United States v. Macintosh

• Decision Date: 25 May 1931
• Docket Number: No. 504,504
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MACINTOSH
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

283 U.S. 605

51 S.Ct. 570

75 L.Ed. 1302

UNITED STATES

v MACINTOSH.

No. 504.

Argued April 27, 1931.

Decided May 25, 1931.

[Syllabus from pages 605-607 intentionally omitted] The Attorney General and Mrs. Thomas D. Thacher, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 607-609 intentionally omitted] Mr. John W. Davis, of New York City, for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 610-612 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent was born in the Dominion of Canada. He came to the United States in 1916, and in 1925 declared his intention to become a citizen. His petition for naturalization was presented to the federal District Court for Connecticut, and that court, after hearing and consideration, denied the application upon the ground that, since petitioner would not promise in advance to bear arms in defense of the United States unless he believed the war to be morally justified, he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree and directed the District Court to admit respondent to citizenship. 42 F.(2d) 845.

The Naturalization Act, § 4, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (U. S. C. title 8, § 372 et seq. (8 USCA § 372 et seq.)), provides that an alien may be admitted to citizenship in the manner therein provided and not otherwise. By section 3 of the same act, jurisdiction to naturalize aliens is conferred upon the District Courts of the United States and other enumerated courts of record. U. S. C. title 8, § 357 (8 USCA § 357). The applicant is required to make and file a preliminary declaration in writing setting forth, among other things, his intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce all allegiance to any foreign prince, etc. Section 4 of the act (U. S. C. title 8, §§ 381, 382 (8 USCA §§ 381, 382)) provides:

'Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and that he absolutely and entirely renounces and ajure § all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same.

'Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States, five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least, and that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. In addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States, as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be required. * * *'

Section 9 of the act, 34 Stat. 599 (U. S. C. title 8, § 398 (8 USCA § 398)), requires that every final hearing upon a petition for naturalization shall be had in open court; that every final order upon the petition shall be under the hand of the court; and that 'upon such final hearing of such petition the applicant and witnesses shall be examined under oath before the court and in the presence of the court.' By section 11, 34 Stat. 599 (U. S. C. title 8, § 399 (8 USCA § 399), it is provided that the United States shall have the right to appear in the proceeding for the purpose of cross-examining the petitioner and witnesses produced in support of the petition 'concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting his right to admission to citizenship, and shall have the right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard in opposition to the granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings.'

By the petition for naturalization, a case is presented for the exercise of the judicial power under the Constitution, to which the United States is a proper, and always a possible, adverse party. Tutum v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 576, 577, 46 S. Ct. 425, 70 L. Ed. 738.

Naturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified, or withheld as Congress may determine, and which the alien may claim as of right only upon compliance with the terms which Congress imposes. That Congress regarded the admission to citizenship as a serious matter is apparent from the conditions and precautions with which it carefully surrounded the subject. Thus, among other provisions, it is required that the applicant not only shall reside continuously within the United States for a period of at least five years immediately preceding his application, but shall make a preliminary declaration of his intention to become a citizen at least two years prior to his admission. He must produce the testimony of witnesses as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution, and in open court take an oath renouncing his former allegiance and pleading future allegiance to the United States. At the final hearing in open court, he and his witnesses must be examined under oath, and the government may appear for the purpose of cross-examining in respect of 'any matter touching or in any way affecting his right to admission,' introduce countervailing evidence, and be heard in opposition.

In specifically requiring that the court shall be satisfied that the applicant, during his residence in the United States, has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, etc., it is obvious that Congress regarded the fact of good character and the fact of attachment to the principles of the Constitution as matters of the first importance. The applicant' beh avior is significant to the extent that it tends to establish or negative these facts.

But proof of good behavior does not close the inquiry. Why does the statute require examination of the applicant and witnesses in open court and under oath, and for what purpose is the government authorized to cross-examine concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the right of naturalization? Clearly, it would seem, in order that the court and the government, whose power and duty in that respect these provisions take for granted, may discover whether the applicant is fitted for citizenship-and to that end, by actual inquiry, ascertain, among other things, whether he has intelligence and good character; whether his oath to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same, will be taken without mental reservation or purpose inconsistent therewith; whether his views are compatible with the obligations and duties of American citizenship; whether he will upon his own part observe the laws of the land; whether he is willing to support the government in time of war, as well as in time of peace, and to assist in the defense of the country, not to the extent or in the manner that he may choose, but to such extent and in such manner as he lawfully may be required to do. These, at least, are matters which are of the essence of the statutory requirements, and in respect of which the mind and conscience of the applicant may be probed by pertinent inquiries, as fully as the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may conclude is necessary.

The settled practice of the courts having jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings has, from the beginning, been in accordance with this view. In re Bodek (C. C.) 63 F. 813; In re Meakins (D. C.) 164 F. 334; In re Mudarri (C. C.) 176 F. 465, 466; In re Ross (C. C.) 188 F. 685; United States v. Bressi (D. C.) 208 F. 369, 372; Schurmann v. United States (C. C. A.) 264 F. 917, 920, 18 A. L. R. 1182; In re Sigelman (D. C.) 268 F. 217. And it finds support in the decisions of this court. As early as 1830, in Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 407, 7 L. Ed. 897, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said:

'The various acts upon the subject submit the decision on the right of aliens to admission as citizens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact.' United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 649, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889.

With the foregoing statutory provisions and the scope of the powers and duties of the courts of first instance in respect thereof in mind, we come to a consideration of the case now before us. The applicant had complied with all the formal requirements of the law, and his personal character and conduct were shown to be good in all respects. His right to naturalization turns altogether upon the effect to be given to certain answers and qualifying statements made in response to interrogatories propounded to him.

Upon the preliminary form for petition for naturalization, the following questions, among others, appear: '20. Have you read the following oath of allegiance? (which is then quoted). Are you willing to take this oath in becoming a citizen?' '22. If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?' In response to the questions designated 20, he answered 'Yes.' In response to the question designated 22, he answered, 'Yes; but I should want to be free to judge of the neces- sity.' By a written memorandum subsequently filed, he amplified these answers as follows:

'20 and 22. I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests of my country, but only in so far as I can believe that this is not going to be against the best interests of humanity in the long run. I do...