School Dist. No. 1, Multnomah County v. Bingham

• Decision Date: 08 June 1955
• Docket Number: M,No.
• Citation: 204 Or. 601,284 P.2d 779
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, Oregon, and Wendell Gray, Jeffery Holbrook, Dorothy O. Johansen, R. M. Robson, Herbert M. Schwab, James C. Yeomans and Clifford E. Zollinger, as the Board of Directors of School Districtultnomah County, Oregon, Respondents, v. Mason L. BINGHAM, H. W. Bruck, Marian L. Copeland, K. R. Crookham and R. L. Fanning, as the Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission of Multnomah County, Oregon, and Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of the State of Oregon, Appellants.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 779

284 P.2d 779

204 Or. 601

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, Oregon, and Wendell

Gray, Jeffery Holbrook, Dorothy O. Johansen, R. M. Robson,

Herbert M. Schwab, James C. Yeomans and Clifford E.

Zollinger, as the Board of Directors of School District No.

I, Multnomah County, Oregon, Respondents, v. Mason L. BINGHAM, H. W. Bruck, Marian L. Copeland, K. R.

Crookham and R. L. Fanning, as the Tax Supervising and

Conservation Commission of Multnomah County, Oregon, and

Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of the State of Oregon,

Appellants.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued June 1, 1955.

Decided June 8, 1955.

Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., and Thomas B. Brand, Deputy Dist. Atty., Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief were E. G. Foxley, Deputy Atty. Gen., William M. Langley, Dist. Atty. for Multnomah County, and Willis West, Chief Deputy of Civil Department, Portland.

Grant T. Anderson, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were King, Miller, Anderson, Nash & Yerke, Portland.

Alexander G. Brown, City Atty., Marian C. Rushing, Chief Deputy City Atty., Portland, Harry A. English, City Atty., Bend, Dale E. Helikson, City Atty., Oakridge, and Chris J. Kowitz, City Atty., Salem, filed a brief amici curiae.

Before WARNER, C. J., and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE, TOOZE and PERRY, JJ.,

LATOURETTE, Justice.

We granted a rehearing to the defendants who again urge that the plaintiff school district is restricted to the levy of $11,190,000 plus six per cent for the year 1954-1955 notwithstanding the voters of the district voted in 1954 a tax base of $12,704,644, and to the plaintiffs who ask a clarification of our opinion with respect to the application of the six per cent limitation to a voted tax base. On account of the public question involved, we have permitted a number of taxing bodies to file briefs amici curiae.

All parties agree that there is nothing in the constitution requiring a full utilization of the voted tax base in the fiscal year following the voted tax base. In other words, the taxing unit is permitted to levy a tax lower than the voted tax base in the fiscal year following the vote of the people.

Reverting to art. XI, § 11 of the constitution, paraphrasing, we find that no taxing unit shall, in any year, levy a tax in excess of the tax base defined in the constitution. Two alternative methods are provided for arriving at a tax base: The automatic tax base provided by the constitution itself which is the total amount of tax levied in any one of the three years immediately preceding, plus six per cent, or 'an amount approved by a majority of legal voters voting upon the question of establishing a tax base.' When a measure is submitted to the voters to establish a tax base the constitutional provision provides:

'* * * Every such measure shall specify in dollars and cents the amount of the tax base in effect and the amount of the tax base sought to be established, and the new tax base, if adopted, shall first apply to the levy for the fiscal year next following its adoption.' Subsection (2), § 11, art. XI, Oregon Constitution.

From the above it is seen that when the voters establish a tax base in dollars and cents, which the voters in plaintiff district did in the amount of $12,704,644, that remains the base until the taxing unit levies taxes in an amount equal to such tax base. There is nothing in the language that expressly or impliedly compels a taxing unit to immediately raise in taxes an amount equal to the full voted tax base.

Defendants' failure to distinguish between a voted tax base and a taxing unit's tax levy is in our opinion the basis for their erroneous construction of the constitutional provision. The people's voted tax base is not a tax levy but a yardstick governing a taxing unit in making a tax levy.

The language of the amendment, that the voted tax base 'shall first apply to the levy for the fiscal year next following its adoption,' clearly means that such voted tax base shall be the polar star on which the taxing unit must hitch its levy. In order to adopt defendants' view that the six per cent limitation is anchored to the tax levy rather than to the voted tax base, we would have to insert in subsection (1) the following words, the tax levy under, before 'the new tax base, if adopted, shall first apply,' etc., which we are not permitted to do. ORS 174.010.

