Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Jordan

• Citation: 290 So.2d 484
• Decision Date: 31 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 43696,43696
• Parties: MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL OF GREATER MIAMI, INC., a Florida corporation not for profit, Petitioner, v. Gladys B. JORDAN et al., Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 484

290 So.2d 484

MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL OF GREATER MIAMI, INC., a Florida corporation not for profit, Petitioner, v. Gladys B. JORDAN et al., Respondents.

No. 43696.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 31, 1974.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1974.

Mallory H. Horton, Horton & Perse, Miami, and Lloyd L. Ruskin, Miami Beach, for petitioner.

Davis W. Duke, Jr., McCune, Hiaasen, Crum, Ferris & Gardner, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.

Joe N. Unger, Miami Beach, for amicus curiae, The Greater Miami Jewish Federation.

Woodrow M. Melvin, Jr., and Mark V. Silverio, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole, Miami, for amicus curiae, University of Miami.

McCAIN, Justice.

We have for review a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal which passed upon a question certified by that court to be of great public interest. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.

The salient facts establish that Harry M. Burt executed two pledges of $50,000.00 each in 1968. These pledges were delivered to the petitioner and provided in pertinent part:

'In consideration of and to induce the subscriptions of others, I (We) promise to pay to Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. or order the sum of Fifty Thousand and no/100 dollars $5,000.00 payable herewith: Balance in Nine equal annual installments commencing on January (sic) 1 of . . ..'

Mr. Burt made payments totalling $20,000.00, which were applied equally to the two pledges and upon his death on November 18, 1969, there remained an unpaid balance of $80,000.00. Upon Mr. Burt's death, the petitioner filed a claim for the unpaid balance of the pledges against his estate. The respondents, as executors, objected to this claim. On the basis of these facts, the trial court held in favor of the charities and the respondents appealed.

There being no claim that the petitioner had suffered any material detriment or that any substantial liability had been incurred in reliance upon the subscriptions, the District Court proceeded to reverse and answered negatively the question certified to this Court. That question is:

'(W)hether the recitation in a charitable pledge that it is given in consideration of and to induce the subscription of others constitutes consideration rendering it enforceable by the promisee against the promisor, in the absence of any reliant action thereon by the promisee such as would create promissory estoppel.'

This question has not been before the courts of this State, so, to answer the question, the District Court has adequately reviewed the various approaches utilized in other jurisdictions and we will not restate that survey. The question restated is, whether in the absence of a showing of reliant action on the part of the promisee, is a pledge binding where the only evidence of consideration is to induce the subscription of others? Certainly there is a strong public policy supporting either position: the guarantee of continued economic support for charitable institutions versus the possible deleterious effect upon the decedent's estate. We are not unmindful of these contravening interests.

The scope of charitable pledges is as broad as human imagination and certainly there is no attempt by this Court to draw guidelines encompassing the breadth of creativity but rather to answer the specific questions raised.

A mere gratuitous promise of a future gift, lacking consideration, is simply unenforceable as a nudum pactum. When the gratuitous promise is coupled with an inducement for others to subscribe, the promise is no longer void on its face. This is the situation in this case. The pledge specifically recites that the subscription is made '(in) consideration . . . to induce the subscriptions of others, . . .'

The District Court was eminently correct when it recited the law that:

'For the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be applicable, the promisor must make a promise which he should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the promisee, . . .'

Therefore, in order for a pledge to survive the death of the donor and be considered a valid claim against the estate, two elements must coincidentally exist. First, the document stating the conditions of the pledge must recite with particularity the...