People v. Witzkowski
| Decision Date | 30 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 44706,44706 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Valerie A. WITZKOWSKI, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lawrence E. Johnson, State's Atty., Urbana (William M. Goldstein, Asst. State's Atty., and Donald Parkinson, Senior Law Student, of counsel), for the People.
Donald M. Tennant, of Dobbins, Fraker & Tennant, Champaign, for appellee.
The People appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County dismissing a complaint which charged the defendant, Valerie A. Witzkowski, with the offense of interference with a public institution of higher education (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 21.2--2). The complaint charged that the defendant did 'without authority through force or violence, by the use of his (sic) person individually or in concert with others, impede access to or movement within the Illini Union Building, 1306 W. Green, Urbana, Illinois, a building owned, operated or controlled by an institution of higher education, to-wit: Board of Trustees, a body corporate, of the Illinois Industrial University in that he (sic) did knowingly remain within the first floor lobby and corridor in front of Room 129 of said Illini Union after having been given due notice to depart by a University of Illinois Peace Officer in violation of Chapter 38 Section 21.2--2(c) of the Illinois Revised Statutes 1969.' No testimony was taken and the judgment was entered upon allowance of defendant's motion to dismiss based on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. Pursuant to Rule 302(a), Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, c. 110A, § 302(a) appeal was taken directly to this court.
Defendant argued to the trial court, and contends here, that the statute is vague and overbroad and therefore violative of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and sections 2, 4 and 5 of article I of the Illinois constitution of 1970, S.H.A. She argues that because the statute purports to regulate the activities of persons it must set forth ascertainable standards of conduct and cannot be so broad as to deny those persons the right of free assembly and association. The People contend that the activities which the statute purports to regulate are not within the scope of the protection afforded by the first amendment and that the statute is neither vague nor overbroad.
The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
'Sec. 21.2--2. A person commits interference with a public institution of higher education when, on the campus of a public institution of higher education, or at or in any building or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the institution, without authority from the institution he, through force or violence, actual or threatened; * * * (c) knowingly occupies or remains in or at any building, property or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the institution after due notice to depart.
Sec. 21.2--5. For the purposes of this Article the words and phrases described in this Section have the meanings designated in this Section, except when a particular context clearly requires a different meaning.
A person has received 'due notice' if he, or the group of which he is a part, has been given oral or written notice from an authorized representative of the public institution of higher education in a manner reasonably designated to inform him, or the group of which he is a part, that he or they should cease such action or depart from such premises. The notice may also be given by a printed or written notice forbidding entry conspicuously posted or exhibited at the main entrance of the building or other facility, or the forbidden part thereof.
'Force or violence' includes, but is not limited to, use of one's person, individually or in concert with others, to impede access to or movement within or otherwise to interfere with the conduct of the authorized activities of the public institution of higher education, its trustees, employees, students or invitees.'
In support of her contention that the statute is vague and overbroad defendant asserts that the sentence structure and location of the words 'without authority from the institution he' makes the section ambiguous and difficult to interpret and apply. She argues that We agree that the definition of the offense set forth in section 21.2--2 is verbose and redundant, but it is not ambiguous or vague. The essence of the statutory definition is that a person commits interference with a public institution of higher education when 'without authority from the institution he, through force or violence, actual or threatened * * * knowingly occupies or remains in or at any building, property or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the institution after due notice to depart.' In view of the all-encompassing nature of the foregoing language, the phrase 'on the campus of a public institution of higher education, or at or in any building or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the institution' appears to be superfluous, but this does not serve to render the statute vague or overbroad.
Defendant contends next that the definition of 'force or violence' in section 21.2--5 is vague and overly broad in that the phrase 'or otherwise to interfere with the conduct of the authorized activities' could include any conceivable act. In People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392, at page 396, 240 N.E.2d 595, at page 598, in rejecting the contention that sections 26--1(a) and 31--1 of the Criminal Code () were invalid by reason of vagueness and overbreadth, this court said: ...
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