Eastman v. Coffeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg. LLC

• Decision Date: 07 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 105,805.,105,805.
• Citation: 284 P.3d 1049
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Parties: Benjamin M. EASTMAN and Marcita K. Eastman, as Trustees of the Eastman Family 1999 Revocable Trust, Plaintiffs, v. COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES REFINING & MARKETING LLC, Defendant.

284 P.3d 1049

Benjamin M. EASTMAN and Marcita K. Eastman, as Trustees of the Eastman Family 1999 Revocable Trust, Plaintiffs,

v.COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES REFINING & MARKETING LLC, Defendant.

No. 105,805.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Sept. 7, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Kansas Supreme Court exercises unlimited review over certified questions which, by definition, are questions of law.

2. Under Kansas common law, strict liability is liability imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care ( i.e., actionable negligence).

3. Under Kansas common law, all strict liability claims in tort are governed by the abnormally dangerous activity test from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519 and 520 (1976).

4. Under the abnormally dangerous activity test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1976): (1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he or she has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm; and (2) this strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.

5. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the courts do not look to legislative history to assist in interpreting the statute. Instead, the court gives effect to the legislative intention as expressed in the statutory language.

6. K.S.A. 65–6203 imposes liability for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state that differs from our Kansas common-law strict liability standard. While both the common-law standard and the statute impose liability absent any showing of intent, negligence, or misconduct on the part of the responsible party, only the statute imposes liability absent any showing that the responsible party was engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity.

7. To determine whether a liability is created by statute, as required for application of the 3–year limitation period found in K.S.A. 60–512(2), the court considers whether the statute creates a new substantive right or merely creates a remedy or procedure for enforcing an existing right.

8. To determine if K.S.A. 60–512(2) applies, a court first ascertains the most analogous cause of action under Kansas law. If an analogous common-law cause of action exists, the court then compares the elements of that action with the elements of the statute in question. If the statutory elements are not identical to the elements of the most analogous common-law cause of action, K.S.A. 60–512(2) applies.

9. Because the elements necessary to establish liability imposed under K.S.A. 65–6203 are not identical to the elements necessary to impose liability under the common-law doctrine of strict liability, K.S.A. 65–6203(a) imposes a new, substantive right not recognized at common law. Thus, the 3–year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60–512(2) applies to actions brought under K.S.A. 65–6203.

Randall K. Rathbun, of Depew Gillen Rathbun & McInteer LC, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for plaintiffs.

Arthur E. Rhodes, of Smithyman & Zakoura, Chartered, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Lee M. Smithyman and Veronica L. Dersch, of the same firm, and Edmund S. Gross, of CVR Energy, Inc., of Kansas City, were with him on the brief for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Moritz, J.:

In 2007, Coffeyville Resources Refining and Marketing, LLC (Coffeyville Resources) accidentally released about 90,000 gallons of crude oil into floodwaters of the Verdigris River in Coffeyville. In 2010, Benjamin and Marcita Eastman, as Trustees of the Eastman Family 1999 Revocable Trust (the Eastmans), filed an action in federal court alleging the oil spill damaged their pecan grove. Eastman v. Coffeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg., LLC, No. 6:10–CV–01216–MLB (D. Kan. petition filed June 30, 2010). The Eastmans initially asserted a continuing nuisance claim but later asserted a statutory right to recover damages under K.S.A. 65–6203 which requires “any person responsible for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state” to “[c]ompensate the owner of the property where the release or discharge occurred for actual damages incurred as the result of the release or discharge.”

In the federal action, Coffeyville Resources admitted potential liability under K.S.A. 65–6203 but argued the Eastmans' claim was barred by the 2–year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60–513(a)(4). But the Eastmans contended they timely filed their action under the 3–year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60–512(2) which applies to “[a]n action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture.” Specifically, the Eastmans argued K.S.A. 65–6203 creates an “absolute” liability different in kind than the strict liability doctrine applied under Kansas common law and therefore the 3–year limitation period applies.

The Honorable Monti L. Belot, United States District Court Judge, District of Kansas, certified six questions to this court under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 60–3201 et seq. Four of those questions related to the Eastmans' continuing nuisance claim, but the Eastmans have abandoned that claim and now are pursuing only a claim under K.S.A. 65–6203. Thus, only two questions remain: (1) whether K.S.A. 65–6203 creates absolute liability, and (2) which statute of limitations, if any, applies to K.S.A. 65–6203?

Factual and Procedural Background

The following undisputed facts are set forth in the certification order:

“1. The Coffeyville Resources refinery, located adjacent to the Verdigris River in Coffeyville, Kansas, processes crude oil and its constituents on a continuous basis.

“2. Plaintiffs are trustees of property located near Coffeyville, Kansas, in close proximity to the Verdigris River, approximately two or more miles downstream of the Coffeyville Resources refinery.

“3. On July 1, 2007, an unprecedented 100 year flood of the Verdigris River necessitated an emergency shutdown of the Coffeyville Resources refinery.

“4. During the emergency shutdown, approximately 80,000 gallons (over 1900 barrels) of crude oil, 5,000 gallons of diesel oil, and 4,000 gallons of crude oil fractions were accidentally released into the flood waters.

“5. The crude oil release was terminated within an hour or two of its inception.

“6. Defendant mobilized clean-up crews, while monitored by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to clean up oil on public and private property.

“7. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on June 30, 2010, alleging that oil carried by the flood waters impacted their pecan grove, thus causing a continuing nuisance.

“8. Plaintiffs allege that this incident is ‘continuing’ because defendant has not cleaned up the oil that impacted their pecan grove. Plaintiffs allege that oil remains on their property and continues to impact their annual pecan harvests.”

Discussion

This court exercises unlimited review over certified questions which, by definition, are questions of law. Burnett v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 283 Kan. 134, 136, 151 P.3d 837 (2007). Additionally, both questions in this case require statutory interpretation which is also subject to our unlimited review. Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009).

The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co., 289 Kan. 605, 607, 214 P.3d 676 (2009). Our first task in interpreting a statute is to read the plain language of the statute, giving ordinary words their ordinary meanings. Padron v. Lopez, 289 Kan. 1089, 1097, 220 P.3d 345 (2009).

1. Does K.S.A. 65–6203 create absolute liability?

With the first certified question, we are asked to determine whether K.S.A. 65–6203 creates absolute liability. To determine the nature of the liability, if any, created by the statute, it is helpful to first discuss the common-law approach to strict liability in Kansas.

Strict Liability Under Kansas Common Law

We have defined strict liability as “liability imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care ( i.e., actionable negligence).” Williams v. Amoco Production Co., 241 Kan. 102, 112–13, 734 P.2d 1113 (1987).

We recently clarified that under Kansas common law, all strict liability claims in tort are governed by the abnormally dangerous activity test from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519 and 520 (1976). City of Neodesha v. BP Corporation, ––– Kan. ––––, –––– – ––––, –––– – ––––, –––P.3d –––– (2012); see Williams, 241 Kan. at 114–15, 734 P.2d 1113 (adopting the abnormally dangerous activity test as set forth in Restatement [Second] of Torts §§ 519 and 520). As cited in Williams,Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 provides:

“ ‘(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.

“ ‘(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.’ ” Williams, 241 Kan. at 114, 734 P.2d 1113.

The Williams court also adopted Section 520 of the Restatement, which lists factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:

“ ‘(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;

“ ‘(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;

“ ‘(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the...