Lindgren v. United States 25 28, 1929

• Citation: 281 U.S. 38,50 S.Ct. 207,74 L.Ed. 686
• Decision Date: 24 February 1930
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Parties: LINDGREN v. UNITED STATES et al. Argued Oct. 25-28, 1929
• Court: United States Supreme Court

281 U.S. 38

50 S.Ct. 207

74 L.Ed. 686

LINDGREN

v UNITED STATES et al.

No. 25.

Argued Oct. 25-28, 1929.

Decided Feb. 24, 1930.

Mr. D. A. Kelsey, of Norfolk, Va., pro hac vice, by special leave of court.

Mr. Jacob L. Morewitz, of Newport News, Va., for petitioner.

The Attorney General and Mr. Claude R. Branch, of Providence, R. I., for the United States.

Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case depends upon the construction and effect of section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,¹ which amended section 20 of the Seamen's Act of 1915² so as to provide:

'That any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal repre- sentative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. * * *'

By this Act, as heretofore construed by this Court, the prior maritime law of the United States was modified by giving to seamen injured through negligence the rights given to railway employees by the Federal Employers' Liability Act and its amendments, and permitting these new and substantive rights to be asserted and enforced in actions in personam against the employers in federal and state courts administering common law remedies, or in suits in admiralty in courts administering maritime remedies. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748; Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 46 S. Ct. 410, 70 L. Ed. 813; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 46 S. Ct. 596, 70 L. Ed. 1085; Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 47 S. Ct. 600, 71 L. Ed. 1069; Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 49 S. Ct. 75, 73 L. Ed. 220.

The Federal Employers' Liability Act,³ which was incorporated in the Merchant Marine Act by reference, related to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees in interstate and other commerce, as specified. Section 1 provided that every such carrier 'shall be liable in damages' to any employee suffering injury, 'or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.' By this section if the injury to the employee results in death his personal representative-while not given any right of action in behalf of the estate-is invested, solely as trustee for the designated survivors, with the right to recover for their benefit such damages as will compensate them for any pecuniary loss which they sustained by the death. See St. Louis, Iron M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 656, 35 S. Ct. 704, 59 L. Ed. 1160; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Co., 275 U. S. 161, 163, 48 S. Ct. 73, 72 L. Ed. 216, 59 A. L. R. 758. And if the employee leaves no survivors in any of the classes of beneficiaries alternatively designated, it necessarily follows that the personal representative cannot maintain any action to recover damages for the death, since there is no beneficiary in whose behalf such an action can be brought.

In 1926, Barford, a seaman employed as third mate on a merchant vessel owned by the United States-then lying at the port of Norfolk, Virginia, in a floating drydock of Colonna's Shipyard, Inc., in which it was being reconditioned-while working in a lifeboat swinging on the vessel's davits, was thrown on the dock by the sudden release of one end of the lifeboat and instantly killed. Lindgren, the administrator of his estate, proceeding under the Suits in Admiralty Act,⁴ filed a libel in personam against the United States in the Federal District Court for Eastern Virginia to recover damages for his death. ⁵ The libel declared specifically 'in a cause of tort and death by wrongful act;' alleged that Barford's death was occasioned by negligence and wrongdoing on the part of the United States, its officers, servants and employees in respect to the fastening of the lifeboat and various other matters; and averred that the libellant, as administrator of Bar- ford's estate, was entitled to recover, 'for and on behalf of the decedent's dependents and heirs,' damages for his death. It did not allege, however, that Barford left surviving him either a widow, child or parent, or any next of kin dependent upon him; nor that his death was caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel.

The United States unsuccessfully excepted to the libel on the ground that it 'failed to state a cause of action,' and then answered on the merits, averring inter alia, that in any event it would not be liable to damages in excess of the proved dependency of such dependents as Barford might have left surviving him.

At the hearing it was not shown that Barford left any survivor in any of the classes designated as beneficiaries by the Federal Employers' Liability Act; there being no evidence that his heirs, a nephew and niece, where dependent upon him.

The District Court found that Barford's death was caused by the negligent installation of the releasing gear in the lifeboat, which permitted it to fall and made this device unseaworthy; held that, although the administrator could not recover under the Merchant Marine Act, applying the rule under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, since the surviving nephew and niece were not dependent, he was entitled to recover under the Virginia Death Statute,⁶ which provided that a personal representative might maintain a suit for damages on account of the death of a person caused by the wrongful act of another-under which dependency was not a necessary condition and the probable earnings of the decedent might be shown; and fixed the damages under this statute at $5,000, for which the administrator was given a decree against the United States.

On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the right of action given to the personal representative of a seaman by the Merchant Marine Act for personal injury resulting in death, was exclusive and superseded the Virginia Death Statute; and since, under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act incorporated in the Merchant Marine Act, there could be no recovery, reversed the decree of the District Court and dismissed the libel. 28 F.(2d) 725.

It is clear that, as Barford left no survivors designated as beneficiaries by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the administrator was not entitled to maintain an action for the recovery of damages under the provisions of that Act, made applicable in case of the death of a seaman by section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act. But while this is not questioned by the administrator, he urges that the right of action given the personal representative by the Merchant Marine Act is not exclusive, and that it neither supersedes the right of action given him by the death statute of the State in which the injury was sustained, nor precludes his right to recover indemnity for the death under the old admiralty rules on the ground that the injuries were occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. These contentions cannot be sustained.

1. Prior to the adoption of the Merchant Marine Act the general maritime law of the United States did not authorize any recovery of damages or indemnity for the death of a seaman, whether the injury was caused by the negligence of the owner or other members of the crew or the unseaworthiness of the vessel. See The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed. 358; The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175, 23 S. Ct. 483, 47 S. Ct. 760; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 240, 42 S. Ct. 89, 66 L. Ed. 210. In this situation it was held, in the absence of any legislation by Congress, that where a seaman's death resulted from a maritime tort on navigable waters within a State whose statutes gave a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts could entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such right was given. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra, 257 U. S. 242, 42 S. Ct. 89, 66 L. Ed. 210; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479, 480, 43 S. Ct. 418, 67 L. Ed. 756.⁷ But, as said by the Circuit Court of Appeals, such statutes 'were not a part of the general maritime law' and were recognized only because Congress had not legislated on the subject.

By the Merchant Marine Act, however, the prior maritime law was modified by giving to personal representatives of seamen whose death had resulted from personal injuries, the right to maintain an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It is plain that the Merchant Marine Act is one of general application intended to bring about the uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction required by the Constitution, and necessarily supersedes the application of the death statutes of the several States. This has been determined in two prior decisions of this Court. In Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, supra, 392 of 264 U. S., 44 S. Ct. 391, 396,-the pioneer case in which the constitutionality and effect of section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act was...