Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio

• Decision Date: 23 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-3110,93-3110
• Citation: 29 F.3d 238
• Parties: Robert M. THOMPSON; and Larry R. Holdsworth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO; Ralph A. Berry; Sterling G. Sechrist; and John H. Happ, individually and as members of the Board of Commissioners of Medina County; and Al John Ribar, individually and as Sheriff of Medina County, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 238

29 F.3d 238

29 Fed.R.Serv.3d 320

Robert M. THOMPSON; and Larry R. Holdsworth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO; Ralph A. Berry; Sterling G.

Sechrist; and John H. Happ, individually and as members of

the Board of Commissioners of Medina County; and Al John

Ribar, individually and as Sheriff of Medina County,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-3110.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued May 10, 1994.

Decided June 23, 1994.

Thomas Kelley (argued), Robert Armbruster (briefed), Armbruster, Kelley, McKenna & Modugno, Akron, OH, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Timothy T. Reid (briefed), Reid, Berry & Stanard, Cleveland, OH, William L. Thorne, Office of the Pros. Atty., Medina, OH, Andrew M. Wargo (argued), Reid, Berry & Stanard, Cleveland, OH, for defendants-appellees.

Before: MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges; and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Contending that the conditions of confinement in the Medina County Jail violated their constitutional rights, inmates Robert M. Thompson and Larry R. Holdsworth brought suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, against the County of Medina, three members of the County's board of commissioners, and the County's sheriff. Thompson and Holdsworth now appeal, claiming that the district court erred in ruling on defendants' (the "County's") motion for summary judgment before addressing plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and in granting the County's summary judgment motion as to all but two of plaintiffs' claims. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

At the time they brought this action in the winter of 1988, Thompson and Holdsworth were incarcerated at the Medina County Jail as pretrial detainees. Both remained at the facility for over six months.

Thompson and Holdsworth raised the following claims with respect to the operation of the jail:

(1) inadequate ventilation;

(2) inadequate medical care and staffing;

(3) inadequate recreation;

(4) lack of inmate classification;

(5) unsanitary conditions;

(6) inadequate mental treatment programs;

(7) lack of due process in disciplinary proceedings;

(8) lack of access to the courts; and

(9) interference with legal mail.

Alleging that these conditions violated their rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and making related claims under the constitution and laws of the State of Ohio, Thompson and Holdsworth filed suit, individually and on behalf of all present and future inmates of the jail, in federal court on July 11, 1988. On January 9, 1989, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on May 31. On June 24, 1991, the district court, in a well-reasoned memorandum and order, granted summary judgment in favor of the County with respect to all claims except the allegations of denial of access to the courts and denial of due process in disciplinary procedures, and deferred ruling on the motion for class certification. See Thompson v. County of Medina, No. 91-3850 (N.D.Ohio June 24, 1991).

On December 30, 1992, after the district court had certified a class only on the remaining issues of denial of access and discipline, the court approved a consent agreement entered into by the parties resolving these two claims, and designated the June 24, 1991 order, granting in part and denying in part the County's motion for summary judgment, as final and appealable. This timely appeal followed.

II

A

Thompson and Holdsworth initially maintain that the district court erred by considering the merits of their case in deciding whether they would be appropriate class representatives, and abused its discretion by ruling on the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion for class certification. In support of this argument, plaintiffs offer the Supreme Court's observation in Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), that it could "find nothing in either the language or history of [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action." See also Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir.1974) ("when determining the maintainability of a class action, the district court must confine itself to the requirements of Rule 23 and not assess the likelihood of success on the merits"). Because they maintain that they were in fact appropriate class representatives, and had satisfied the other requirements of Rule 23(a), plaintiffs conclude that the district court erred in not certifying the class as to those issues disposed of on summary judgment. We disagree.

Rule 23 provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED.R.CIV.P. 23(c). Addressing an identical plaintiffs' claim to that brought by the plaintiffs here--the district court erred in ruling on a motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on a motion for class certification--the Ninth Circuit held that:

Neither Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 nor due process necessarily requires that the district court rule on class certification before granting or denying a motion for summary judgment. Rule 23 clearly favors early determination of the class issue, but where considerations of fairness and economy dictate otherwise, and where the defendant consents to the procedure, it is within the discretion of the district court to decide the motion for summary judgment first.

Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 545-46 (9th Cir.1984). Similarly, this Court has considered a claim that the district court was required to determine whether a plaintiff's complaint could be maintained as a class action before the court could dismiss the entire action. Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125, 105 S.Ct. 2656, 86 L.Ed.2d 273 (1985). In rejecting this contention, this Court responded directly to the reasoning and precedent relied upon by plaintiffs in the instant matter. As the Marx Court observed:

[Eisen and Weathers ] merely stand for the proposition that when a district court is determining whether a class action may properly be maintained under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the relative merits of the underlying dispute are to have no impact upon the determination of the propriety of the class action. These cases do not establish a broad rule that in all cases the determination of the propriety of a class action must precede any consideration of the merits.

Id. Here, given that many of the violations claimed by Thompson and Holdsworth had been remedied, or never existed, and that neither plaintiffs nor the members of the class were prejudiced by the order of the court's rulings, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that it should decide the motion for summary judgment first. See Wright, 742 F.2d at 544 ("It is reasonable to consider a Rule 56 motion first [ (before ruling on a motion for class certification) ] when early resolution of a motion for summary judgment seems likely to protect both the parties and the court from needless and costly further litigation.").

In regard to the district court's denial of the motion for class certification as to the issues disposed of on summary judgment, Rule 23 provides that members of a class may sue as representative parties on behalf of the entire class only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a). Thompson and Holdsworth, moreover, bore the burden of demonstrating that they satisfied all of these prerequisites. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870, 97 S.Ct. 182, 50 L.Ed.2d 150 (1976). This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for class certification under Rule 23 for abuse of discretion. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.1988). Given these standards, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify a class as to the issues disposed of on summary judgment. Cf. Gwirtz v. Ohio Education Ass'n, 887 F.2d 678, 683 (6th Cir.1989) (declining, in light of a finding that the district court did not err in granting judgment against named plaintiffs, to order district court to certify class nonetheless), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1810, 108 L.Ed.2d 941 (1990).

B

Thompson and Holdsworth contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County on all but two of the issues raised in their complaint. This argument is without merit.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 698 (6th Cir.1993). Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). We view all evidence before us in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the conditions of confinement at the jail violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. First, the Eighth Amendment requires that convicted prisoners held in the Medina County Jail be provided "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)....