Nogueira v. New York Co

Citation1930 AMC 763,281 U.S. 128,50 S.Ct. 303,74 L.Ed. 754
Decision Date14 April 1930
Docket NumberNo. 248,248
PartiesNOGUEIRA v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. Sol Gelb and Humphrey J. Lynch, both of New York City, for petitioner.

Mr. Edward R. Brumley, of New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this action, brought in the District Court of the United States under the Federal Employer' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59), the complaint was dismissed upon the ground that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, was applicable and afforded an exclusive remedy. Chapter 509, 44 Stat. 1424, U. S. C. tit. 33, §§ 901-950 (38 USCA §§ 901-950). The judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 32 F.(2d) 179.

The petitioner was injured on a car float of five hundred tons belonging to the defendant railroad company. The float was a vessel used in the transportation of railroad cars, and at the time of the injury was lying in navigable waters at Pier 42, East River, New York Harbor. The petitioner was employed by the railroad company as one of a gang of freight handlers in loading freight into cars on the float. He was using a hand truck in carrying a bale of paper, a piece of interstate freight, and, as the float was serveral feet lower than the dock, it was necessary to move the bale over a plank which ran from the dock to the middle of the float at a steep incline. Several men were assigned to help the petitioner in order to control the movement of the bale by handhooks. The petitioner was in front of the truck holding its handles, and alleged that, by the negligence of the other men, who failed to hold the bale properly, it got out of control and skidded down the plank, throwing the petitioner on the floor of the float and crushing his leg.

The contention is that the car float was used as an adjunct to railroad transportation in interstate commerce, and that it was not the intention of Congress to substitute the remedy under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for that afforded by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals assumed that the petitioner would have been entitled to prosecute his claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act if the later act did not apply. If the latter was applicable, the remedy thereunder was made exclusive by the explicit provision of section 5, 44 Stat. p. 1426, U. S. C. tit. 33, § 905 (33 USCA § 905).1

The general scheme of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was to provide compensation to employees engaged in maritime employment, except as stated, for disability or death resulting from injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States where recovery through workmen's compensation proceedings might not validly be provided by state law. Employers are bound to secure the payment of the prescribed benefits to those of their employees whose employment is covered by the act, and this compensation is to be payable irrespective of fault as a cause of the injury.

Employers are thus defined in section 2, subdivision (4), 44 Stat. 1425 (U. S. C. tit. 33, § 902 (33 USCA § 902)): 'The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed in Maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock.)' The term is not defined otherwise, with respect either to the nature or the scope of the enterprises in which the employer is engaged. The definition is manifestly broad enough to embrace a railroad company, provided it has employees who 'are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States.'

The employees subject to the act are not defined affirmatively, but section 2, subdivision (3), Id., contains the following limitation: 'The term 'employee' does not include a master of member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.' In this instance, the petitioner was not the master or member of the crew of the vessel, and the vessel was not under eighteen tons.

The 'coverage' of the act is stated in section 3, subdivision (a), 44 Stat. 1426 (U. S. C. tit. 33, § 903 (33 USCA § 903)):

'§ 903. (a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.'

In Atlantic Transport Company v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 34 S. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157, the libelant was engaged as a stevedore in loading a ship lying in port in navigable waters. The court had no doubt that he was performing a maritime service and that the rights and liabilities of the parties were matters within the admiralty jurisdiction. In Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, the Southern Pacific Company, a common carrier by Railroad in interstate commerce, also operated a steamship between New York and Galveston. Jensen, an employee of the company, was killed while he was engaged in unloading the ship which was berthed at a pier in the North River, New York harbor. He was operating a small electric freight truck which he drove out of the vessel upon a gang plank running to the pier. The Court of Appeals of New York (215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600, L. R. A. 1916A, 403, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 276), held that the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state applied to his employment and that the statute was not obnoxious to the Federal Constitution. In this court, two questions were presented, first, whether the Federal Employers' Liability Act was applicable and hence the state statute could not control; and, second, whether the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state conflicted with the general maritime law which constitutes an integral part of the federal law under article 3, section 2, of the Federal Constitution. Concluding that the case was not within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as the ship could not properly be regarded as a part of the railroad's extension or equipment, the court took up the second question and decided that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act could not constitutionally govern the case of one injured upon navigable waters while engaged in maritime service. It was said that the state statute attempted to give a remedy unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary proceedings of any court, and was not saved to suitors from the constitutional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal District Courts.

In State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263, 42 S. Ct. 473, 66 L. Ed. 933, 25 A. L. R. 1013, a longshoreman was injured on a dock while engaged in such a case, where the injury took that in such a case, where the injury took place on an extension of the land, the maritime law did not prescribe the liability, and the local law had always governed. The Workmen's Compensation Law of the state was accordingly held to be applicable. The distinction was thus maintained between injuries on land and those which were suffered by persons engaged in maritime employment on a vessel in navigable waters.

From the standpoint of maritime employment, it obviously makes no difference whether the freight is placed in the hold or on the deck of a vessel, or whether the vessel is a car float or a steamship. A car float in navigable waters is subject to the maritime law like any other vessel. The injury caused to petitioner in this case is thus as much within the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as was that of the employee in Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, supra, and recovery for the injury 'through workmen's compensation proceedings' could not 'validly be provided by state law.'

As the present case falls directly within the affirmative provisions of section 3 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 USCA § 903), we look next to the case specially excepted. Section 3, after the provision quoted above, continues:

No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of—

'(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or

'(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof, or of any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.'

The case of the petitioner does not come within any of these exceptions. Their limited character is significant. No exception is made of the employees of a railroad company employed in maritime service on the navigable waters of the United States or with respect to the question whether such employment was in connection with an extension of railroad transportation. As to the master and crew of a vessel, it should be noted that section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act 1920 (chapter 250, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (46 USCA § 688)), gave to seamen the rights and remedies under all statutes of the United States which were applicable to railway employees in cases of personal injury, thus carry- ing to seamen the benefit of the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Panama Railroad Company v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748; Engel v....

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