United States v. Mann
Decision Date | 09 October 1968 |
Docket Number | No. C 158-189.,C 158-189. |
Citation | 291 F. Supp. 268 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Theodore MANN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of New York, for the United States, Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Asst. U. S. Atty., of counsel.
Louis Bender, New York City, for defendant, Charles A. Stillman, New York City, of counsel.
On March 13, 1959, the defendant, then 67 years old, was charged in a five-count indictment with willful attempts to evade taxes owed by himself and his wife on their income for each of the calendar years 1952 through 1956. The first steps following the indictment were accomplished with "admirable promptness," Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 217, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); within two months defendant had entered a plea of not guilty, moved for a bill of particulars, and received the particulars ordered by the court in its partial granting of the motion. Some nine years and three months later, on August 14, 1968, the Government moved the case for assignment to a trial part.
The case was set for trial to begin October 14, 1968, subject to the motion defendant has made under the Sixth Amendment1 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(b)2 for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that he has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial or, in the words of the Rule, a trial without "unnecessary delay."
The motion is one which requires particularized attention to the specific facts of the case. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957). The protection invoked guards "only against unreasonable and unnecessary delay, and those characteristics call for an evaluation of all the circumstances." United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 983, 85 S.Ct. 1352, 14 L.Ed.2d 276 (1965). Specifically, we have been instructed to consider four factors: "the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant * * *." Id., 338 F.2d at 807, quoting from United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963). We proceed, then, to consider these factors in the order stated.
The length of delay
A delay of 9½ years is patently shocking on its face. This first factor need not detain us. The Government, conceding as much, urges that "the other factors serve to direct the Court's discretion in favor of a denial of the motion."
Asserted reasons for the delay
The case for the prosecution does not brighten measurably under this heading. Seven Assistant United States Attorneys, successively charged with the case over the years, have filed affidavits. Three of these report that at one time or another defense counsel said something about `'`documents" which would establish his client's innocence. More specifically, this series of affiants reports as follows:
In view of the disposition to be reached herein, it may be appropriate to say that the management of the case by the successor now in charge of it appears to have been wholly beyond reproach. This, in turn, is not meant to imply personal criticism of any particular individual whose docket may once have carried the case. What must be said, however, is that the affidavits serve, by the transparency of the purported explanations, to reveal a total lack of justification for the passage of over nine years between indictment and proposed trial.
It is not even necessary for this conclusion to rest upon, or weigh, the reply affidavit of defense counsel, who says he identified or produced certain "documents," never claimed to have any others, but did (and does) believe there were "leads" to exculpatory records which ought properly to be pursued by government investigators. Cf. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 135-136, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). Putting this to one side, the suggested "reason" for the delay is no reason at all. It is unlikely that any competent law student would consider it possible to fend off for years the prosecution of an elderly defendant by vague, shifting, and unfulfilled promises of "documents."3 Whatever law students might imagine, nobody could sit for more than a few hours in the criminal calendar part of this Court, listening to the knowledgeable and relentless pressure of vigorous prosecutors upon reluctant defense counsel, without recognizing the silliness of any such illusion. And, of course, the public is entitled to no less than such steady efforts to see that criminal justice should be as swift and certain as may be consistent with the demands of fair and orderly procedure.
Summarizing on the first two of our four relevant factors, the case is one of atrociously long delay wholly without any semblance of justification.
Asserted prejudice to defendant
Where delay is as long and as groundless as that revealed here, prejudice may fairly be presumed simply because everyone knows that memories fade, evidence is lost, and the burden of anxiety upon any criminal defendant increases with the passing months and years. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966); Hanrahan v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 348 F.2d 363, 366-367 (1965); Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796, 798-799 (8th Cir. 1925); Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196-200 (D.Md.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 101, 100 L.Ed. 761 (1955). But defendant has more than this generalized kind of inference to support his motion.
It is agreed that the indictment centers upon alleged sums received by defendant as commission income, but not reported in his returns for the years in question, from three companies: Milwaukee Crane and Service Co., Victor Machinery Co., and Simmons Machine Tool Corp. As reported in the Government's opposing papers, the alleged sums and payors were as follows:
Simmons Victor Milwaukee 1952— $ 12,938.00 $ 11,988.00 $ 950.00 1953— 27,251.80 16,000.00 11,251.80 1954— 60,000.00 37,500.00 $22,500.00 1955— 42,500.00 10,000.00 32,500.00 1956— 32,100.00 32,100.00 __________________ ___________ __________ __________ Totals $174,789.80 $107,588.00 $12,201.80 $55,000.00
It is undisputed that defendant did business with these companies during the pertinent years and that, apart from all the memories and records that may be lost during intervals of from twelve to sixteen years, people who presumably knew many pertinent facts have died. Thus, as to the Simmons Corp., it is asserted by the defense that defendant "dealt primarily with Mr. Charles Simmons, Sr., and to some extent with his son, Charles Simmons, Jr." At various times in 1957, while defendant's tax liability was under investigation, Simmons, Sr., is said to have assured defendant and his accountant (who makes an...
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