was 'doing out there, there is (sic) no pedestrians allowed out there, and running across the highway is reckless use of the highway by a pedestrian.' The defendant stated that he 'just hitchhiked from Massachusetts.' The officer asked the defendant to produce some form of identification, but he 'didn't have any.' He said he 'lost it.' The officer testified, 'I was going to issue (the defendant) a summons for reckless use of the highway by a pedestrian, but he had no identification.' The defendant was told 'to place his hands on the hood of the (police) car.' The officer 'patted him down for weapons.' No weapons were uncovered. The 'patting-down' did uncover narcotics.

On oral argument, the defendant conceded that the officer had probable cause to arrest him for illegal use of the highway; however, the claim was made that the officer did not have the right 'to make this intrusive kind of search that he did here.'

The reasonableness of the stop is conceded. A stop involves a temporary restraint of the person's freedom to walk away and is a seizure within fourth amendment dimensions.

The next question the court must consider calls for an analysis of the extent of the stop, both in the duration and in the scope of the questioning. The initial questioning may assure the officer that no further investigation is necessary. Conversely, the answers given by the stopped person may cause the officer to believe more strongly that something is amiss. The use of the highway by the defendant and his inability to produce identification of any kind were sufficient circumstances to alert the officer that something was amiss. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, the court said: 'Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own * * * safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons. * * *' See State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 468, 231 A.2d 353 (the action taken by the policeman should be judged by its 'reasonableness in the totality of the circumstances').

The court must proceed to consider the reasonableness of the frisk, which is a separate arate issue from that of the reasonableness of the stop.

A frisk involves the patting-down a...

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6 cases
  • State v. Legrand, AC 30577
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • June 7, 2011
    ...grounds, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009); State v. Liebowitz, 7 Conn. App. 403, 509 A.2d 43 (1986); State v. Anonymous (1971-20), 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 583, 280 A.2d 816 (1971); State v. Fausel, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CR-05-0057485 (Novemb......
  • State v. Trine
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 12, 1996
    ...the very issue before us today was addressed twenty-five years ago by the Connecticut Circuit Court. In State v. Anonymous 1971-20, 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 583, 587-88, 280 A.2d 816 (1971), Judge David Jacobs wrote: "Where, as in the case at bar, the officer does not feel an object which seems to be......
  • State v. Legrand
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • June 7, 2011
    ...grounds, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009); State v. Liebowitz, 7 Conn.App. 403, 509 A.2d 43 (1986); State v. Anonymous (1971–20), 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 583, 280 A.2d 816 (1971); State v. Fausel, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford at Milford, Docket No. CR–05–0057485, 2006 WL 4......
  • Jones v. State, 47117
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • July 28, 1972
    ......Anonymous, 6 Conn.Cir. 583, 280 A.2d 816, 819. But see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, decided June 12, 1972. The 'leafy ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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