Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara

• Citation: 288 F.3d 375
• Decision Date: 12 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99-56887.,99-56887.
• Parties: Ann DANIEL; Leonard Hill, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA; All Persons Unknown, Claiming any Right, Title Estate Lien or Interest in or to the w/in Described Property; Does, 1-1000 inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

288 F.3d 375

Ann DANIEL; Leonard Hill, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA; All Persons Unknown, Claiming any Right, Title Estate Lien or Interest in or to the w/in Described Property; Does, 1-1000 inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-56887.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 4, 2001.

Filed March 12, 2002.

Withdrawn April 18, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven A. Amerikaner, Hatch & Parent, Santa Barbara, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Stephen Shane Stark, Alan L. Seltzer and William M. Dillon, County of Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, for the defendants-appellees.

Peter H. Kaufman, Attorney General's Office, San Diego, CA, for Amicus California Coastal Commission.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 98-09453-MMM.

Before TROTT, McKEOWN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The Opinion filed March 12, 2002, and appearing in the advance sheets at 282 F.3d 1196, is hereby withdrawn and replaced by the attached opinion.

With the filing of this new opinion, the panel has voted unanimously to DENY the petition for rehearing filed by Appellees County of Santa Barbara, et al. on March 26, 2002.

The panel has also voted unanimously to DENY the petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc filed by Appellants Daniel and Hill on March 26, 2002. The full court has been advised of the petition for en banc rehearing, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35(b).

OPINION

WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Ann Daniel and Leonard Hill ("the Daniels") purchased beachfront property in Santa Barbara County ("the County") in 1997. In 1974, Carl Johnson, one of the Daniels' predecessors in interest, made a 25-year "firm, continuing" Offer to Dedicate to the County a five-foot-wide pedestrian and bicycle easement across the property. In 1977, Johnson renewed the offer. These two Offers to Dedicate were exacted by the County in return for granting permits to Johnson to divide and then to build on the property. In 1987, W. Bruce and Darleine Bucklew ("the Bucklews"), also predecessors in interest, made a 25-year "irrevocable" Offer to Dedicate the same five-foot easement. All three Offers to Dedicate were matters of public record.

In 1998, shortly after the Daniels' purchase of the property (and within the 25-year periods of all three Offers to Dedicate), the County accepted the Offer to Dedicate made by the Bucklews. The Daniels challenged the County's action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the federal Constitution. They also alleged violations of state law. The County successfully moved to dismiss the complaint, and the Daniels appeal the dismissal of their § 1983 claim. We affirm the district court.

I

In 1997, the Daniels purchased beachfront property in Santa Barbara County that had once been part of a larger parcel owned by Johnson. In 1973 and 1974 Johnson had divided the original parcel into four separate parcels; the division included a thirty-foot-wide driveway and a five-foot-wide passageway to the beach for the common use of the owners of the four parcels. A regional commission of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission ("Coastal Commission" or "Commission")¹ approved the division, conditioned on Johnson's

offer[ing] for dedication to the County of Santa Barbara or its successor in jurisdiction, for recreational pedestrian and bicycle access an easement 5' in width from Padaro Lane to the mean high tide line.... Said offer shall be a firm continuing offer of dedication which is not rejected or vitiated by failure to accept or purported rejection for a period of 25 years, unless the County has in the meantime provided beach access within a distance of 300 yards upcoast or downcoast of this parcel. The offer of dedication shall be conditioned on assumption by the County of Santa Barbara or its successor, of the burden of maintenance of the easement and the beach area to which access is provided, together with the burden of public liability on the easement.

(Emphasis added.) Johnson appealed the imposition of this Firm Continuing Offer to Dedicate ("FCOTD") to the Commission, which affirmed the regional commission's decision. Johnson brought no judicial challenge to the administrative decision.

In 1977, Johnson applied to the Coastal Commission for a permit to build a house on the parcel that is now owned by the Daniels. The permit was approved by the Commission, conditioned on a renewal of the 25-year FCOTD described above. Johnson built the house under the permit in 1978, and he did not challenge the imposition of the renewed FCOTD either administratively or judicially.

The Bucklews owned the parcel on which Johnson built the house as successors in interest. In August 1987, in response to a demand by the Commission, the Bucklews signed a 25-year Irrevocable Offer to Dedicate ("IOTD") the same five-foot easement described in the two FCOTDs granted by Johnson. The Bucklews did not challenge the Commission's demand for the IOTD either administratively or judicially.

The Daniels purchased the Johnson/Bucklew property in 1997. On September 15, 1998, the County notified them that on October 6, 1998, it would consider whether to accept the Bucklews' 1987 IOTD. On October 5, 1998, the Daniels unsuccessfully attempted to rescind it. On October 20, 1998, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution accepting the 1987 IOTD.

In November 1998, the Daniels filed suit against the County for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a physical taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. They also alleged several violations of state law. On motion by the County, the district court dismissed the takings claim. It held that the Daniels lacked standing because all the Offers to Dedicate were attached to the property at the time they purchased it. Alternatively, the district court held that any takings claims accrued in 1974 and 1977, and in any event no later than 1987, and were therefore time-barred. Finally, the district court held that even if the Daniels had standing and their takings claim was not time-barred, the claim would not be ripe because the Daniels could not allege that the state had refused to compensate them or their predecessors for the alleged taking. The district court then dismissed the supplemental state claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Daniels appeal the dismissal of their takings claim.

II

We review questions of law de novo. See McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir.1999). "A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle it to relief." Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2000). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissals for failure to state a claim or for lack of standing are reviewed de novo. See Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1149; Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.2000). Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is reviewed de novo. See Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir.1999). Ripeness is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir.1998).

Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the government may not take "property ... for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960).

We affirm the district court's dismissal of the Daniels' takings claim on two independently sufficient grounds. First, the Daniels' claim is an impermissible attempt to revive the time-barred claims of their predecessors in interest. Second, the injunctive and declaratory remedy sought by the Daniels is, in any event, not available under the takings claim they seek to bring.

III

We first examine the takings claims of the Daniels' predecessors in interest, Johnson and the Bucklews. Johnson's and the Bucklews' claims arising out the exaction of the offers to dedicate can plausibly be characterized as either regulatory or physical takings. Under either characterization, Johnson and the Bucklews are time-barred from pursuing those claims. The Daniels, as their successors in interest, are similarly time-barred. They may not bring a claim based on the exaction of the offers to dedicate, or on the later acceptance of one of those offers.

A

We think it most plausible to characterize Johnson's and the Bucklews' claims as alleged regulatory rather than physical takings. The Coastal Commission regulated the development of private property along the California coast, including the Johnson/Bucklew property. As part of that regulation, it granted permission to subdivide the parcel and to build on one of the four lots in return for Johnson's agreement to grant the two FCOTDs. The Commission did not grant anything in exchange for the Bucklews' grant of the IOTD, but the Bucklews' grant was part of the ongoing regulatory process that had begun with Johnson's grant of the first FCOTD in 1974.

Under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission...