Williams v. Townsend

• Decision Date: 05 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 67-1086.,67-1086.
• Citation: 283 F. Supp. 580
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Walter WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Mr. TOWNSEND, etc., et al., Defendants.

283 F. Supp. 580

Walter WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Mr. TOWNSEND, etc., et al., Defendants.

No. 67-1086.

United States District Court C. D. California.

April 5, 1968.

Walter Williams, in pro. per.

John D. Maharg, County Counsel, and Jerome Zamos, Deputy County Counsel, for defendants Vince M. Townsend, Jr., Deputy Public Defender for County of Los Angeles, etc.

DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER FOR DISMISSAL

HAUK, District Judge.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss in this case which seeks damages against the defendants as a result of an alleged conspiracy by the defendants, while acting under color of State law, to deprive the plaintiff Walter Williams of certain civil rights protected under the Constitution of the United States of America.

The Complaint alleges that on or about March 27, 1967, plaintiff was being held in a "jail tank" adjacent to the Municipal Court of Los Angeles to await trial on a charge of battery in violation of Section 242 of the California Penal Code.¹ While being so held, plaintiff alleges that "Mr. Townsend" had the plaintiff and between thirty and forty other "indigent citizens" sit down and advised all of them "that it would be best to plead guilty". By virtue of "Mr. Townsend's" alleged failure to confer individually with each of the indigents, the plaintiff alleges that he was denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In addition, plaintiff alleges that the "public defender" (sic) attempted to add certain other charges against the plaintiff herein, although there is no allegation that such charges were actually added to the criminal complaint filed against plaintiff. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that, under California Government Code, § 26502,² the only county official who may draw an indictment or information is the district attorney or his deputies.

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint upon the following grounds: first, that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in view of plaintiff's failure to allege compliance with the provisions of the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, which requires the filing of a claim prior to the institution of an action against a public employee for an injury resulting from an act or omission within the scope of his employment; and, second, that the claim is now barred by the Statute of Limitations set forth in the Act. The validity of both of these contentions depends almost entirely upon whether the California Tort Claims Act of 1963 is applicable to a Federal Civil Rights suit such as plaintiff has attempted to allege here.

The Court has examined the record before this Court, which includes the Complaint, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, and plaintiff's Opposition, which is inartfully titled "amended complaint in opposition of motion to dismiss and points and authorities in support thereof", and has concluded that the plaintiff's Complaint on file herein does not state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and further concludes that, even if all of plaintiff's allegations were true, his failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act of 1963 bars recovery in this Court.

Now having heard the arguments and having examined all the files, documents and records herein, the cause having been submitted for decision, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court renders its decision:

DECISION

Prior to bringing an action against a public employee in the State of California, a plaintiff must comply with the 1963 California Tort Claims Act as Amended.

It is well established that, since Congress failed to provide a period of limitations within which an action must be brought under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, the applicable statute of limitations is that which is most applicable in the state where the cause of action arises. Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189, 98 A.L.R.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1962); Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1964); Swan v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963). It is equally clear that, where it appears that a state has more than one statute of limitations, the Federal Court must apply that statute which the state would enforce had an action seeking similar relief been brought in the state court. Smith v. Cremins, supra; Swan v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, supra; Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.Cal.1964); Funk v. Cable, 251 F.Supp. 598, 599 (M.D.Pa. 1966); Gaito v. Strauss, 249 F.Supp. 923, 931 (W.D.Pa.1966).

Prior to September 20, 1963, the effective date of the California Tort Claims Act, the three-year statute of limitations provided by Section 338(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure was held to be applicable in civil rights cases. Lambert v. Conrad, 308 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1962); Smith v. Cremins, supra; Beauregard v. Wingard, supra. In the only California appellate decision since 1963 involving facts similar to the instant action, Collins v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 456, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1966), applied the statute of limitations set forth in the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, as Amended. In view of this, the conclusion is inescapable that a Federal Court in California must now likewise apply the limitation provisions of the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, as Amended.

The California Tort Claims Act of 1963, as Amended, Government Code, § 950.2, sets forth the most applicable statute of limitations for bringing actions in the Federal Courts against public employees.

Section 950.2 of the California Government Code enacted in 1963 and Amended in 1965 provides:

"Grounds for barring cause of action.

Except as provided in Section 950.4, a cause of action against a public employee or former public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity for such injury is barred under Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) of this division or under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 945) of Part 4 of this division. This section is applicable even though the public entity is immune from liability for the injury."

Section 950.2, as originally enacted in 1963, was amended in 1965. The purpose of that amendment is explained in the Comment provided by the California Law Revision Commission found in the annotated versions of the Government Code. That comment reads as follows:

"Comment on 1965 amendment:

"This amendment makes it clear that suit against a public employee or former employee is barred when a suit against the entity is barred (1) by failure to present any claim at all or (2) by presenting a claim that is insufficient, too late or for any other reason inadequate to support an action against the employing public entity. (The blanket reference to Part 3 makes the rule stated in this section applicable as well to contractual claims procedures (see Section 930 et seq.) and local ordinance or charter claims procedures (see Section 935).) Likewise, if suit against a public entity is barred by the applicable statute of limitations or by any other provision in Chapter 2 of Part 4 dealing with actions against public entities, suit against the public employee or former employee is also barred.

"The addition of the last sentence to this section eliminates an existing ambiguity by providing that the presentation of a claim to the employing public entity is a prerequisite to suit against an employee notwithstanding the fact that the applicable substantive law may declare the entity to be immune from liability for the injury. Because the employing public entity is financially responsible for judgments against its employees (see Section 825), the presentation of a claim is required in all cases." West's Annotated Gov.Code (1966), vol. 32, pp. 382-383.

This section, therefore, requires the presentation of a claim to the public entity in all cases, even where the action is filed against the public employee, himself, for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment. Compliance with this requirement of filing a claim is an integral part of the plaintiff's cause of action that must be pleaded and proved by him. Kitchen v. Delafield, 221 Cal.App.2d 114, 118, 34 Cal.Rptr. 288 (1963); Illerbrun v. Conrad, 216 Cal.App.2d 521, 524, 31 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1963); Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability, California Practice Book No. 24, Continuing Education of the Bar, Sections 10.3, 10.7 and 10.9, pp. 435-441.

Turning now to the time element, we find that the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, California Government Code, Section 911.2 reads:

"Time for presentation of claims.

A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) of this chapter not later than the 100th day after the accrual of the cause of action. A claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915 of this chapter not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action."

Section 810.8 of the California Government Code defines "injury" as meaning "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private person." It should be noted that this language contrasts sharply with the language of the former sections of the Government Code which carefully confined the right of recovery to damages caused by negligence or carelessness. The new section now makes it clear that the distinction between claims based on negligence and intentional torts has been...