Commonwealth of Kentucky v. State of Indiana
| Decision Date | 14 April 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 16,16 |
| Citation | 281 U.S. 163,74 L.Ed. 784,50 S.Ct. 275 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. STATE OF INDIANA et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[Syllabus from pages 163-165 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Clifford E. Smith and J. W. Cammack, both of Frankfort, Ky., for complainant Commonwealth of Kentucky.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 165-167 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Hatfield & Roberts, of Evansville, Ind., Fred C. Gause, of Indianapolis, Ind., and Thomas P. Littlepage, of Washington, D. C., for other defendants.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 167-169 intentionally omitted] Messrs. James M. Ogden, Atty. Gen., Arthur L. Gilliom, of Indianapolis, Ind. and Connor D. Ross, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant State of Indiana.
Mr. Thomas P. Littlepage, of Washington, D. C., for defendants James Duane Duncan and others.
In September, 1928, the commonwealth of Kentucky and the state of Indiana, by their respective highway commissions, entered into a contract for the building of a bridge across the Ohio river between Evansville, Ind., and Henderson, Ky. The contract was approved by the Governor, and as to legality and form, also by the Attorney General, of each state. The contract recited the acts of Congress and of the state Legislatures which were deemed to authorize the enterprise. Acts of Congress of July 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 355, 356; March 2, 1927, 44 Stat. 1337; March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1398, Indiana, Act of 1919, c. 53; Act of 1927, c. 10, Kentucky, Acts of 1928, chapters 172 and 174. The state of Indiana immediately began the performance of the covenants of the contract on its part, and thereupon nine citizens and taxpayers of Indiana brought suit in the superior court of Marion county in that state to enjoin the members of the highway commission and other officers of Indiana from carrying out the contract upon the ground that it was unauthorized and void.
The commonwealth of Kentucky then asked leave to file the bill of complaint in this suit against the state of Indiana and the individuals who were plaintiffs in the suit in the state court, seeking to restrain the breach of the contract and the prosecution of that suit, and for specific performance. In its return to the order to show cause why this leave should not be granted the state of Indiana said that it had 'no cause to show'; that the state intended ultimately to perform the contract, if performance were permitted or ordered by the courts in which the litigation over the contract was pending, but that it did not intend to do so until after that litigation had finally been disposed of favorably to its performance; that the state of Indiana had entered into the contract by virtue of authority of its own statutes and of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1927; that, as there was no court having complete jurisdiction over the parties and subject-matter, other than this court, the state yielded to the jurisdiction of this court, and that it was in the public interest that an early adjudication be had which would be final and binding upon all parties interested.
Leave being granted, the bill of complaint herein was filed. It set forth the contract and the pertinent statutes, the pendency of the Indiana suit (to which the commonwealth of Kentucky was not, and could not be made, a party), that the delay in the construction of the bridge would cause irreparable injury to the commonwealth of Kentucky, and that the complainant had no adequate remedy other than through this suit. The complaint further alleged that the northern approach to the bridge would rest on and extend over Indiana soil and the southern approach would be on Kentucky soil; that the state of Indiana as well as the commonwealth of Kentucky had full authority to enter into the contract under the state statutes cited, and that the contract was also authorized by the acts of Congress to which reference was made. The complaint was later amended to correct an inaccurate citation.
Separate answers were filed by the state of Indiana and by the individual defendants. The answer of the state of Indiana admitted that the allegations of the complaint were true. The answer then averred:
After stating that, as the validity of the contract had been drawn in question in the litigation in the state court, the state did not feel warranted in proceeding until there was a final adjudication establishing its right to perform, the answer added:
The individual defendants filed an answer and, it the same time, moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that there was no controversy between the two states or between the commonwealth of Kentucky and the individual defendants; that under section 265 of the Judicial Code no injunction should be granted staying proceedings in the suit in the state court; that the proceedings involved the interpretation of the statutes and laws of Indiana; that the contract was not binding on the State of Indiana, being made without authority of law; and that the commonwealth of Kentucky had an adequate remedy at law. The answer of the individual defendants admitted the making of the contract, but denied its validity. The parties, pursuant to a stipulation moved to submit the case upon the pleadings and briefs, including the separate motion of the individual defendants to dismiss. The motion to submit was denied, the motion to dismiss was postponed, and the case was assigned for oral argument. Later, the commonwealth of Kentucky moved to strike out the answers and for a decree pro confesso.
After hearing argument, the court overruled the motion to dismiss in so far as it questioned the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the bill of complaint and to proceed to a hearing and determination of the merits of the controversy, and directed that all other questions sought to be presented by that motion be reserved for further consideration at the hearing upon the merits.
A statement of facts, to which the complainant, the defendant state, and the individual defendants agreed, was then filed. It admitted the allegations of the complaint with respect to the enactment of the various statutes mentioned and the making of the contract. It set forth that the state of Indiana by its highway commission and proper officers were 'now ready and anxious to perform said contract,' but would not do so until there was a final adjudication by the Supreme Court of Indiana or by this court; that it was of great interest and concern to both states that the litigation should be determined as early as possible, consistently with the convenience of the court; that the failure of the state of Indiana promptly to perform the covenants of the contract on its part had caused and will cause the commonwealth of Kentucky injury and damage for which no adequate remedy at law exists; and that the commonwealth of Kentucky was, and had been, 'ready, able and willing' to perform the covenants of the contract on its part. It was also stated that all the allegations made by the state of Indiana in its answer were true. There was fur- ther agreement to the effect that the blueprints and drawings filed herein correctly showed the location approved for the bridge by both states, the boundary line between the states, the location of the spans, bridge structure and approaches, the high-water lines, and the topography at the site of the bridge. It was agreed that the individual defendants were...
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