29,470 La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/97, State v. Jackson

Decision Date20 August 1997
Parties29,470 La.App. 2 Cir
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

John F. Brewer, Jr. and Richard Goorley, Shreveport, for Appellant.

Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul Carmouche, District Attorney, Hugo A. Holland, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

Before HIGHTOWER, BROWN and STEWART, JJ.

[29,470 La.App. 2 Cir. 1] HIGHTOWER, Judge.

Addressing two counts of first degree murder, La. R.S. 14:30, a jury found Antonio Jackson guilty of one count of second degree murder, La. R.S. 14:30.1, and one count of manslaughter, La. R.S. 14:31. The court ordered that, for these respective offenses, Jackson serve consecutive life-without-benefit and forty-year terms of imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant now appeals the convictions and sentences. We affirm.

FACTS

On June 9, 1994, Randall Glenn Thomas, Joseph Jackson, and defendant planned the armed robbery of Burford's Grocery Store in Keithville, Louisiana. 1 The following morning, the trio placed scarves over their lower faces, armed themselves, and went into the front part of the establishment demanding money from David and Glenn Lacobee, the father and son proprietors. Glenn's mother and David's wife, Helen Lacobee, quickly moved into the store's office. When Thomas attempted to force him to hand over the money from the cash register, David Lacobee drew his own pistol and the pair exchanged fire, injuring Thomas and fatally wounding the elder victim. 2 Thomas then ran from the store and drove away in the robbers' vehicle. One of the Jacksons next shot and killed Glenn Lacobee kneeling by the safe in the rear of the store, despite his compliance with the malefactors' demands. Joseph Jackson then removed approximately $400 in change from the safe.

After fleeing the store, the Jacksons ran through some nearby woods to a highway. They then caught a ride to Shreveport, before taking a bus home. Some ten days later, an anonymous caller led investigators from the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office ("CPSO") to the Jacksons. After officers visited the residence of Martha Jackson (Joseph's sister and defendant's mother), the three men agreed to go to CPSO to discuss the case.

[29,470 La.App. 2 Cir. 2] They soon each confessed to participating in the robbery. Thomas also admitted shooting David Lacobee, but both of the Jacksons denied shooting Glenn Lacobee. Even so, investigators identified Antonio Jackson's palm prints on a meat counter in the back of the store near Glenn Lacobee's body. Charged with two counts of first degree murder Antonio Jackson proceeded to trial in early 1996.

DISCUSSION
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In this first assignment of error, defendant complains that the trial court failed to suppress his inculpatory statement and two photographic identifications.

Inculpatory Statement

Defendant contends that police conduct in obtaining his inculpatory statement violated the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Thomas, supra, however, we exhaustively considered and rejected the identical argument. Defendant gave his statement under essentially the same circumstances as Thomas, and later joined him in the same motion to suppress. With defendant failing to raise any new issue or show further circumstances peculiar to his treatment, we find Thomas dispositive regarding the admissibility of the statement presently before us. This aspect of the assignment is without merit.

Photographic Identifications

Next, defendant curiously urges the suppression of two photographic identifications never introduced at trial. All the same, the trial court denied a motion to suppress that failed to specify any particular identifications.

On appeal, defendant designates the two alleged identifications as coming from Lisa Boyd and Hulon Carkeet, the first of these individuals being near the store on the morning in question and the other having driven the bus the Jacksons rode after the incident. The record, however, does not reveal Boyd's participation in a photographic lineup. Furthermore, at trial, she never pointed out the defendant or mentioned a line-up, nor did any witness testify regarding her alleged identification. Notably too, the denial of the motion to suppress addressed only Carkeet's identification of the Jacksons in two [29,470 La.App. 2 Cir. 3] photo line-ups conducted after the police received their inculpatory statements. Still, Carkeet did not testify at trial, nor did any witness refer to his identification. These facts, then, fail to disclose any prejudice to defendant. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 921. Accordingly, this portion of the assignment of error is also without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

This assignment asserts that the trial court wrongly found defendant competent to stand trial despite psychological evaluations and tests showing him both without the capacity to assist counsel and characterized as mentally retarded.

