Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-2854.,01-2854.
• Parties: Roger FORREST, Appellant, v. KRAFT FOODS, INC., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

285 F.3d 688

Roger FORREST, Appellant, v. KRAFT FOODS, INC., Appellee.

No. 01-2854.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 11, 2002.

Filed: April 3, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anne Potter Walters, Moline, IL, argued (Stephen T. Fieweger, Rock Island, IL, on the brief), for appellant.

Christian M. Poland, Chicago, IL, argued (Timothy C. Klenk, on the brief), for appellee.

Before: BOWMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Roger Forrest, Jr. appeals from the district court's¹ entry of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Kraft Foods, Inc., in his racial discrimination suit. Because Forrest failed to present evidence showing that Kraft's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination were a pretext for unlawful discrimination, we affirm.

I.

Forrest, an African-American male, was employed as a meat production worker at Kraft's Davenport, Iowa, facility for approximately seven years. During this time, Forrest held several positions, including working as a "cooker" for the last year of his employment at Kraft. There were a total of four cookers in Forrest's department. The position required the cookers to place baskets of meat in cooking tanks, monitor the temperature and cooking time, pull the baskets from the cooking tanks and place them in cooling tanks (a "hot pull"), and pull the baskets from the cooling tanks (a "cold pull").

During Forrest's tenure at the Kraft facility, he amassed an extensive disciplinary record. He was cited for attendance problems, unacceptable behavior, poor workmanship, and leaving work early without permission. Kraft states, and Forrest concedes, that Forrest's disciplinary history was worse than any other employee in this 1600-person facility. Forrest did not contest any of these citations, though he now contends, offering no evidence in support of the contention, that the extensive nature of his disciplinary record is itself evidence of racial discrimination.

On October 28, 1997, Forrest wanted to leave work early to join some other employees at a bar. Kraft's policy required that he get permission from his supervisor, Rebecca Thomas, prior to leaving. When Forrest asked Thomas if he could leave early, she replied, "Roger, you cannot leave until your shift is covered." Sometime after that, Forrest discovered that the next shift's cooker would not be coming to work. Another employee, Dan Keefe, was tapped to cover that cooker's shift. The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Forrest, indicate that Forrest assumed that Keefe would also finish Forrest's remaining duties. Without again speaking with Thomas to determine whether he had permission to leave, Forrest left an hour early, leaving two cold pulls and one hot pull to be done.

Following a fact-finding meeting, Kraft fired Forrest on November 5, 1997, citing his extensive disciplinary record and his unauthorized early departure from work on October 28.² Following his dismissal Forrest filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and was issued a right-to-sue notice, whereupon he filed the present action.

II.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir.1998). "We will affirm if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Although the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving party, "a nonmoving party may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but must instead set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Thomas v. Runyon, 108 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1997)).

Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, Forrest bears the initial burden of establishing a case of discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). We will assume for the purposes of this case that Forrest met this burden, and thus we review the record to determine whether Kraft met its burden of rebutting the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its action. See Rose-Maston, 133 F.3d at 1107; Britton v. City of Poplar Bluff, Mo., 244 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir.2001). Kraft contends that it terminated Forrest because of his dismal disciplinary record, with his unauthorized early departure on October 28 constituting the triggering event. Thus, Kraft has met its burden, and the presumption of discrimination accordingly falls from the case.

In the final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Forrest bears the burden of showing that the proffered explanation is a mere pretext. Rose-Maston, 133 F.3d at 1107. He may prove pretext and "avoid summary judgment only if the evidence considered in its entirety (1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [race] was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision." Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir.19...