In their briefs, both original and on rehearing, defendants urge us to consider the arguments in the voters' pamphlet in connection with our interpretation of the constitutional provision. Were we to do so we would find the following language of the committee provided for by ch. 546, Oregon Laws 1951, which does not support defnedants' position: 'If the new base is accepted by the voters, it automatically becomes subject to the six per cent limitation described above.' The word 'it' obviously refers to the voted tax base and not to the taxing unit's levy thereunder.

We now come to the question of whether or not subdivision (a) of subsection (1), § 11, art. XI of the constitution relating to the six per cent limitation applies after the tax levy equals the voted tax base. In our original opinion we stated in no uncertain terms that it did not. On the original hearing before us briefs and arguments were not particularly directed to this question. However, we felt that the question was so entwined with the matter in issue that we should give consideration to the same. Upon the rehearing, however, the question was briefed and argued thoroughly. All parties to this litigation and the amici curiae agree that in any event the six per cent limitation does apply if the levy reaches the voted tax base. And in this we now concur.

Since, however, all the members of the court do not agree with us on this question, we shall state our reasons in support of our position. Everyone, so far as we can ascertain, connected with the promotion of the constitutional amendment, as is evidenced by the statements in the voters' pamphlet, and all litigants in the present case, hold the view that the so-called six per cent limitation clause applies in any event on top of the voted tax base. Starting with this premise, it is our duty, if we can logically do so, to support that view. We are not unmindful, however, that if the language of the amendment is unambiguous, we must adhere to the language and not entertain anything dehors the same. We are of the opinion, however, that there is an ambiguity in the language used so far as the matter now being discussed is concerned.

In construing the constitution the presumption and legal intendment are that every word, clause and sentence therein have been inserted for some useful purpose. The object and purpose of a constitutional amendment must be considered and it must not be interpreted on narrow technical principles but upon broad general lines in order that the object intended may be accomplished. State v. Cochran, 55 Or. 157, 104 P. 419, 105 P. 884. We find in Branch v. Albee, 71 Or. 188, 193, 142 P. 598, 599, the following language:

'In construing a constitutional provision, the whole provision is to be examined with a view to ascertaining the meaning of every part. The presumption is that every clause has been inserted for some useful purpose, and therefore the instrument must be construed as a whole, in order that its intent and general purposes may beascertained; and, as a necessary result of this rule, it follows that, wherever it is possible to do so, each provision must be construed so that it will harmonize with all others, without distorting the meaning of any of such provisions, to the end, that the intent of the framers of the provision may be ascertained and carried out, and effect be given to the instruments, as a whole.'

Unquestionably, the legislature, in submitting the constitutional amendment to the people, had in mind that the voted tax base would be based upon the needs of the taxing unit and that therefore the levy would equal the same. Keeping this in mind, the language used in subsection (2) of § 11 has significant importance. It is there stated that 'the new tax base, if adopted, shall first apply to the levy for the fiscal year next following its adoption.' Inasmuch as the taxing unit must submit to the voters the question of establishment of a tax base at a primary or general election, which would be in May or November, the next fiscal year, as a matter of law, would be July 1 following; so that the words, 'shall first apply to the levy for the fiscal year next following its adoption' would be idle phraseology and surplusage if they were confined to the context of subsection (2) of the amendment.

Since we must presume that the words 'shall first apply', etc., serve some useful purpose, we must look to the entire instrument, consider its history, the arguments by its proponents in the voters' pamphlet and its object and purpose, to ascertain the intent of its framers.

It could not logically be contended that the language meant that the voted tax base would first apply to the tax levy for the next following fiscal year and then, secondly, for the ensuing fiscal year because the tax base established by the voters would continue to apply indefinitely unless interrupted.

It is apparent to us that the language found in the amendment, i. e., the new tax base shall first apply, implies that another tax base shall thereafter apply. The only other tax base noted in the amendment is the six percent limitation base and that, in our opinion, is the base intended. In this respect the words, 'first apply,' would serve a useful purpose which is in consonance with the intention of the framers of the amendment. We therefore are of the opinion that after the tax levy reaches the tax base then the six per cent limitation found in subdivision (a) would apply and continue to apply until changed by a vote of the people.

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