Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky.

• Decision Date: 07 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-6538.,00-6538.
• Citation: 289 F.3d 417
• Parties: Charles Michael PRATER; Eugene Hollis; and Lynn Sowder, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF BURNSIDE, KENTUCKY; Richard Sadler; Conrad Bryant; Henry D. Coffey; Emma Branum; Dean Lovins; Delores Sizelove; and David Brummett, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

289 F.3d 417

Charles Michael PRATER; Eugene Hollis; and Lynn Sowder, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF BURNSIDE, KENTUCKY; Richard Sadler; Conrad Bryant; Henry D. Coffey; Emma Branum; Dean Lovins; Delores Sizelove; and David Brummett, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-6538.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 22, 2002.

Decided and Filed May 7, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bryan Scott Hicks (argued and briefed), Cincinnati, OH, A.C. Donahue, Donahue Law Group, Somerset, KY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jeffrey Scott Lawless (argued and briefed), Travis, Pruitt & Lawless, Somerset, KY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Mark B. Stern, Michael S. Raab, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Intervenor.

Before: NORRIS, SILER, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Main Street Baptist Church, through its pastor and trustees, brought suit in federal district court against the City of Burnside, Kentucky, as well as against the City's mayor and several council members, asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). These claims arose from the City's decision to develop a previously dedicated roadway located between two lots owned by the Church. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the Church's § 1983 claim and dismissed sua sponte the Church's RFRA cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Summit Avenue is a dedicated public roadway that runs in a north-south direction within the City. This roadway has long been developed north of its intersection with Central Avenue. But the portion of Summit Avenue that runs south of Central Avenue was not developed until 1997. The development of this portion of Summit Avenue, referred to by the parties as "Summit Avenue Extended," gives rise to the present controversy.

Summit Avenue Extended and U.S. Route 27 run parallel to each other south of Central Avenue, with U.S. Route 27 lying to the east of Summit Avenue Extended. The Church owns a lot that lies between the two streets (Lot 1). Central Avenue marks the northern boundary of Lot 1. The Church also owns a second lot that abuts the western side of Summit Avenue Extended (Lot 2). Central Avenue marks the northern boundary of Lot 2 as well. The Burnside Masonic Lodge owns a large lot that abuts both the western edge of U.S. Route 27 and the southern boundary of Lots 1 and 2, on which the Lodge operates the Burnside Cemetery. Summit Avenue Extended terminates at the northern boundary of the Cemetery.

A 1949 plat of the City shows that Lots 1 and 2 had once been planned as a residential development, with each lot subdivided into nine individual parcels. Summit Avenue Extended would have provided the only street access to the Lot 2 parcels. The Church, however, abandoned the planned residential development when it acquired Lots 1 and 2 in 1985. It intended to locate its building and parking area on Lot 1, with Lot 2 reserved for future expansion.

The Church's design plan located its building near the western boundary of Lot 1, less than 20 feet from Summit Avenue Extended. A City ordinance, however, requires that structures be located at least 20 feet from a public roadway. To avoid violating this ordinance, the Church requested that the City close the dedicated roadway for Summit Avenue Extended and thus allow the Church to consolidate Lots 1 and 2.

The City refused the request, and subsequently brought suit in state court to enforce the above-referenced ordinance. This suit was resolved after the Church dedicated the land necessary to move the roadway for Summit Avenue Extended several feet to the west, which gave the Church's building the necessary clearance from the planned roadway. The City approved the rededication of Summit Avenue Extended in 1988. Its suit against the Church was then dismissed for failure to prosecute in 1989.

In June of 1996, the City adopted a resolution to proceed with the development of Summit Avenue Extended. The purpose of the development was to provide direct public access to a shelter being constructed within the Cemetery. This shelter, located near the point where Summit Avenue Extended terminates at the Cemetery's northern boundary, is designed to facilitate grave-side funeral services.

The City informed the Church of the resolution in late June of 1996. This led the Church to once again request that the City permanently close Summit Avenue Extended. The City then put the development of Summit Avenue Extended on hold and invited the Church to submit an alternative proposal. By November of 1996, however, the Church had not yet responded. Instead, the Church sought a temporary restraining order in state court.

The Church's complaint alleged that the proposed development of Summit Avenue Extended would violate various provisions of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, as well as RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4. In November of 1996, the state court issued a temporary restraining order that prohibited the City from developing Summit Avenue Extended. One month later, however, the court granted the City's motion to dissolve the restraining order. The court then granted the City's motion to dismiss the Church's complaint in February of 1997, which, over the City's objection, was dismissed without prejudice.

In March of 1997, the Church finally submitted a formal proposal for an alternative route of access to the Cemetery shelter. This proposal was rejected by the City the following month. The City began the development of Summit Avenue Extended shortly thereafter.

In May of 1997, the Church, through its pastor and trustees, brought the present lawsuit against the City, as well as against the City's mayor and several council members, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The Church asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, RFRA, and various provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. In suing under § 1983, the Church alleged that the City had violated the Free Exercise, Free Speech, Freedom of Assembly, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Both the City and the Church filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In August of 1999, the district court granted partial summary judgment to the City on the basis that the Church had failed to establish any violation of the First Amendment. Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court had declared RFRA unconstitutional, the court also dismissed the Church's RFRA claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. After receiving additional briefing from the parties, the court granted summary judgment to the City on the remainder of the Church's § 1983 claim in September of 2000. Having dismissed all of the Church's federal claims, the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the Church's state-law claims.

The Church now appeals. First, the Church maintains that it offered sufficient evidence to sustain its claim under § 1983, relying specifically on the City's alleged violations of the Takings Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Due Process Clause. Second, the Church argues that it has established a violation of RFRA, as amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

This court reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only where there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The district court's dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also reviewed de novo. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). When deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "[t]he court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of [the] factual allegations as true." Id. (citation omitted). A claim should not be dismissed "`unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Buchanan v. Apfel, 249 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Church maintains that the district court erred in granting the City summary judgment on the Church's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that provides recovery for constitutional deprivations incurred under the color of state law. According to the Church, the City violated several constitutional provisions when it chose to develop rather than permanently close Summit Avenue...