Jones v. Csx Transp.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-14787.,No. 01-14786.,01-14786.,01-14787. |
| Parties | Benjamin D. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. James Emery O'Steen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX Transportation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Mark Joseph Bujold, Lane & Gossett, P.C., Brunswick, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Randall A. Jordan, Mary Helen Moses, Steven P. Bristol, Jordan, Bristol & Moses, St. Simons Island, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Richard B. North, Jr., Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Amicus Curiae.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.
Before TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK*, District Judge.
Benjamin D. Jones and James Emery O'Steen ("the plaintiffs") sued CSX Transportation, Inc. under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of their exposure to asbestos. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of CSX on the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress damages based on their fear of contracting cancer. The district court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial challenging the jury's comparative negligence finding. Because the plaintiffs made no showing of any objective manifestations of their emotional distress, and because we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of their motions for a new trial, we affirm.
The plaintiffs were employed by CSX in various capacities for many years, during which they worked with and around products containing asbestos. The plaintiffs sued CSX and several other defendants, alleging among other things negligence on the part of CSX, and seeking damages under the FELA as a result of that negligence for physical injuries to their respiratory systems and emotional distress from their fear of contracting cancer.1 Over the lengthy course of the proceedings, all of the other defendants either settled or were dismissed, leaving CSX as the sole remaining defendant. Prior to trial, CSX filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress damages. The sole ground advanced by CSX for partial summary judgment was the plaintiffs' failure to show an objective manifestation of their emotional distress.2 Agreeing with CSX that the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate some objective manifestation of their fear of contracting cancer, and finding that they failed to do so, the district court granted CSX's motion.
The cases proceeded to trial on the plaintiffs' remaining claims against CSX, at which several medical experts testified about the plaintiffs' respiratory problems. Two medical experts opined that Jones suffered from asbestosis, an asbestos-related disease, and one medical expert gave a similar opinion with regard to O'Steen. Three other medical experts, however, opined that Jones did not suffer from an asbestos-related disease, and four medical experts opined that O'Steen did not suffer from an asbestos-related disease. Additionally, several of the physicians, including all of those called by the plaintiffs, testified that both of the plaintiffs had a significant smoking history that could have caused or contributed to their respiratory problems. Jones smoked between half a pack and a pack and a half a day for a total of thirty-three years, and O'Steen smoked up to a pack a day for approximately twenty-five years.
The jury returned verdicts finding that CSX had been negligent and that such negligence caused injury to both Jones and O'Steen. The jury additionally found, however, that each of the plaintiffs had been negligent and that their own negligence also caused their respective injuries. The jury attributed 5% of each of the plaintiffs' injuries to CSX, the remaining 95% in each case being attributed to the plaintiff himself. The jury found Jones's total damages, without adjustment for comparative negligence, to be $46,215, and it found O'Steen's total damages, without adjustment for comparative negligence, to be $37,595.3
The district court subsequently entered judgment on the jury's verdicts. After reducing by 95% the amounts found by the jury for each of the plaintiffs, the district court awarded $2,310.75 to Jones and $1,879.75 to O'Steen. The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, asserting among other things that the jury's findings that Jones and O'Steen were 95% negligent were contrary to the evidence, were against the weight of the evidence, and resulted from mistake or prejudice. On the same day that the plaintiffs filed these motions, CSX filed a motion to amend the judgments by offsetting the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs by their combined settlements with the other defendants, who allegedly were CSX's joint tortfeasors. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motions for a new trial and granted CSX's request to offset the judgments. The court then entered an amended judgment awarding Jones $2,319.82 in costs and $0 in damages, and an amended judgment awarding O'Steen $3,727.46 in costs and $0 in damages.
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CSX on their claims for damages based on their fear of cancer, as well as the district court's denial of their motions for a new trial.
We review de novo the grant of partial summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. See O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir.2001). We review the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See Lambert v. Fulton County, 253 F.3d 588, 595 (11th Cir.2001).
The plaintiffs contend that the court should have granted their motions for a new trial because the jury's finding that they each were 95% comparatively negligent was against the great weight of the evidence, was contrary to the evidence, and was the result of mistake, prejudice or compromise. CSX, however, argues that the plaintiffs waived review of this issue by not filing with the district court a motion for judgment as a matter of law on comparative negligence. Alternatively, CSX asserts that there was ample evidence to support the jury's comparative negligence finding. Having considered the plaintiffs' arguments as to this issue in light of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court's denial of the motions for a new trial without further discussion. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1.
Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on their claims for damages based on their fear of contracting cancer. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that their recovery for emotional distress is allowed by the Supreme Court's decision in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997), which held that a worker exposed to asbestos could not recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress based on his fear of contracting cancer until he exhibited symptoms of a disease. The plaintiffs argue that they have exhibited symptoms of an asbestos-related disease, i.e. asbestosis, and therefore may recover for their fear of cancer under Buckley. The plaintiffs also argue that, because Buckley contains no requirement that a plaintiff show objective manifestations of his emotional distress, the district court erred in requiring the plaintiffs to make such a showing. CSX, on the other hand, argues that the plaintiffs cannot recover for their fear of cancer until they exhibit symptoms of cancer itself. Additionally, CSX maintains that the district court correctly required a showing of objective manifestations of the plaintiffs' emotional distress.
We are thus presented with two questions related to the plaintiffs' ability to recover for their fear of contracting cancer. First, we are asked to decide whether the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley permits recovery for the plaintiffs' fear of contracting cancer when they have exhibited symptoms of an asbestos-related disease but not of cancer specifically. Second, we are asked to decide whether the plaintiffs must produce some objective evidence of their emotional injuries to recover for their fear of contracting cancer. Because the sole ground of CSX's motion was the plaintiffs' failure to show objective manifestations of their emotional distress, and because the district court granted partial summary judgment on this basis alone, we will not address the first question and limit our discussion to answering the second question.4 After reviewing the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as the common law and the decisions of other federal courts, we conclude that the plaintiffs were required to make a showing of objective manifestations of their emotional distress to recover for that distress under the FELA. Because they failed to do so, the district court properly granted partial summary judgment to CSX.
In recognizing that emotional injuries are compensable under the FELA, the Supreme Court has not decided whether objective manifestations of those injuries are required. Nonetheless, we think that the Court's decisions in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994) and Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997) are instructive.
In Gottshall, two railroad workers sued their employer under the FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The first plaintiff, Gottshall, based his claim on witnessing the death of a co-worker, and being made to work within sight of his body, while performing strenuous work in extremely hot and humid...
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