Pruett v. Marshall
Decision Date | 30 September 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 18238.,18238. |
Citation | 283 F.2d 436 |
Parties | Frank PRUETT, Appellant, v. Robert Ellington MARSHALL, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Clifford Emond, Edward W. McDonald, Birmingham, Ala., for appellant.
James E. Clark, Bibb Allen, Birmingham, Ala., for appellee, London, Yancey, Clark & Allen, Birmingham, Ala., of counsel.
Before HUTCHESON, JONES and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.
Frank Pruett, the plaintiff-appellant, was injured when an automobile in which he was riding as a passenger was struck from behind by an automobile that Robert Marshall, the defendant-appellee, was driving. The accident occurred at ten in the morning, November 10, 1958, about three miles east of Irondale, Alabama, on U. S. Highway 78. At the time of the accident the day was clear. At the point of the accident the highway is straight and has four lanes, a center parkway, and wide shoulders. The evidence is undisputed that the front of Marshall's car ran into the rear of the car, operated by one Hazelwood, in which Pruett was riding. Pruett sustained serious injuries. The testimony is in hopeless conflict as to whether there was negligence on the the part of the defendant that contributed proximately to the accident. This was the only issue submitted to the jury. The jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a new trial. The trial judge1 denied the motion and granted judgment for the defendant. We affirm.
The appellant makes a number of assignments of error, but the main thrust of his argument is that on the facts there was a miscarriage of justice and that the district court should have set aside the verdict as contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The appellant, however, did not move for a directed verdict under Rule 50, F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A. When a party allows a case to go to the jury without challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by a motion for a directed verdict, the appellate court is powerless to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. This Court has said that when a litigant is content to let the case go to the jury, "having done so, and having lost before the jury, he cannot be heard later to say that the trial judge should be put in error for having submitted the matter to the jury in the first place". Stokes v. Continental Assurance Co., 5 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 893, 894. Again: "Federal appellate courts do not directly review jury verdicts but only rulings of the judge which may have affected the verdict." Baten v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 5 Cir., 1939, 103 F.2d 272, 274. See also Boudreaux v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 5 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 954; Moore v. Stephens, 6 Cir., 1959, 271 F.2d 119; Moore, Federal Practice, Section 50.05(1) (2d Ed.); Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 1081, p. 781.
An appellate court may reverse a district court for denial of a new trial based on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence only if the denial was "an abuse of discretion". It is difficult to define what constitutes an abuse of discretion. Discussing the problem in Whiteman v. Pitrie, 5 Cir., 1955, 220 F.2d 914, 919, Judge Rives, for the Court, stated:
* * *"
The plaintiff relies heavily on Indamer Corp. v. Crandon, 5 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 391, in support of his argument. We do not see this case as supporting the plaintiff's position. Judge Tuttle, for the Court, in that case discussed the rules governing appellate review of jury verdicts and motions for a new trial: 217 F.2d 391, 393. emphasis added. In the Indamer case the new trial was only a partial new trial; it was granted because the amount of damages found by the jury clearly bore no relation to the proof submitted, and the jury had been permitted to hear an improper contention on this point by the defendants' attorneys. No such situation exists here. We cannot say that there is an "absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict," such as existed in the Indamer case. On the contrary, as we read the record, there is evidence to support the jury's verdict: evidence that the plaintiff's driver created a dangerous emergency and that the accident occurred when the defendant, acting under the spur of the emergency, swerved suddenly to the wrong side to avoid a wreck.
This Court in American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Drexler, 5 Cir., 1955, 220 F.2d 930, held that where the evidence is such that fair-minded men might draw different inferences from it and reasonably disagree as to what the verdict should be, the question is for the jury. The Court of Appeals may not invade the province of the jury to find the facts merely because the members of the Court, if they had sat as the jury, might have drawn different inferences and conclusions from all the testimony. See Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 5 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 395, 401. The Supreme Court has pointed out that if there is a reasonable basis in the record for the jury's verdict, the appellate court may not weigh the conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and arrive at a conclusion opposite the one reached by the jury. The reviewing court's "function is exhausted when an evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable." Lavender v. Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916. Here, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial; no basis for reversal because of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
During the course of the trial the defendant's attorney attempted to question the plaintiff as to whether the host driver, Hazelwood, or Hazelwood's representative had made a settlement with the plaintiff. The plaintiff's attorney objected to that line of questions. The trial judge sustained the objection. The attorney for the plaintiff then and there moved for a mistrial. The trial judge overruled the motion but again said that he sustained the objection, and he instructed the jury to disregard the question stating: The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, within the ten-day period provided in Rule 59(b) F.R.C.P., itemizing thirty-eight reasons for a new trial. Reason No. 31 was the question propounded the plaintiff relating to a settlement with the host driver. Reason No. 32 was that the trial court refused to order a mistrial because of the question. Five weeks later, that is, long after expiration of the time for filing a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(b), the plaintiff's attorney filed an "amended motion", amending Reasons 31 and 34 and adding five more reasons for a new trial. The amendment to Reason 31 spells out in detail that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the alleged improper questioning. The amendment to Reason 34 adds little or nothing to the original. The other reasons in the amended motion allege that the court erred in "emphasizing" certain phrases and words in the charge; in giving certain written instructions requested by the defendant; in depriving the plaintiff of an opportunity to analyze written charges requested by the defendant; in allowing the defendant's attorney, contrary to the court's directions, to fail to furnish the plaintiff's attorney a copy of written instructions given by the court to the jury. The district court dismissed the amended motion on the ground that it was filed too late, citing Rule 59(b) and Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 10 Cir., 1947, 162 F.2d 813, and struck the motion to amend on the defendant's motion to strike. The court then overruled the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The appellant contends that these rulings were erroneous.
There is respected authority that when a motion for a new trial is made within the ten-day period for filing provided in Rule 59(b), the trial court should be able in the exercise of a sound discretion, to...
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