Roberts v. Singletary

Citation29 F.3d 1474
Decision Date10 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-4780,92-4780
PartiesRickey Bernard ROBERTS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Martin J. McClain, Chief Asst. Capital Collateral Representative, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Thomas H. Dunn, Sp. Asst. Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, FL, for appellant.

Ralph Barreira, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fariba Komeily, Miami, FL, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

Rickey Bernard Roberts ("Roberts"), a Florida prison inmate convicted in 1985 of first-degree murder, armed sexual battery, and armed kidnapping, appeals the district court's judgment denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, and after hearing oral argument, we conclude that the district court correctly denied habeas relief and, accordingly we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Following Roberts' convictions and penalty proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death. After independent consideration of the facts of the case, the trial judge accepted the recommendation of the jury and imposed a death sentence. Roberts' convictions and sentences 1 were affirmed on direct appeal. Roberts v. State, 510 So.2d 885 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1123, 99 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). Roberts filed a state habeas petition under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 which was summarily denied. The denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed on appeal. Roberts v. State, 568 So.2d 1255 (Fla.1990). Roberts then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and thereafter denied relief. Roberts v. Singletary, 794 F.Supp. 1106 (S.D.Fla.1992).

The factual background of this case has been recounted in the prior opinions of the federal district court and the Florida Supreme Court; however, we provide a brief recitation of the relevant events. According to the state's key witness, Michelle Rimondi ("Rimondi"), during the early morning hours of June 4, 1984, she, the murder victim, George Napoles ("Napoles"), and Rimondi's friend Jammie Campbell ("Campbell") were parked on the beach off the Rickenbacker Causeway near Key Biscayne, Florida, drinking wine. Campbell fell asleep in the front passenger seat in Napoles' Dodge Omni. Roberts approached the Omni and asked Napoles and Rimondi what they were doing at the beach and asked for identification. Suspecting that Roberts was an undercover beach patrol officer, Napoles gave Roberts his driver's license. Roberts first frisked Napoles and then frisked Rimondi. When Roberts touched Rimondi on the breasts and thighs, Napoles became suspicious and asked Roberts for some identification.

Roberts took Napoles to his car, supposedly to retrieve some identification, and reached into the back seat and pulled out a baseball bat. Roberts then forcibly brought Napoles back to the Omni where he ordered Rimondi to face the interior of the Omni and not turn around. Looking over her right arm, Rimondi saw Roberts repeatedly hit Napoles in the back of the head with the bat. Rimondi testified she was unable to scream. Roberts then pushed Napoles' body towards the beach. Still holding the bat, he grabbed Rimondi and pulled her near the body and told her that if she did not take her clothes off she "was going to get just like George or worse." R.--VII, 2187.

When it appeared that someone might be coming, Roberts told Rimondi to get dressed and forced her into his car where he eventually raped her. Roberts then left the beach with Rimondi. Realizing that he had lost his wallet, Roberts returned to the beach with Rimondi, found the wallet and checked on Napoles. Rimondi testified that Napoles was still alive at that time, with a very faint pulse. Roberts raped Rimondi a second time before taking her to her sister's boyfriend's house where she was staying that weekend. Napoles' body was discovered later that morning.

Soon after Napoles' body was discovered, Rimondi informed the police that a black man wearing a shirt with the name "Rick" on it had killed Napoles and raped her. After receiving a tip that Roberts was the "Rick" responsible for the crime, detectives questioned Roberts concerning the incident. Rimondi identified both Roberts and his car. Roberts initially denied being on Key Biscayne in the past two months. However, after learning that his palm print was detected on the roof of Napoles' Omni, Roberts admitted being on the Key during the early morning hours of June 4. He maintained that he picked up Rimondi while she was hitchhiking on the causeway. According to Roberts' trial testimony, Rimondi told him that she needed a ride home because her friends had passed out from drinking wine. Roberts claims that after Rimondi got into his car, she asked him to return to her friend's car to get her purse. While Rimondi was getting her purse, Roberts claims to have leaned into the car to look at her friend on the front seat, placing his hand on the roof. According to Roberts, after retrieving the purse, he then drove Rimondi home. Roberts claimed he never saw Napoles and did not rape Rimondi.

II. ISSUES

Roberts raises nine issues on appeal:

1. Whether the application of Florida's Rape Shield Statute violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments where Roberts was precluded from cross-examining a State's witness about her occupation as a prostitute which gave her a potential motive and where he was precluded from testifying about her statement to him concerning her occupation as a prostitute.

2. Whether the withholding of material exculpatory evidence from the defense violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

3. Whether the refusal to disclose during a deposition the contents of statements of a State's witness to an agent of the State violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

4. Whether the trial court's ruling that Roberts could not cross-examine several State's witnesses about pending charges violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

5. Whether Roberts was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt-innocence phase of his capital trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

6. Whether Roberts was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel when counsel failed to raise meritorious issues on appeal.

7. Whether Roberts was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his capital penalty phase.

8. Whether Roberts' sentencing jury was inadequately instructed regarding the aggravating circumstances.

9. Whether Roberts was deprived of his right to have the sentencer consider valid mitigating factors.

The district court found several of Roberts' claims to be procedurally defaulted and found no merit to Roberts' remaining claims for relief. We affirm the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief for all of the reasons expressed in its thorough and articulate opinion. See Roberts v. Singletary, 794 F.Supp. 1106 (S.D.Fla.1992). We feel compelled, however, to address separately several issues raised by Roberts in this appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

"In reviewing a petition filed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, we presume that factual findings made by a state court are correct. We review factual conclusions made by the district court under the clearly erroneous standard. We review mixed questions of fact and law de novo." Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1010 (11th Cir.1992) (citations and footnote omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1625, 123 L.Ed.2d 183 (1993).

A. Confrontation Clause Issue

Prior to trial, Roberts' defense counsel attempted to discover whether Rimondi gave an inconsistent version of the rape and murder to her rape treatment counselor, Denise Moon ("Moon"). Moon counseled Rimondi on a weekly basis up until the time of trial. At the time the counseling sessions began, Moon was an employee of the State. Shortly after Rimondi's treatment began, Moon joined the state attorney's office as a witness coordinator. At her deposition, Moon refused to reveal the contents of her discussions with Rimondi, relying on Fla.Stat. 90.5035, which grants a sexual assault victim and her counselor a privilege not to reveal confidential communications made during rape counseling. At trial, defense counsel moved to reopen the deposition of Moon. R.--III, 630. The trial court inquired of defense counsel what Rimondi said in her deposition about the content of her discussions with Moon and counsel stated that he did not ask Rimondi about her discussions with Moon. R.--III, 621-22. The trial court denied this motion. R.--III, 630-31.

In his federal habeas petition Roberts contends that under Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), his Sixth Amendment right was violated when he was unable to question Moon regarding any inconsistent statements Rimondi may have made regarding the rape and murder. In its response, the State alleges that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Roberts did not raise it on direct appeal. The district court found the issue to be procedurally defaulted. We agree. 2

Roberts first raised this claim in his State postconviction proceeding under Rule 3.850, Fla.R.Crim.P. The Florida Supreme Court held that the claim was procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal. The court further found that "[n]one of the decisions relied upon in connection with th[is] claim[ ] is such a change in the law as to preclude a procedural bar under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980)." Roberts v. State, 568 So.2d...

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