Whitaker v. Hitt

• Decision Date: 06 November 1922
• Docket Number: 3815.
• Citation: 285 F. 797
• Parties: WHITAKER et al. v. HITT, United States Commissioner, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

285 F. 797

WHITAKER et al. v. HITT, United States Commissioner, et al.

No. 3815.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

November 6, 1922

Submitted October 1, 1922.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Paul B Cromelin, W. J. Neale, and R. T. Scott, all of Washington D.C., for appellants.

Peyton Gordon and J. H. Bilbrey, both of Washington, D.C., for appellees.

Before SMYTH, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

Appellants filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, praying that writs of habeas corpus issue to prevent their removal to the Southern district of the state of California, where they had been indicted for unlawfully transporting in interstate commerce a stolen automobile from the state of New Jersey to the state of California.

The power of the court is invoked on the ground that the act of Congress under which the indictment was found is unconstitutional and void, in that its enactment is beyond the power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States; that the act is vague uncertain, and indefinite; that the indictment is defective in that it does not allege ownership of the vehicle transported, the value of the vehicle, or directly charge that the vehicle was stolen; and that the bail required by the commissioner was illegal and void.

The indictment was found under the Act of Congress of October 29, 1919, c. 89 (41 States. 325), forbidding the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. The act among other things provides:

'That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. ' Section 3.

The act defines the term 'motor vehicle' to--

'include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.'

The term 'interstate or foreign commerce,' is defined in the act as follows:

'The term 'interstate or foreign commerce' as used in this act shall include transportation from one state, territory, or the District of Columbia, to another state, territory, or the District of Columbia, or to a foreign country, or from a foreign country to any state, territory, or the District of Columbia.'

It is apparent from the language used that Congress was merely giving a definition of the meaning of the term 'interstate or foreign commerce' as used in the act, and not attempting to place any limitation upon the word 'commerce' as used in the Constitution. In defining a criminal offense arising in interstate commerce, it is competent for Congress to limit it in terms to the commercial transaction covered by the act, the infraction of which is made criminal by the statute. In other words, Congress may make criminal a particular use to which one or more instrumentalities of interstate commerce may be applied to the exclusion of all others; and in so doing it places no limitation whatever upon its broad jurisdiction to regulate interstate commerce generally, as provided in the Constitution.

But it is urged that the mere driving of a stolen automobile from one state to another, is not interstate commerce within the commerce clause of the Constitution. The transportation, it is contended, must be by common carrier for hire, or the vehicle must have been used to carry passengers or freight for hire, or be transported for sale or hire. In Kelly v. United States, 277 F. 405, which involved the trial of an offense under the statute before us, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, in considering the charge of the trial court to the effect that moving a stolen automobile under its own power from one state to another was transportation in interstate commerce, said:

'We are of the opinion that this instruction is sanctioned by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court construing and upholding an analogous statute. To penalize the transportation of a given article is in effect to prohibit its transportation. And if the Congress may prohibit the interstate transportation of lottery tickets (Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 Sup.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492), of impure foods and drugs (Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 31 Sup.Ct. 364, 55 L.Ed. 364), of intoxicating liquors into a prohibition state, even for personal use (Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 37 Sup.Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326, L.R.A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845), and of women and girls for an immoral, though noncommercial purpose (Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 Sup.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442, L.R.A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168), we perceive no reason, constitutional or other,

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