Keenan v. Director General of Railroads, 71.

Decision Date13 November 1922
Docket Number71.
PartiesKEENAN v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS. [1]
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Harris Beach, Harris & Matson, of Rochester, N.Y. (Daniel M. Beach and Paul Folger, both of Rochester, N.Y., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Carroll & Degnan, of Niagara Falls, N.Y. (Joseph A. Wechter, of Buffalo, N.Y., of counsel), for defendant in error.

Before ROGERS, MANTON, and MAYER, Circuit Judges.

MANTON Circuit Judge.

The parties will be referred to by the designation used below i.e., the defendant in error will be referred to as the plaintiff, and the plaintiff in error as the defendant.

The defendant maintains a freight yard at Suspension Bridge, New York, where there are upwards of 40 tracks. The tracks are referred to by numbers and the place of injury to the plaintiff was in that portion of the yard lying between the freight house and No. 37 platform. Here there are 17 tracks in all. On the day of the plaintiff's injury, July 19 1919, there were 3 or 4 cars standing on track No. 25 in the yard, which track ran generally east and west and was at a point directly north of the oil platform. The plaintiff was attempting to pass over the bumpers between 2 of these cars and was caught and his leg crushed resulting in its amputation. The cars at the time he attempted to cross, were standing still, but a string of cars drifted down on track No. 25 in a westerly direction and bumped into the 3 or 4 standing cars while the plaintiff was attempting to cross. It appears that these cars had broken away from a train which was pulling east on track No. 25, and this was due to the fact that a sill which held a coupler on one of the cars gave way, permitting the coupler to drop to the ground at the switching point on track No. 25 east of the oil platform. Keenan's work had been handling freight, sweeping out cars, and bringing ice and water to the workmen in the yard. His duty on the day in question was to carry water from the freight house to No. 37 platform; in doing so, he was obliged to cross some 18 tracks, over which there was no footpath or crossing. All but 2 of these tracks were actively employed. At the time he was returning with a full pail of water to the workmen in the yard. Keenan looked to the west, and, though he could see to the westerly end of one of these strings of cars, he could not see as far as the westerly end of the other strings of cars. He could not see the east end of these strings of cars although he could see 40 or 50 car lengths down the track to the east. He testified:

'I took my pail, and put it in, and set it down, under the cars, half ways, as far as I could reach, on the bare ground between the rails. It was underneath the bumpers.'

He attempted to climb to the end of the box car, and reached to the iron handle which was fastened to the end of the box car, having one foot up on the step, and after he took hold on the iron bar to help himself over the bumpers to get to the other side, the runaway car struck the east end of the string of cars, and the crash threw him outside, with his right leg across the rail, and the wheels crushed it. There was no warning of the collision or crash, and the first he knew of the car colliding was when he was thrown. Liability was imposed below for a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, and the question presented here is whether or not the plaintiff, engaged as he was, was entitled to the benefits accorded an employee by reason of the terms of the act. Act April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298 (Comp. St. Sec. 8617 et seq.).

This string of cars was to be started into various tracks in the westbound yard (the yard where the accident occurred). A cut was made in 2 or 3 cars into track No. 25, and one of the crew of trainmen rode that string in and stopped it before coming against the cars standing thereon. The next cut was intended for another track, and while the westerly end of the train was still a car and a half length on track No. 25 the engine stopped, the train parted, and the rear or westerly cars ran down to track No. 25, striking the cars that had previously been shunted down, forcing them against the standing cars further west, and moving them sufficiently to cause the jerk and the consequent throwing of Keenan from the bumpers. The cars parted because a coupler pulled out of the west end of one of the cars, leaving the coupled car still attached to the train. It appears that the entire coupler pulled out, comprising the coupler pocket, knuckle pin, and knuckle lock. The cause was the breaking apart of the sill which held it in place. It was necessary, in the performance of his work, for the plaintiff to cross a large number of tracks, and he had no other way than to climb over the cars in question in making progress in performing his duty.

The Safety Appliance Act was intended by Congress 'to permit the safety of employees and travelers. ' There seems to have been no limitation placed on these two clauses, and in the absence of limitation it is applicable to all employees and all travelers. Again, section 8 of the act (Comp. St Sec. 8612) eliminates the assumption of risk in case of violation covering 'any employee of any common carrier who may be injured. ' Does it apply to employees who are injured by trains when not in the act of coupling or uncoupling cars? In Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617, 37 Sup.Ct. 456, 61 L.Ed. 931, it was held that an interstate railway carrier was liable in damages for an employee injured in the discharge of his duty, regardless of the position he was in at the time of his injury. In this case, the couplers failed to work automatically in a switching operation, and resulted in a collision of cars from one of which the plaintiff, a switchman, was thrown. He was standing on one of the 5 cars for the purpose of releasing the brakes and was thrown to the track. ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Donnell v. Elgin Ry Co
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 12 Diciembre 1949
    ...the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, the Act 'is also aimed at insuring couplers that will hold together.' Keenan v. Director General of Railroads, 2 Cir., 1922, 285 F. 286, 290; Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Eisenhart, 3 Cir., 1922, 280 F. 271; Erie R. Co. v. Caldwell, 6 Cir., 1920, 264 F. 9......
  • Rush v. Thompson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 12 Mayo 1947
    ...... Rule 3.21, Supreme Court of Missouri: Sec. 105 of the General. Code for Civil Procedure. (7) The court erred in refusing to. give to ...335; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 64, 68 L.Ed. 284; Keenan v. Director of. Railroads, 285 F. 286; Kimberling v. Wabash Ry. Co., ......
  • Martin v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 30 Julio 1929
    ...233 U.S. 44; Railroad v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406; Railroad v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287; Auchenbach v. Railroad, 8 F.2d 351; Keenan v. Director General, 285 F. 286, denied, 261 U.S. 616; Railroad v. Auchenbach, 16 F.2d 550, certiorari denied, 273 U.S. 761; Overstreet v. Railroad, 238 F. 565. When......
  • Flat Slab Patents Co. v. Turner
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • 18 Noviembre 1922
    ...appeals is as follows: (1) Reversal and dismissal of the contempt proceeding. (2) No recovery for the first period of the accounting. [285 F. 286.] (3) recovery for the third period of the accounting. (4) No recovery of damages for the second period of the accounting. (5) Recovery of profit......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT