Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police

• Citation: 290 F.3d 567
• Decision Date: 14 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1866.,01-1866.
• Parties: DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY; Port Authority Transit Corporation, a subsidiary of the Delaware River Port Authority v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30, an unincorporated labor organization; James R. Stewart, in his capacity as President of FOP Lodge 30; New Jersey Policemen's Benevolent Association Intercounties Local # 30, an unincorporated labor organization; Anthony Cappello, Jr., in his capacity as President of New Jersey Policeman's Benevolent Association Intercounties Local # 30, Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 567

290 F.3d 567

DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY; Port Authority Transit Corporation, a subsidiary of the Delaware River Port Authority v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30, an unincorporated labor organization; James R. Stewart, in his capacity as President of FOP Lodge 30; New Jersey Policemen's Benevolent Association Intercounties Local # 30, an unincorporated labor organization; Anthony Cappello, Jr., in his capacity as President of New Jersey Policeman's Benevolent Association Intercounties Local # 30, Appellants.

No. 01-1866.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Filed May 14, 2002.

Argued January 17, 2002.

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Charles T. Joyce, (argued), Benjamin Eisner, Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Gary M. Lightman, Lightman & Welby, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for appellants, Fraternal Order of Police, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30 and James R. Stewart.

Patrick Matusky, (argued), Jerome J. Shestack, Laura E. Krabill, Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, William H. Roberts, Peter A. Gold, Scott A. Mayer, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for appellees, Delaware River Port Authority and Port Authority Transit Corporation.

Donald F. Burke, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Newark, New Jersey, for Amici Curiae—appellee, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

David B. Greenfield, Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, New York City, for Amici Curiae—appellee, The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.

Michael Houghton, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Delaware, Richard S. Mroz, Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, for Amici Curiae—appellee, The Delaware River and Bay Authority.

BEFORE: SCIRICA and ROSENN, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge^*.

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

At issue is whether we should give preclusive effect to a state court judgment on a collective bargaining matter. In a declaratory judgment action, the District Court held that despite a prior New Jersey judgment, the Delaware River Port Authority had no duty under its congressionally approved bi-state compact to recognize certain collective bargaining rights of supervisory employees. We will reverse.

I.

In 1999 the Fraternal Order of Police, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30 ("Lodge 30") and the Policemen's Benevolent Association Intercounties Local 30 ("Local 30") sought recognition and the right to collectively bargain for supervisory law enforcement personnel from the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA) and the Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO), a subsidiary of the DRPA. A majority of "superior officers" — corporals and sergeants with supervisory capacity — employed by the DRPA and the PATCO had authorized the unions to represent them as their exclusive bargaining agents.¹

The DRPA sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that (1) the authority to fix and determine terms and conditions of employment, including compensation of the superior officers, rests solely with the DRPA; and (2) the DRPA was not required to recognize or bargain collectively with the unions. The unions contended a prior New Jersey judgment merited preclusive effect. Fraternal Order of Police, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30 v. DRPA, 323 N.J.Super. 444, 733 A.2d 545, 547 (1999), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 663, 745 A.2d 1213 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1275, 120 S.Ct. 2743, 147 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000) ("Lodge 30").

There is a prior history of labor-management relations between the parties. In 1975, the DRPA voluntarily recognized Lodge 30 as the collective bargaining agent for DRPA patrol officers and until 1996, negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements.² In 1996, labor negotiations stalled between the DRPA and Lodge 30. After the DRPA altered the employment terms and conditions for patrol officers, Lodge 30 brought suit in New Jersey state court to "require the continuation of good faith bargaining" under the prior arrangement. Id. The New Jersey Superior Court agreed, finding New Jersey and Pennsylvania had "parallel or complementary legislation of a different nature... which ... clearly gives public employees a right to freely organize and designate representatives and also to negotiate in good faith." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Holding the New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes demonstrated a shared public policy favoring labor arbitration, the Superior Court granted Lodge 30's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 547-48.

