U.S. v. Greer
| Decision Date | 14 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 99-1073(CON).,Docket No. 99-1092(XAP).,Docket No. 99-1072(L). |
| Citation | 285 F.3d 158 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. William GREER, a/k/a Thomas Williams Dodds, and Stephen Brent Hutchins, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
David V. Kirby, Then-Acting United States Attorney for the District of Vermont (Gary G. Shattuck, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), Burlington, VT, for Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Edward S. Zas, Federal Defender Division Appeals Bureau, Legal Aid Society, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee William Greer.
Mark A. Kaplan, Burlington, VT, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Stephen Brent Hutchins.
Before: FEINBERG, JACOBS, and STRAUB, Circuit Judges.
William Greer and Stephen Brent Hutchins appeal from judgments of conviction entered on January 27, 1999, following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (William K. Sessions, III, Judge). Greer was convicted of conspiracy to import and export hashish and marijuana, violations of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA"), 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903, and failure to file a currency transaction report, and was sentenced principally to a term of imprisonment of 324 months. Hutchins was convicted of conspiracy to import and export hashish and marijuana and violations of the MDLEA, and was sentenced principally to a term of imprisonment of 276 months. The United States cross-appeals from the sentences imposed.
On appeal, Greer and Hutchins raise several challenges to their convictions. First, they contend that the District Court committed reversible error by excluding the parties and counsel from in camera meetings with prospective jurors to discuss jury service hardship excuses. Second, they assert that the court further erred by failing to disclose to the parties and counsel that one prospective juror attempted to discuss issues unrelated to hardship during his in camera meeting. Third, they argue that a new trial was required because a juror failed honestly to answer material questions on voir dire and because that juror and others had been exposed to extrinsic evidence. Fourth, the defendants contend that the District Court improperly instructed the jury that a foreign nation's consent to enforcement of United States law, even if provided after indictment, satisfies the jurisdictional element of the MDLEA. Fifth, the defendants assert that the District Court erred by failing to state its reasons for imposing their sentences at a particular point within a United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") range that exceeded 24 months, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). Finally, Hutchins argues that his $500,000 fine was clearly erroneous.
In its cross-appeal, the government challenges the sentences imposed by the District Court on three grounds. First, the government contends that the District Court erred in excluding from defendants' relevant conduct, under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, a quantity of drugs that was part of the defendants' offense but that was not intended for distribution in the United States and had already been the subject of foreign prosecution. Second, the government argues that the District Court erroneously found the defendants to be only managers or supervisors rather than leaders or organizers of criminal activity pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Finally, the government asserts that the District Court erred in refusing to impose a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
As explained below, we conclude that the District Court did not err by excluding the parties and counsel from in camera meetings with prospective jurors to discuss jury service hardship excuses and by not disclosing particular remarks made by one prospective juror during such an in camera meeting. We further hold that the District Court did not exceed its allowable discretion in denying defendants' motion for a new trial.
Next, we conclude that the District Court properly instructed the jury that a foreign nation's consent to enforcement of United States law provided any time before trial satisfies the jurisdictional element of the MDLEA. We also hold that the fine imposed on Hutchins was not clearly erroneous and that the District Court did not err in concluding that the defendants were only managers or supervisors rather than leaders or organizers of criminal activity.
We find, however, that because the District Court's sentencing remarks are ambiguous, we are unable to determine from the record whether the court was required to state its reasons for the defendants' sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). We thus remand for clarification. We also hold that the District Court erred by sentencing Greer to 120 months' imprisonment for violating the currency reporting requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A), by excluding from relevant conduct a quantity of drugs that was part of the defendants' offense, and by applying the wrong standard in evaluating statements under the U.S.S.G.'s obstruction of justice provision. We thus remand for resentencing, but note that the defendants must be resentenced in accord with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir.2001).1
Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for clarification of the record and for resentencing.
This appeal arises out of an international drug smuggling and distribution conspiracy that spanned several decades and included the shipment of tons of hashish and marijuana to North America. The defendants, William Greer and Stephen Brent Hutchins, were prosecuted and convicted for their participation in that conspiracy. We recount only the events and circumstances that bear upon the parties' claims and that provide essential context.
The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, showed the following. The conspiracy was organized and headed by Dutch and Canadian organizations, which shared in the profits and directed the operations. Greer and Hutchins were hired to assist in the smuggling ventures. From 1980 to 1993, Greer and Hutchins conspired to import and export thousands of pounds of hashish and marijuana across the Vermont Canada border. The defendants, and associates whom they oversaw, transported drugs using backpacks, snowmobiles, boats, all-terrain vehicles, and airplanes. From 1989 to 1991, the defendants also participated in or planned the offloads of many tons of hashish from vessels in the St. Lawrence River into Canada and the United States. In 1991, one such offload attempt went awry — barrels of hashish were discovered floating in the St. Lawrence River after bad weather and an equipment malfunction foiled the smugglers' efforts — and the defendants were eventually arrested. Greer and Hutchins were prosecuted in Canada for drug offenses in connection with the failed offload.
In July 1996, a nine-count Superseding Indictment was filed against Greer and Hutchins in the United States, and the defendants went to trial in the District of Vermont in early 1997. At the close of trial, Greer and Hutchins were each convicted of one count of conspiring to import and export a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 953, 960, and 963, and one count of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute hashish on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903. Greer was also convicted of one count of failing to report the international transportation of currency in violation of 31 U.S.C §§ 5316(a)(1)(A) and 5322(b). The jury acquitted the defendants of the remaining counts, which are not relevant to this appeal. The District Court sentenced Greer to 324 months' imprisonment and Hutchins to 276 months' imprisonment. They timely filed notices of appeal.
Prior to jury selection, each venire person completed a jury questionnaire, which asked, inter alia, whether the potential juror, a relative, or a person close to that juror had ever been a victim of a crime, a witness to a crime, or accused of a crime. Prospective juror John Baker answered "no" to this question.
Then, prior to announcing the case to the jury panel, the District Court described the possible length of the trial and permitted those jurors with extraordinary personal circumstances and potential scheduling conflicts to address those issues individually in chambers. Neither the parties nor counsel were permitted to participate or observe. According to the court, this was standard procedure.
Defense counsel objected to their exclusion from the meetings. The court responded, however, that the purpose of the meetings was solely to discuss requests for excusal unrelated to the prospective jurors' knowledge of the case. Defense counsel asked what the court would do if a prospective juror mentioned something about the case. The court responded, The court also noted that a court reporter would be present, though the reporter would likely not have a transcript of the meetings prepared before jury selection.
The court then met with approximately 30 jurors individually in chambers. The following colloquy took place between the court and juror John Baker:
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