State v. Tafoya

• Decision Date: 16 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 32,120.,32,120.
• Citation: 285 P.3d 604,2012 -NMSC- 030
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Julian TAFOYA, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

285 P.3d 604

2012 -NMSC- 030

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Julian TAFOYA, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 32,120.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 16, 2012.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender, Adrianne R. Turner, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} On the night of November 15, 2008, while aimlessly driving around Roswell, New Mexico, Julian Tafoya (Defendant) shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of the car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of “shooting at or from a motor vehicle,” NMSA 1978, § 30–3–8(B) (1993), attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed the above crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years.

{2} Defendant now appeals his convictions to this Court. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“Appeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court.”); accordRule 12–102(A)(1) NMRA. Defendant first argues that his felony murder conviction should be reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting “at” nor “from” a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 30–3–8(B), and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction. We agree with Defendant and, for reasons discussed more thoroughly below, remand to the trial court to vacate the felony murder conviction and enter judgment for second degree murder. See generally State v. Haynie, 116 N.M. 746, 748, 867 P.2d 416, 418 (1994) (discussing the authority of an appellate court to remand for entry of judgment when evidence supports conviction on the lesser included offense). We therefore do not reach Defendant's second argument, that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot serve as the requisite collateral felony for a felony murder conviction.

{3} Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. We agree, and seeing no dispute that the evidence supports a finding on the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, we remand the case for entry of judgment for second degree murder. See id.

{4} We reject Defendant's final two arguments: that his sentence for attempted murder was improperly enhanced because the same prior felonies were used both to enhance that sentence and to establish his guilt on the felon in possession of a firearm charge, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

{5} Crystal Brady, Andrea Larez, and Kaprice Conde picked Defendant up at an Allsup's Convenience Store in Roswell the night of November 15, 2008. Conde and Defendant were dating, and Brady, Conde, and Defendant had been hanging out at a motel together earlier that day. Brady testified that she was addicted to methamphetamine (meth) at the time, and that before the shooting the three of them had been smoking meth and marijuana, and drinking alcohol. Conde testified that she had been up for five days partying, was high on meth at the time, and was also addicted to the drug. Bloodwork done during Larez's autopsy revealed she had also been using meth.

{6} After picking Defendant up, the four proceeded to cruise around the city listening to loud music. Brady testified that during this time she and the other occupants of the car were smoking meth and marijuana and drinking alcohol. Brady was driving the car, which belonged to Larez. The car had a standard transmission, which was unfamiliar to Brady, and at one point “[she] heard a loud sound, and [the car] stalled out.” Right after the car stalled, Defendant shot Larez. Conde and Brady both testified that there was a sudden gunshot followed by more shots. An officer in the area described the gunfire as multiple shots in fairly rapid succession, possibly with a short pause between the fourth and fifth shot.

{7} After the first shot, Brady observed that Larez had been shot and appeared to have died instantly from the wound. When asked what Brady was thinking after she saw that Larez had been shot, she testified that “[she] didn't [think]—it was all so sudden.” Brady further testified that upon seeing that Larez had been shot, she turned toward the back of the car screaming and was shot in the face. Brady testified that she only remembers Defendant's face, does not remember him saying anything, that “he looked like a scared little punk,” and that she thought Defendant was really high. After being shot, Brady was able to exit the car and crawl away for help. Defendant and Conde also exited the car and ran away, ultimately taking separate paths.

{8} Physical evidence presented at trial showed that Larez and Brady were both shot only once: Larez through the back of the neck and Brady in the face through her right nostril. A fragment of a bullet was recoveredbelow a crack in the windshield, and an additional bullet was found lodged in the steering wheel. This, other evidence collected from the vehicle, and the nature of the wounds indicated that the shots were fired entirely within the vehicle—from the back seat to the front two seats of the car. Further factual development is provided below as necessary for the legal analysis.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is not “shooting at or from a motor vehicle” for purposes of Section 30–3–8(B).

{9} Defendant first argues that the felony crime of “shooting at or from a motor vehicle” cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction because Defendant and the two victims were all in the same car together. Defendant was never charged with violating Section 30–3–8(B), and the State made the decision a week before trial to use the crime as the underlying felony for its felony murder theory. We note as a preliminary observation that, during defense counsel's directed verdict motions after the State rested its case, the prosecutor made the following concession:

I realize that most shooting from a motor vehicle cases involve[ ] someone shooting at a target outside a car. I'm sure that the legislat[ure] was thinking to a large extent of a drive-by shooting where someone drives by someplace in a car and shoots and they are on their way. And the legislat[ure] wanted to make a crime shooting from or at a motor vehicle that encompass[es] that.

{10} Despite its stated understanding of the general purpose of Section 30–3–8(B) at trial, the State here argues that the Legislature did not intend to limit shootings involving motor vehicles in this manner. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that shooting wholly within a vehicle simply cannot constitute shooting “at” or “from” a vehicle. While we acknowledge that arguments can certainly be made either way, we agree with Defendant and hold that the Legislature intended to cover two distinct and contrasting factual scenarios involving two distinct and contrasting trajectories: (1) the discharging of a gun from a space clearly outside of and away from the vehicle at the vehicle, and (2) the discharging of a gun from a vehicle at something clearly outside of the vehicle. If the Legislature intended for Section 30–3–8(B) to additionally cover shootings occurring entirely within a vehicle, it could have done so with ease—for example, by adding the word “in,” or the term “from within” to the statute. In concluding that the intended scope of Section 30–3–8(B) is ultimately unclear, albeit logically weighing more toward a categorical exclusion rather than inclusion of these facts, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of Defendant. See State v. Johnson, 2009–NMSC–049, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (“[L]enity is reserved for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994)).

1. Plain–Language Reading of Section 30–3–8(B)

{11} Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo, with the ultimate goal of such review to be “facilitat[ing] and promot[ing] the legislature's accomplishment of its purpose....” State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994); see also State v. Smith, 2004–NMSC–032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. In analyzing a statute, we first look at the plain language of the statute. See Smith, 2004–NMSC–032, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. We use caution when attempting to discern legislative intent by looking only to the words themselves, however, because this “beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate ... differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning.” Id. (quoting Helman, 117 N.M. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359).

Section 30–3–8 reads, in pertinent part:

Shooting at dwelling or occupied building; shooting at or from a motor vehicle:

...

B. Shooting at or from a motor vehicle consists of willfully discharging a firearm at or from a motor vehicle with reckless disregard for the person of another.

(emphasis added)

{12} We begin our discussion of the language of Section 30–3–8(B) by noting the inherent ambiguity that “function words” such as “at” and “from” present, because by...