Stone v. Quaal

Citation29 N.W. 326,36 Minn. 46
PartiesLane K. Stone and another v. Lars L. Quaal
Decision Date13 October 1886
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Plaintiffs, as mortgagees of a crop of growing wheat, brought this action in a justice's court in Lac qui Parle county alleging that on October 1, 1883, Nelson, the mortgagor, made default in payment of the mortgage debt, ($ 38.82,) whereupon, by the terms of the mortgage, plaintiffs became the owners and entitled to the immediate possession of the mortgaged wheat, and that on or about November 1, 1883, the defendant unlawfully took from plaintiffs' possession and converted to his own use, 60 bushels of such wheat, of the value of $ 48, to plaintiffs' damage in the sum of $ 38.82, for which sum, with interest and costs, judgment is demanded.

The answer was as follows: "Defendant, for answer to plaintiffs' complaint, denies each and every allegation thereof except the execution of the chattel mortgage."

At the trial before the justice, the execution of the mortgage and default in payment were proved, and it appeared that the crop was harvested, and the wheat (80 or 90 bushels) placed in Nelson's granary with 120 bushels of other wheat. Out of this mass Nelson delivered to defendant 51 bushels, and afterwards delivered the rest of it to others than the plaintiffs. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount prayed in the complaint, and the defendant appealed on questions of law alone, to the district court for the same county, where the appeal was heard by Brown, J., who held that the answer was in legal effect an admission of the allegations of the complaint, and ordered judgment of affirmance, from which judgment the defendant appealed.

Judgments of the district court and of the justice reversed.

Volstead & Sorley, for appellant.

H. L. Hayden, for respondents.

Gilfillan C. J. Mitchell, J., concurring. Vanderburgh, J., concurring.

OPINION

Gilfillan, C. J.

The court below erred in holding the denial in the answer to be a negative pregnant, and therefore an admission of the allegations in the complaint. The statute provides that the answer shall contain "a denial of each allegation of the complaint controverted by the defendant, or of any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief." Under this, what is termed the "general denial" has from the beginning been practised and been sanctioned by this court. As usually expressed, this denial is of "each and every allegation" of the whole, or of some clearly-indicated portion, of the pleading to which the denial is in answer, or of the whole or part of such pleading with clearly and definitely expressed exceptions. However expressed, it is sufficient if it clearly shows that the pleader intends to deny "each and every" of the allegations in the whole or of the part of the opposite pleading referred to. This form of denying, instead of specific denials, was adopted from motives of convenience and it has considerations of convenience to commend it. In effect, it is precisely the same as if each of the allegations so denied were specifically and separately referred to and denied. It is of no greater and no less effect. Is no better and no worse denial than such specific and separate denial would be. It puts in issue each allegation of fact to which it relates as fully as though each of such allegations were specifically denied. Thus, in this complaint, it is alleged that "on or about the first day of ...

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