Washington v. Aerojet-General Corporation

• Decision Date: 29 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 67-1873.,67-1873.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Charles E. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

282 F. Supp. 517

Charles E. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 67-1873.

United States District Court C. D. California.

March 29, 1968.

Monroe E. Price, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff.

James N. Adler and Munger, Tolles, Hills & Rickershauser, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOR DISMISSAL

HAUK, District Judge.

Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against his employer, the defendant, seeking money damages, attorney's fees and costs as a result of an allegedly discriminatory disciplinary layoff.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because of plaintiff's failure to comply with the procedural prerequisites under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and because plaintiff previously made a binding election of forums.

Defendant filed two affidavits in support of its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition supported by copies of several relevant documents, the authenticity of which were admitted by defendant. Thereafter defendant filed a Reply Memorandum and a supplemental affidavit in support of its Motion to Dismiss.

This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-5(f).¹

The uncontested facts as set forth in the complaint, the defendant's affidavits, the documents submitted by plaintiff and as admitted by plaintiff in oral argument and in his Memorandum in Opposition are relatively simple. They are set forth chronologically below.

On September 1, 1967, plaintiff Charles E. Washington, received a written reprimand and a one-month disciplinary layoff for the use of allegedly profane, foul and threatening language towards a plant security officer. On September 5, 1967, a grievance protesting the disciplinary action taken against plaintiff was filed alleging defendant's action to have been discriminatory. The collective bargaining agreement governing plaintiff's employment was between defendant and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and contains a provision expressly forbidding discrimination on the basis of race. On September 6, 1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereafter EEOC) received from plaintiff a charge alleging that he had been disciplined discriminatorily because he was a Negro. The next day, September 7, 1967, plaintiff completed a Complaint of Employment Discrimination under the California Fair Employment Practice Act, Cal. Labor Code, Sections 1410-1433, again alleging that his disciplinary layoff was the result of racial discrimination. On September 13, 1967, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, a Third Step Hearing was held between representatives of the IAMAW and defendant. Plaintiff Washington participated in the Third Step Grievance Hearing, at the conclusion of which the grievance was settled by the company and the union agreeing, with the concurrence of plaintiff Washington, that the one-month disciplinary layoff would be reduced to nine days. Washington signified his acceptance by initialling the settlement agreement and by returning to work. On September 28, 1967, the EEOC received from the staff of the California Fair Employment Practices Commission (hereafter Cal FEPC) a letter stating that the case of plaintiff Washington was "scheduled to be closed" at the Cal FEPC October 1967 meeting. Also enclosed was a staff memorandum to Commissioner Ford recommending that the case be closed because of plaintiff Washington's concurrence in the settlement reached through the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure. On October 2, 1967, the EEOC received from plaintiff Washington a request that the EEOC "assume jurisdiction of my case at this time". On October 19 and 20, 1967, the Cal FEPC met in Los Angeles and closed the Washington — Aerojet-General matter. Plaintiff Washington did not thereafter refile with the EEOC or again ask the EEOC to assume jurisdiction over his charge. The present action was filed in this Court by plaintiff on December 29, 1967.

Based upon these undisputed facts, defendant has moved the Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the action on the ground that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.²

The Court has examined the record before this Court, which includes, among other things, the plaintiff's complaint, the documents submitted by the plaintiff, and the affidavits submitted by defendant. The matter has been extensively argued by counsel, in writing and orally. The Court has reviewed all of this material and concludes that even if every alleged fact that is favorable to plaintiff were true, such facts would not establish any cause of action for the plaintiff. On the contrary, taking all the facts alleged in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and indulging every inference in support of plaintiff's allegations, it is clear that the defendant is entitled to have its Motion to Dismiss sustained.

Now having heard the arguments and having examined all the files, documents and records herein, the cause having been submitted for decision, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court renders its decision.

DECISION

Plaintiff failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC and thereby failed to comply with one of the procedural requisites to suit established by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the filing of a timely charge is a prerequisite to private civil action. Not only is this clear from the specific language of Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5, but in its First Annual Legal Interpretations prepared by the General Counsel of the EEOC and issued by the Commission itself, it is provided:

"An individual may not file suit in a Federal District Court under Section 706(e) through (g) of Title VII 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(e) through 5(g) where he has not timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." EEOC Opin.Ltr. 4/19/66.³

Similarly, in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F.Supp. 332, 338 (S.D.Ind.1967), the court held:

"The Court is convinced that no action for damages or reinstatement under the Act can be maintained by those employees of defendant who failed to file timely charges with the EEOC * * *."

The provisions of Title VII with regard to when a charge of discrimination must be filed are set forth in Sections 706(b) and 706(d) of Title VII, 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-5(b) and 5(d). Section 706 (b) provides:

"In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated * * *." (Emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 706(d) then provides:

"In the case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has followed the procedure set out in subsection (b) of this section, such charge shall be filed by the person aggrieved within two hundred and ten days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier * * *." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(d).

Since California has a state law prohibiting racial discrimination and providing a remedy for such discrimination, Cal. Labor Code, Sections 1410-1433, it is clear from the precise and mandatory language of the Federal Civil Rights Act quoted that before the timely charge can be filed with the EEOC alleging racial discrimination in California the aggrieved person must:

1. File a complaint with the California Fair Employment Practices Commission;⁴

2. Wait 60 days or until the Cal FEPC earlier terminates its proceedings;⁵ and

3. Then file with the EEOC within 30 days after the Cal FEPC notifies the aggrieved party of its termination (or within 210 days of the alleged unlawful discrimination, whichever is earlier).⁶

The Cal FEPC did not officially dispose of plaintiff's case until its meeting on October 19 and 20, 1967, and the only matters filed by plaintiff with the EEOC were plaintiff's charge received by the Commission on September 6, 1967, and his request that the EEOC assume jurisdiction received by the Commission on October 2, 1967. From these facts defendant urges that plaintiff's charge was prematurely filed and that no timely charge has ever been filed by plaintiff Washington. Plaintiff concedes, as of course he must, that both the charge received by the Commission on September 6, 1967, and the letter requesting the Commission to assume jurisdiction received by the Commission on October 2, 1967, were received by the Commission prior to the date when the Cal FEPC officially terminated its consideration of this matter. Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that his charge was timely, either (a) because the Cal FEPC should be considered to have terminated its action on September 28, 1967, when the EEOC was advised by the staff of the Cal FEPC of the staff's recommendation, or (b) because the plaintiff's actions should be construed as a matter of law as requesting that the EEOC take jurisdiction at...