291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002), 01-1047, In re Air Crash At Little Rock Arkansas

• Docket Number: 01-1047.
• Citation: 291 F.3d 503
• Date: 29 May 2002
• Parties: In re AIR CRASH AT LITTLE ROCK ARKANSAS, ON JUNE 1, 1999. Anna Lloyd, Appellee, v. American Airlines, Inc. Appellant. United States; Air Transport Association of America, Inc., Amici on Behalf of Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

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291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002)

In re AIR CRASH AT LITTLE ROCK ARKANSAS, ON JUNE 1, 1999.

Anna Lloyd, Appellee,

v.

American Airlines, Inc. Appellant.

United States; Air Transport Association of America, Inc., Amici on Behalf of Appellant.

No. 01-1047.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

May 29, 2002.

Submitted: Oct. 15, 2001.

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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G. Luke Ashley, argued, Dallas, TX, for appellant.

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, argued, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for amicus U.S.A. in support of appellant, American Airlines.

James P. Malcom, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

Before HANSEN,¹ Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

American Airlines appeals the judgment and verdict in favor of Anna Lloyd in this multi-district litigation case. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 1, 1999, American Airlines flight 1420 crashed on the runway at Little Rock Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas. The pilot and ten passengers died as a result of the accident. Anna Lloyd was a passenger on this flight, returning from a three-week trip to Germany and Austria with a group of college singers from Ouachita Baptist University. This incident spawned several lawsuits, and the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated the cases and transferred them to the Eastern District of Arkansas. Because Lloyd was an international passenger, she sued American under the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 876 U.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 note (1994) (the Warsaw Convention). Prior to trial, American moved for leave to file a third-party complaint against the United States for contribution in all cases arising out of the air crash, both domestic and international. The district court granted the motion with regard to the domestic cases, but denied the motion for international cases. The district court ruled that because American signed a series of International Air Transport Association (IATA) intercarrier agreements,² it was liable to the passenger

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in contract, not in tort, and therefore could not be a joint tortfeasor.

At trial, Lloyd's testimony about the accident and her recovery revealed the following facts. Lloyd was seated near the back of the airplane at the time of the crash, and her leg was punctured and scraped by the bolts from an airplane seat. She also suffered traumatic quadriceps tendinitis when other seats fell on her knees. Lloyd was treated for these injuries and smoke inhalation, and released from the hospital on the same night as the crash. Lloyd later saw two doctors concerning her knee injuries and underwent physical therapy for three to four weeks.

Following the accident, Lloyd spent the remainder of the summer with a friend in Texarkana, which is what she had planned to do before the accident, and worked with young children. The next fall, Lloyd returned to Ouachita and continued her studies toward becoming a music teacher. She testified that she was anxious and nervous that semester and struggled to get good grades. However, her cumulative grade point average for the 1999 fall semester was higher than her grade point average before the accident. Further, between the time of the accident and trial, Lloyd had traveled on three more trips with the Ouachita Singers. At the time of trial, Lloyd continued to suffer from flashbacks and panic attacks.

Lloyd scheduled an appointment with a psychiatrist, Dr. Harris, in March 2000. Prior to that appointment, Harris referred Lloyd to a psychological examiner, Dr. VanBlaricom, for testing. VanBlaricom performed psychological assessment tests and provided the results to Harris, who then diagnosed Lloyd as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and a major depressive disorder. Harris also served as one of Lloyd's experts at trial. Harris testified that Lloyd's personality traits made her susceptible to PTSD, and that the condition was caused by Lloyd's experiences during the airplane crash. Harris stated that the physical injuries to Lloyd's legs were "a factor" in her PTSD and depression, but later testified that these conditions were not necessarily caused by her knee injuries, stating, "I think it was so horrible on that flight, she thought she was going to die, I think she would have had [PTSD] without the knee injury."

