Corliss v. Bowers

Decision Date28 April 1930
Docket NumberNo. 344,344
Citation74 L.Ed. 916,50 S.Ct. 336,281 U.S. 376
PartiesCORLISS v. BOWERS, Collector of Internal Revenue
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Joseph M. Hartfield, of New York City, for petitioner.

The Attorney General and Mr. Charles E. Hughes, Jr., Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit to recover the amount of an income tax paid by the plaintiff, the petitioner, under the Revenue Act of 1924, June 2, 1924, c. 234, § 219(g) (h), 43 Stat. 253, 277 (U. S. C. tit. 26, § 960 (26 USCA § 960, note)). The complaint was dismissed by the District Court, 30 F.(2d) 135, and the judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 F.(2d) 656. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.

The question raised by the petitioner is whether the above section of the Revenue Act can be applied constitutionally to him upon the following facts. In 1922 he transferred the fund from which arose the income in respect of which the petitioner was taxed, to trustees, in trust to pay the income to his wife for life with remainder over to their children. By the instrument creating the trust the petition reserved power 'to modify or alter in any manner, or revoke in whole or in part, this indenture and the trusts then existing, and the estates and interests in property hereby created,' etc. It is not necessary to quote more words because there can be no doubt that the petitioner fully reserved the power at any moment to abolish or change the trust at his will. The statute referred to provides that 'where the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the taxable year, * * * the power to revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust, then the income of such part of the trust for such taxable year shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor.' Section 219(g) with other similar provisions as to income in section 219(h). There can be no doubt either that the statute purports to tax the plaintiff in this case. But the net income for 1924 was paid over to the petitioner's wife and the petitioner's argument is that however it might have been in different circumstances the income never was his and he cannot be taxed for it. The legal estate was in the trustee and the quitable interest in the wife.

But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid. If a man directed his bank to pay over income as received to a servant or friend, until further orders, no one...

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625 cases
  • Helvering v. Stuart
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • November 16, 1942
    ...75, 131 A.L.R. 655. In none of the cases had the taxpayer really disposed of the res which produced the income. In Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336, 74 L.Ed. 916, he had disposed of the res but with a power to revoke at any moment. This right to realize income by revocation at ......
  • Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brown
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • April 27, 1965
    ...at the very least, there must be a meaningful economic transfer in addition to a change in legal title. See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336, 74 L.Ed. 916. Thus the question posed here is not whether this transaction constitutes a sale within the terms of the Uniform Commercial......
  • 31 318 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. First Security Bank of Utah 8212 305
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1972
    ...to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.' Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378, 50 S.Ct. 336, 337, 74 L.Ed. 916 (1930). It is, of course, well established that income assigned before it is received is nonetheless taxable to the as......
  • Doll v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • May 11, 1945
    ...61 S.Ct. 144, 85 L.Ed. 75, 131 A.L.R. 655; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L.Ed. 788; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378, 50 S.Ct. 336, 74 L.Ed. 916) or benefits to him (Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119, 61 S.Ct. 144, 85 L.Ed. 75, 131 A.L.R. 655; Douglas v.......
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  • The Economic Substance Doctrine: A U.S. Anti-Abuse Rule
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
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    ...(1945)) Taxation is not so much concerned with refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property. (Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); see also Commr. v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Griffiths v. Commr., 308 U.......
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    ...that item of income will be paid. The income tax principle was first expressed by the Supreme Court in the 1930 case of Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930), where Justice Holmes stated that "[i]ncome that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own op......
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    ...naked legal title, but beneficial ownership, which carries with it dominion over the property." This conclusion followed Corliss v. Bowers, 281 US 376 (1930), in which the Supreme Court stated that "taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command......
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