In accordance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 641 et seq., the defense filed a Motion for Appointment of a Sanity Commission. Later, after defendant's examination by the appointed commission and a hearing directed at competency, the court found Jackson able to proceed to trial. 3

Three persons testified at the sanity hearing. For "a little over an hour" in early 1996, Dr. George Seiden, forensic psychiatrist, examined the accused and found him competent to stand trial. He explored defendant's grasp concerning first degree murder, the possible penalties for murder and armed robbery, the concepts of guilt and innocence, the roles of the jury and both attorneys in determining guilt, the judge's role in sentencing, and the possibility of a plea bargain. While not understanding the significance of the sanity commission until provided an explanation, defendant said if he testified he would tell the jury that "he was in the wrong place at the wrong time." Although reluctant to discuss the facts at first, he later related to the doctor about being in the store with "those men," hearing shots fired, not understanding the events, falling to the floor and hiding, and then leaving the store.

While generally able to respond to Dr. Seiden's questions, defendant had some difficulty interpreting proverbs such as "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." [29,470 La.App. 2 Cir. 4] This inability, attributed to a lower-than-average intelligence, did not indicate to the psychiatrist that Jackson would be unable to understand questions put to him.

To arrive at his opinion, Dr. Seiden relied upon both interviews and psychological testing. Although not disagreeing with the unfavorable test results, he found these indeterminate of defendant's competence to stand trial. Dr. Seiden explained that subnormal intelligence alone does not necessarily equate to such incompetency, and, also, that defendant's psychological test results reflect his possible "malingering," or deliberate attempts to appear less intelligent.

Dr. Dean Robinson, psychiatrist, interviewed the defendant for approximately twenty minutes and found his answers to be internally consistent, i.e., he did not contradict himself at any point and had no problem understanding straightforward questions. This expert essentially agreed with the conclusions of Dr. Seiden. In Dr. Robinson's view, psychological testing is a valuable adjunct to interviews and, if the two results differ, collaboration with psychologists may sometimes be necessary.

After cumulatively spending about eight hours in some six meetings with defendant, Dr. Michael Johnson, a psychologist licensed in 1994, found Jackson incompetent to stand trial due to intellectual deficits. Dr. Johnson gauged defendant's IQ on the Wechsler scale to be 64 or 65, and two other tests contravened certain suggestions of malingering. This expert acknowledged, however, that some of Jackson's poor responses to open-ended questions, like "What are your legal rights?" or "What is a verdict?," could have been the result of "stonewalling" rather than low intelligence.

Dr. Johnson based his conclusion largely upon two psychological tests, viz., the Georgia Court Competency Test and the Court Competency Incomplete Sentences Blank. A "passing" or competent score on the Georgia test is 70, scores between 60 and 70 are marginal, and those below 60 are failing. Defendant scored 54. Compared to a passing mark of 20 on the incomplete sentence test, defendant scored 17. The psychologist felt that objective test results provide more accurate predictors of mental abilities than do interview-based opinions. In a letter reporting his evaluation, Dr. Johnson noted [29,470 La.App. 2 Cir. 5] defendant's difficulty in remembering details of the crime, his lack of understanding about the consequences of a guilty plea, and his inability to state his height, weight, date of arrest, or the present date. In regard to the possibility of malingering, the written summary also acknowledged that "[h]is scores may reflect exaggeration of or deliberate feigning of intellectual limits."

It is fundamental, of course, that a defendant who lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist counsel in preparing a defense may not be subjected to trial. La.C.Cr.P. art. 641; Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); State v. Brooks, 541 So.2d 801 (La.1989); State v. Lott, 27,849 (La.App.2d Cir. 04/03/96), 671 So.2d 1182. Mental retardation or subnormal intelligence, however, is not in itself proof of incapacity. State v. Lawrence, 368 So.2d 699 (La.1979). For a discussion of the appropriate considerations in determining competency, see State v. Bennett, 345 So.2d 1129 (La.1977). Because Louisiana law presumes sanity, the defendant faces the burden of establishing his incapacity. State v. Brooks, supra; State v. Bennett, supra; State v. Lott, supra. Furthermore, the determination of competency is ultimately the...

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