Harris also testified that Lloyd had a physical injury to her brain due to her chronic PTSD. He referred to academic articles on this subject, which state that the hypothalamus and limbic system in the brain of people with PTSD function abnormally. However, Harris did not testify that Lloyd's hypothalamus and limbic system functioned abnormally, and he also admitted that he did not perform available tests which could have determined if Lloyd suffered from any such abnormalities. Rather, Harris merely stated that Lloyd's brain was not functioning normally as evidenced by lack of sleep and concentration, as well as the flashbacks.

Dr. Charles Fuller, a professor of music at Ouachita, testified on Lloyd's behalf. Fuller testified that Lloyd had a "very

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low" chance of completing student teaching and becoming a music teacher. Fuller stated that following the accident, Lloyd lacked the ability to focus on schoolwork; however, he also admitted that Lloyd successfully completed full course loads in the two semesters following the accident. Furthermore, Fuller related that while Lloyd had dropped classes in the fall 2000 semester, she did not need a full course load to complete her degree, and that she would be eligible to begin student teaching once she completed the course she was then taking.

American's psychiatric expert, Dr. Eth, examined Lloyd and her medical records and testified that with proper treatment, Lloyd's prognosis was "quite good." Finally, Lloyd's economic expert testified that her maximum economic losses, including future medical expenses and income loss due to her inability to attain a teaching certificate and become a music teacher, were $1,166,875.98.

At the close of the evidence, American made a motion for judgment as a matter of law to strike the claims for mental injuries,³ and argued that under Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991), such injuries were not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. The district court denied this motion and also denied a motion for new trial. In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999, 118 F.Supp.2d 916, 917 (E.D.Ark.2000).

The jury returned a $6.5 million verdict⁴ in favor of Lloyd. American appeals, and argues that the verdict bears no reasonable relationship to Lloyd's injuries, is grossly excessive as a matter of law, and shocks the conscience. American also argues the district court improperly admitted lay and opinion testimony, and finally, that the district court improperly precluded it from joining the United States as a third-party tortfeasor for contribution. The United States has filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of American on this final point.⁵

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for new trial is appropriately granted if the verdict is against the

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weight of the evidence and if allowing it to stand would result in a miscarriage of justice. This ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Van Steenburgh v. Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 1999).

We review a district court's ruling admitting expert witness testimony under Rule 702 for an abuse of discretion. Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc. 259 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2001). We likewise review the trial court's admission of lay opinion testimony for abuse of discretion. Wactor v. Spartan Transp. Corp., 27 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1994).

The proper interpretation of the Warsaw Convention is an issue of law, which we review de novo. Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1144, 121 S.Ct. 1079, 148 L.Ed.2d 955 (2001).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Recovery for Mental Injuries

American argues, as indicated, that the verdict was excessive as a matter of law and that the evidence established at trial does not support an award of $6.5 million. American also argues that mental injury damages are not recoverable at all under the Warsaw Convention, or in the alternative, that if they are recoverable, they are recoverable only to the extent that they flow from physical injuries. Under either scenario, according to American, a $6.5 million verdict is excessive.

In Floyd, the Court held that mental injuries, unaccompanied by physical injuries, were not compensable under the Warsaw Convention. The Court expressly left open the question of whether mental injuries accompanied by physical injuries were recoverable under the Convention. 499 U.S. at 552-53, 111 S.Ct. 1489.

The aftermath of Floyd has led to a split of authority on the issue of when, if ever, to allow recovery for mental injuries. Very few, if any, courts have taken the primary stance that American advances-that emotional injuries are not recoverable at all under the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F.Supp. 654, 665 (N.D.Cal. 1994) (rejecting approach of allowing no recovery at all for mental injuries because that approach is too restrictive of passengers' rights). And in fact, the case American cites for this proposition, Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F.Supp.2d 170 (S.D.N.Y.2001), does not support this rigid theory. Instead, the Turturro court merely held that the plaintiff could not recover for physical manifestations of her emotional damages. Id. at 178.

The more mainstream view, and widely attributed to the...