Hicklin v. Coney

• Decision Date: 04 December 1933
• Docket Number: No. 94,94
• Citation: 78 L.Ed. 247,54 S.Ct. 142,290 U.S. 169
• Parties: HICKLIN v. CONEY et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

290 U.S. 169

54 S.Ct. 142

78 L.Ed. 247

HICKLIN

v CONEY et al.

No. 94.

Argued Nov. 17, 1933.

Decided Dec. 4, 1933.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.

Messrs. B. Wofford Wait, of Tampa, Fla., and J. N. Nathans and John P. Grace, both of Charileston, S.C., for appellant.

Mr. Irvine F. Belser, of Columbia, S.C., for appellees.

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Railroad Commission of South Carolina brought this suit in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the state seeking the enforcement of the state statutes regulating transportation by motor vehicles.¹ The peti- tion alleged that the respondents below, including the present appellant, fell within Class F of motor vehicle carriers, that is, those known as contract carriers of property, not proposing to operate upon a regular schedule or over a regular route, and that they were carrying on their business on the public highways without having obtained the required certificates or paying the prescribed license fees. Appellant demurred to the petition and also made return and answer. The petitioners filed reply. Appellant contended that the statutory requirements, as applied to him as a private contract carrier, denied the equal protection of the laws and deprived him of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also, as he was engaged in interstate transportation, were repugnant to the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of the state decided the federal questions adversely to these contentions. 168 S.C. 440, 167 S.E. 674, 679.

First. It was competent for the state in exercising its control over the use of the highways to make reasonable regulations governing that use by private contract carriers. These regulations may require on the part of interstate as well as intrastate carriers the payment of reasonable license fees and the filing of insurance policies to protect the interests of the public by securing compensation for injuries to third persons and their property from the negligent operations of such carriers. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 365, 366, 52 S.Ct. 595, 76 L.Ed. 1155, 81 A.L.R. 1402; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 274, 277, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288. The statutory requirements, in this instance, do not compel private contract carriers to become common carriers. Stephenson v. Binford, supra, 287 U.S. pages 265, 275, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288. The contention that private contract carriers are required to carry 'cargo insurance' (Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577, 45 S.Ct. 191, 69 L.Ed. 445, 36 A.L.R. 1105) is unavailing in view of the construction to the contrary placed upon the statute by the state court. That court said:

'Our statute, however, like that construed in the Stephenson Case, expressly recognizes the distinction between common carriers and private contract carriers; and from an examination of the entire act it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to put common carriers and private contract carriers on the same footing with regard to the matters here complained of. We think, and so hold, that in the case of private carriers, or contract carriers, the provisions of section 8511 extend no further than to require such carriers to execute an indemnity bond, as the commission may prescribe under the provisions of the act, for the protection of the public receiving injury, either in person or in property, by reason of any act of negligence of such private or contract carriers. We do not think it was the intent of the Legislature, in the passage of the act, to require contract carriers to obtain and carry cargo insurance, and we construe the act as not imposing upon them such requirement.'

Appellant complains of this construction of the statute as being contrary to its terms, but that question is not for us. The decision of the state court is controlling as to the meaning and extent of the statutory requirements. St. Louis, Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362, 35 S.Ct. 99, 59 L.Ed. 265; Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 32, 33, 44 S.Ct. 432, 68 L.Ed. 885; American Railway Express Co. v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 273 U.S. 274, 280, 47 S.Ct. 355, 71 L.Ed. 642. Nor does the statute as construed exhibit a fatal defect of indefiniteness. Its requirements as to the appellant, as the state court has defined them, are not uncertain.

Another objection, that the Railroad Commission was authorized to regulate the rates of private contract carriers, was answered by the state court in saying that the Commission had never exercised such a power, 'if any it has under the act,' and hence that appellant had no ground for complaint. This is an adequate answer here on the present showing, as the Court does not deal with academic contentions. Stephenson v. Binford, supra, 287 U.S. page 277, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288.

Second. Appellant insists that an undue burden is placed upon interstate commerce because the license fees are based on the 'carrying capacity' of the vehicles. The state court held that the fees 'are collected, as provided for by section 8517, for the purpose of maintaining the public highways over which such motor vehicles shall operate, as compensation for their use.' The statute provides for the segregation, for this purpose, of the moneys collected. See Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 555—557, 47 S.Ct. 702, 71 L.Ed. 1199. In this view the fees are not open to the objection raised in Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186, 188, 51 S.Ct. 380, 75 L.Ed. 953. Carrying capacity, the size and weight of trucks, unquestionably have a direct relation to the wear and hazards of the highways. It is for this reason that the authority of the state to impose directly reasonable limitations on the weight and size of vehicles, although applicable to interstate carriers, has been sustained. Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143, 47 S.Ct. 548, 71 L.Ed. 966; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388, 389, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167. As the state may establish such regulations directly, the state may adjust its license fees, otherwise valid as being reasonable and exacted as compensation for the use of the highways, according to carrying capacity in furtherance of the same purpose. Clark v. Poor, supra.

Third. The contention that appellant has been denied the equal protection of the laws is based on the discrimination resulting from the exemption of 'farmers or dairymen, hauling dairy or farm products; or lumber haulers engaged in transporting lumber and logs from the forest to the shipping points.' Section 8508. Reliance is placed on our decision in Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 587, 75 L.Ed. 1264. In that case, the statute applied to all carriers for compensation over regular routes and exempted from its provisions 'any transportation company engaged exclusively in the transporting agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm products and fresh and Salt Fish and Oysters and Shrimp from the point of production to the...