The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding:

Although neither of the creator states of a bi-state agency may unilaterally impose its legislative will on the bi-state agency ... the agency may be subject to complementary or parallel state legislation.... This parallel or complementary legislation need not be nearly identical and specifically apply to the agency. Rather, the public policy of both states, articulated in parallel statutes that are substantially similar but do not specifically include defendant, is applicable to a bi-state agency, although the statutory scheme of each state is not.

Id. at 551 (quotations and citations omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied a petition for certification. 745 A.2d 1213 (1999). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 530 U.S. 1275 (2000).

The unions cite the preclusive effect of Lodge 30. Additionally, they claim the New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes providing collective bargaining rights to patrol officers also apply to the DRPA. See N.J.STAT.ANN. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp.1993), PA.STAT.ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 et seq. (1961 & Supp.1993). These "complementary" statutory schemes, the unions contend, demonstrate each legislature has "concurred in" the legislation of the other, effectively modifying the DRPA Compact.

The District Court granted the DRPA's motion for summary judgment, concluding that under federal constitutional and statutory law, the DRPA Compact can only be amended by legislation of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania that (1) "expressly applies" to the DRPA; and (2) is "substantially similar" in substance, imposing specific additional duties on the DRPA. DRPA v. Fraternal Order of Police, 135 F.Supp.2d 596, 606-09 (E.D.Pa.2001). Because neither legislature expressly applied their state's labor laws to the DRPA, the District Court ruled the DRPA was not obligated to comply with state laws regarding union recognition and collective bargaining for law enforcement officers. Id. The District Court also rejected the unions' issue preclusion arguments, holding Lodge 30 only addressed the DRPA's obligation to bargain with a voluntarily recognized union. Id. at 609-11.³ This appeal followed.⁴

II.

In 1931, the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania legislatively created the Delaware River Port Authority to develop the ports of Philadelphia and Camden and to operate bridges and provide mass transportation across the Delaware River. N.J.STAT.ANN. § 32:3-2 et seq.; PA.STAT.ANN. tit. 36, § 3503 et seq. Under the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The United States Congress formally approved the DRPA Compact in 1932.

The DRPA is a "public corporate instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey." N.J.STAT.ANN. § 32:3-2, PA.STAT.ANN. tit. 36, § 3503. But it is not an "arm" of either state. Nor is it vested with attributes of state sovereignty. Peters v. DRPA, 16 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (3d Cir. 1994). The DRPA's powers and duties are framed entirely by the Compact. It is governed by a sixteen-member Board of Commissioners.⁵ A majority of each state's delegates to the Board must approve any DRPA action. Id. The Compact allows either state's legislature to grant the DRPA additional powers or impose on it additional duties by passing legislation that is "concurred in by the legislation of the other [state]." N.J.STAT.ANN. § 32:3-5, PA.STAT.ANN. tit. 36, § 3503.

Article IV(e) of the Compact provides the DRPA Commissioners the right to "appoint, hire or employ ... agents and employees, as it may require for the performance of its duties, by contract or otherwise, and fix and determine their qualifications, duties and compensation." N.J.STAT.ANN. § 32:3-5, PA.STAT.ANN. tit. 36, § 3503. Under Article IV(e), the DRPA maintains a Bureau of Police to protect the public and DRPA property. The Bureau consists of patrol officers, sergeants, and corporals, who are accorded "all of the powers ... and all of the immunities conferred by law on police officers or municipal police officers in ... the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." N.J.STAT.ANN. § 32:4-6, PA.STAT ANN. tit. 36, § 3504.1. The DRPA Compact itself does not expressly grant DRPA employees collective bargaining rights. Nor does the Compact impose a duty on the DRPA's management to bargain collectively with unions.

III.

First, we consider whether the District Court wrongfully declined to give issue preclusive effect to Lodge 30, which held that legislation need not "specifically" apply to the DRPA Compact to modify the DRPA's obligations to collectively bargain with its police officers. We exercise plenary review over this question of law.⁶

Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction on an issue necessary to support its judgment is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a cause of action involving a party or one in privity. E.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) ("[T]he usual rule is that merits of a legal claim once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction are not subject to redetermination in another...