Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, Vermont

• Decision Date: 29 March 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 01-7504.,No. 875.,875.
• Citation: 287 F.3d 162
• Parties: Fredrick K. KOCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT, Sherwood D. Lake, Jr., and John Doe, Unidentified Brattleboro Police Officer, Defendant-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 162

287 F.3d 162

Fredrick K. KOCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT, Sherwood D. Lake, Jr., and John Doe, Unidentified Brattleboro Police Officer, Defendant-Appellees.

No. 875.

Docket No. 01-7504.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued February 28, 2002.

Decided March 29, 2002.

David A. Gibson, Brattleboro, VT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kevin J. Coyle, Burlington, VT; Nancy Goss Sheahan, McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan Burlington, VT, of counsel, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before KEARSE, JACOBS, and KEITH,^* Circuit Judges.

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Fredrick Koch ("Koch") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants Town of Brattleboro, Vermont, Deputy Sheriff Sherwood D. Lake ("Lake"), and Police Officer John Doe on Koch's civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Koch alleged that the Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when Lake and another officer (later identified as Marshall Holbrook) placed Koch in custody after entering his home without a search warrant, arrest warrant, or other justification. The district court held that because the Defendants did not violate Koch's Fourth Amendment rights, Koch had no cause of action. Although we agree that the police's initial entry into Koch's house was proper, as was their later entry into a second floor room, we find it unnecessary to decide whether their presence in the house between these two events, over Koch's objection, violated Koch's Fourth Amendment rights. Because the law on that question is not clearly established, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

I. Factual Background

The district court succinctly summarized many of the facts:

Fred Koch was 70 years old at the time of his arrest. He has suffered from bipolar disorder for many years and is required under conditions of state probation to take lithium on a daily basis. His mental illness has caused him to behave inappropriately in social situations on many occasions and his behavior has often required police intervention. At the time of the arrest at issue here, Lake had known Koch for about 15 years and was aware of his mental illness. He considered Koch to pose a danger under certain circumstances.

On March 9, 1997, the Brattleboro Police Department (Police) received a complaint that Koch had, after attempting to run the complainants' car off the road, pinned their parked car so as to impede their ability to exit the car, and then threatened them physically and orally. Later that day, the Police received a second complaint from another citizen that Koch had blocked her car with his vehicle and then attempted to keep her from leaving a parking lot. At some point, Lake reported these complaints to the state's attorney, James Maxwell, who advised Lake to charge Koch with two felony counts of Unlawful Restraint in the second degree.

On March 17, 1997, Lake and Holbrook went to Koch's residence in separate squad cars "to either give [him] a citation or bring [him] to the station for processing in connection with the events of March 9th." They had not requested or received a search warrant or arrest warrant.

Dist. Ct. Op. at 2,3.

At Koch's house, Doris Reed, a friend of Koch's, answered the door. Reed invited the officers in and told them that Koch was upstairs. Lake knew that Reed and Koch were friends. He thought that they might be companions, knew she was often at Koch's home, and frequently saw them in each other's company. Lake also knew that Reed lived at a separate residence.

After the officers entered the house, Koch, standing at the top of the stairs, told them to leave. The officers did not leave, but followed Reed up the stairs towards Koch.¹ Koch remained angry and orally abusive at the officers' continued presence. Lake told Koch that he wanted to speak to him. While they continued up the stairs, Koch went into a room on the second floor.

Lake and Reed knocked on the door to that room. Koch opened the door, Reed vanished inside the room, and Koch locked the door. At this point, according to his deposition testimony, Lake was concerned for Reed's safety. He banged on the door, but Koch refused to open it. Using a fire extinguisher pin hung on the wall, Lake picked the lock and opened the door. After entering the room, Lake realized that Koch was not a threat to Reed, Holbrook, or himself; however, Koch was agitated. Lake believed that Koch had begun to lose control. The officers then handcuffed Koch and transported him to the police department. Koch did not resist. He was released from custody within an hour or two and given a citation to appear in court the next day. Koch was arraigned on March 19, 1997, and his charges were amended to two counts of disorderly conduct.

Koch then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, alleging that the Defendants had violated his civil rights by violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted it in whole. Koch then filed the instant appeal.

II. Standard of Review

This Panel reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Irby v. New York City Transit Authority, 262 F.3d 412, 413 (2d Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This standard places the initial burden on the moving party to identify "those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a moving party has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court must read all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III. Discussion

A. Qualified Immunity and Municipal Liability

When determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity, we ordinarily begin with a two-step test. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). First, we determine whether a constitutional right was violated. See Dela Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). Then, we determine whether that right was "clearly established." Id. at 1069. "`The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). "If the controlling law is not clearly established, an official cannot be liable, because `a reasonable person would not be expected to know how to structure his conduct to avoid liability.'" Id. (citing Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir.1994)).

Although we normally apply this two-step test, where we are convinced that the purported constitutional right violated is not "clearly established," we retain the discretion to refrain from determining whether, under the first step of the test, a constitutional right was violated at all. See Horne v. Coughlin III, 191 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.1999). cert. denied 528 U.S. 1052, 120 S.Ct. 594, 145 L.Ed.2d 493 (1999). In such an instance, we may rely exclusively on qualified immunity to decide a case. Id. This procedure avoids the undesirable practice of unnecessarily adjudicating constitutional matters. See id. at 246. The principle concern directing us to decide the constitutional issue, however, is the "likelihood that the question will escape federal court review over a lengthy period" because federal courts will repeatedly rely on qualified immunity to decide cases. Id. at 249. Were this to happen, the right would never be "clearly established" because courts would habitually avoid the question. Id.

Here, there is little chance that any unsettled constitutional issues raised will escape federal review for long. The facts of this case are not ones that only occur in § 1983 cases. More often, they will be litigated during a motion to suppress in a criminal trial. At such a time, the court will not be able to avoid deciding the constitutional questions raised in this case. Therefore, where appropriate, we refrain from determining whether Koch's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. On such issues, summary judgment was appropriate for the Defendant-officers because Koch cannot point to the existence of a "clearly established" right. Similarly, summary judgment was appropriate for the Defendant-municipality on Koch's claim that it failed to train its employees properly, because its employees did not violate, or are not likely to violate, a "clearly established federal constitutional right" — a prerequisite for municipal liability under a failure to train theory. Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964, 120 S.Ct. 398, 145 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). On other issues, where a violation of a clearly established constitutional right is alleged, Koch's claims fail because the Defendants did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

B. Fourth Amendment Claims

The Fourth Amendment states that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's "central requirement is one of reasonableness." Illinois v. McArthur,...