Scoggin v. Lincoln University
Decision Date | 19 September 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 1259.,1259. |
Citation | 291 F. Supp. 161 |
Parties | Joseph SCOGGIN, Jr., and Edward Jefferson, Plaintiffs, v. LINCOLN UNIVERSITY and Earl E. Dawson, President, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Robert B. Curtis, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs.
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., State of Missouri, Louis C. DeFeo, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for defendants.
Plaintiffs, two students of Lincoln University, a State supported institution, filed a complaint in which they alleged that defendants, the governing officials of that institution, acting under color of State law, deprived them of rights guaranteed them by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Jurisdiction was appropriately invoked under Section 1343(3) of Title 28, United States Code and Section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code.
Pursuant to procedures directed and agreed upon at pretrial conference, the parties prepared and filed a full stipulation of facts. At the plenary evidentiary hearing both parties advised that neither wished to adduce any additional evidence.
On May 15, 1968 the judgment attached hereto as Appendix A was entered. The second paragraph of that judgment stated:
The questions of federal constitutional law presented in this case are likely to be presented in a substantial number of future cases. In accordance with the practice of this Court (see, for example, Taylor v. United States (W.D. Mo., 1963) 224 F.Supp. 82), I have circulated a copy of that memorandum opinion to my colleagues, Chief Judge William H. Becker, and Judges William R. Collinson and Elmo B. Hunter, in order to ascertain whether the legal principles stated can be said to reflect the view of all active judges of this Court.
Another student discipline case was pending before Judge Hunter in Division 4 of this Court (Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, No. 16852-4). A Court en banc order was entered in both cases for briefs and oral argument from the parties and from amicus curiae. A copy of that order is attached as Appendix B. The Court en banc received excellent briefs pursuant to that order and heard oral argument on July 31, 1968.
On September 18, 1968, the Court en banc entered a general order stating the judicial standards and substance of procedure that would, in the absence of some exceptional circumstance, be applied to all actions concerning the discipline of students in tax-supported educational institutions of higher education. All the active judges of this Court contributed to and actively participated in the deliberations that resulted in the final order. All unanimously agree with the statement of the applicable standards and principles contained in the general order. We are also agreed that appropriate application of those standards and principles will promote uniformity of decision in this district.
No exceptional circumstances are presented by this case. It is therefore appropriate that the standards and principles stated in the general order be applied to the facts of this case. The general order of the Court en banc of September 18, 1968 is published in 45 F.R. D. 133. Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, our findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated in this memorandum opinion.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties stipulated and agreed that:
The problem of the cost and quality of the food served in the cafeteria at Lincoln University was not of recent origin. Demonstrations concerning that situation occurred at least as early as the year preceding the current incident. Exhibit J was a copy of a memorandum dated October 14, 1967 from Dean of Students Pugh to all Lincoln University students on the subject of an increase in board cost that went into effect for the Fall semester in 1967. That notice, posted the Saturday before the disturbance occurred the following Wednesday, stated:
The Dean then set forth three reasons for the increase and concluded as follows:
Exhibit B attached to the stipulation of the parties is a copy of the reported proceedings of the Committee. That exhibit shows that the committee was initially convened on Wednesday, October 18, 1967, the day following the disturbance, and commenced what it called the "investigation phase of its work." It listened first to reports from Dean Pugh, Dean Chapman, Dean Adams, and Student President Brown. Mr. Marshall thereafter moved that "all persons whose names have been advanced here before the Committee by the reports it had just heard be instructed to appear before the Committee, first for questioning, as a part of the committee's investigation of the situation, and later, if necessary, for a hearing of any charges that might be placed before them, if the investigation warranted such action."
When plaintiff Scoggin was first called before the committee he was advised that "no charges had been placed against any one at this point, since the Committee was still in the investigation phase of its work." After listening to three days of "investigation" testimony "the Committee reviewed all the testimony which had been heard to this point, and determined that sufficient cause existed to place formal charges against the following persons: naming seven students including both plaintiffs."
The single charge formulated against all seven students was that each was allegedly guilty of:
Planning and/or participating in a demonstration which led to the destruction of University property on Wednesday, October 18, 1967, at the Student Union Building.
Consideration of student activity and of the later proceedings before the discipline committee must be viewed in light of the notice given all students on October 14, 1967, which stated that "if it becomes apparent that we `must' demonstrate to protest Cafeteria conditions it is hoped we (1) respect the rights of those who do not share in our decided methods, (2) be orderly and peaceful, and (3) respect and care for university property."
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Papish v. Board of Curators of University of Missouri
...133 (1968). This same standard of review is erroneously compounded in other cases from the same district, see e. g., Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F.Supp. 161 (W.D.Mo.1968)." From these statements the dissent unintentionally but erroneously concludes that it is the practice in this district......
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...470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Imposition of sanctions shall only be on the basis of substantial evidence."); Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 291 F.Supp. 161, 171 (W.D.Mo.1968). In this Circuit, only one district court has addressed the issue of whether a student's opportunity for appeal wit......
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Esteban v. Central Missouri State College
...830 (N.D.Ga. 1968); People v. Bundte, 87 Cal.App.2d 735, 197 P.2d 823 (1948). See also Judge Oliver's opinion in Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F.Supp. 161 (W.D.Mo. 1968). To hold otherwise, in my opinion, violates every basic principle of due process the law is known to I respectfully submi......
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