Gilliam v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 10 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 43363,43363
• Citation: 291 So.2d 593
• Parties: Freddie Laverne GILLIAM and Robert Leo Bradley, Petitioners, v. J. Parks STEWART, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jane R. Stewart, Deceased, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 593

291 So.2d 593

Freddie Laverne GILLIAM and Robert Leo Bradley, Petitioners, v. J. Parks STEWART, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jane R. Stewart, Deceased, Respondent.

No. 43363.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 10, 1974.

Rehearing Denied April 9, 1974.

R. James Stroker of Gurnery, Gurnery & Handley, Orlando, for petitioner Gilliam.

Monroe E. McDonald of Sanders, McEwan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for petitioner Bradley.

W. Ford Duane of Robertson, Williams & Duane, Orlando, for respondent.

DREW, Justice, Retired:

This cause ¹ is here by virtue of a certificate ² of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, that the decision below passes upon a question of great public interest, viz:

'Where a person suffers a definite and objective physical injury, i.e. heart attack, as a result of emotional stress, i.e., fright, induced by a defendant's alleged negligent conduct may such person maintain an action against the defendant even though no physical impact from an external force was imposed upon the injured person?'

The undisputed facts out of which this action arose ³ are set forth at length in the decision of the District Court of Appeal and will not be restated here.

The District Court decision concedes the correctness of the action of the trial judge under the established and long standing law of this State in the following language:

'The trial court's entry of the summary judgment is consistent with the judicially established procedent heretofore in effect, namely, that no recovery can be had for mental pain and suffering Unaccompanied by any physical injuries in the absence of wantonness, wilfulness or malice. . . .'

While one question is certified here, viz. whether Florida should recede from the long standing rule of negligence in this area, the greater question--and the one more basically involving the constitutional language 'great public interest'--is the action of the majority below in openly overruling previous decisions of this Court. The constitutional system of courts in this State contemplates that only the Supreme Court may overrule its own decisions. This does not necessarily infer that the decisions of this Court are always correct but it does provide a system for the uniform operation of the laws of this State throughout its borders. One of the reasons for allowing certiorari here from the district courts is that a decision of one of the district courts is in conflict with a decision of this Court--or another district court--on the same point of law.

We recognize that in this fast changing world the general welfare requires from time to time reconsideration of old concepts. When the district courts decide that ancient precedents should be overruled, we welcome their views and such should be unhesitatingly rendered but, in cases such as this, it is the duty of the district courts under the plain constitutional language to adhere to the former precedents and then certify the decision to us. This will assure uniformity. A certificate of the district court of appeal that its decision involves a question of great public interest does not vest jurisdiction here. It affords the basis to seek review but it is the petition for certiorari that gives us jurisdiction. In this case, for instance, had the parties elected not to take certiorari here, the decision of the district court would have become final and would have created in that district a decision contrary to others within the State. Judge Reed clearly perceived the error of his brethren in his observation concluding his dissent, viz.

'Finally, if the impact doctrine is to be dispatched in a judicial forum, I would think it better for this court to affirm the trial court on the basis of established precedent and certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court so that it may wield the axe. See Lunney v. Post, Fla.App.1971, 248 So.2d 504, dissent.'

Now, on the merits of the question certified--

Judge Mager's opinion for the majority below ably presents the case for receding from the impact doctrine. No useful purpose will be served by repeating here what he has so ably set forth there. We do not agree that, especially under the facts in this case, there is any valid justification to recede from the long standing decisions of this Court in this area. There may be circumstances under which one may recover for emotional or mental injuries, as when there has been a physical impact or when they are produced as a result of a deliberate and calculated act performed with the intention of producing such an injury by one knowing that such act would probably--and most likely--produce such an injury, but those are not the facts in this case.

The views expressed by Mr. Judge Reed in his dissenting opinion in the lower court, with one exception, are the present views of the majority of this Court and adopted as ours. We do not agree with Judge Reed that the power to change the impact rule is vested exclusively in the Legislature. The impact rule is a judicial creation just as are many other substantive rules of tort law and, since it was judicially created, we are of the view that if this Court should reach the conclusion that such rule was inequitable, impractical or no longer necessary, it may be, judicially, altered or abolished.

The decision below is quashed with directions to reinstate the trial court's summary judgment.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C.J., and BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

McCAIN, J., dissents.

ERVIN and ADKINS, JJ., dissent with opinions.

ERVIN, Justice (dissenting):

I would adopt the majority view of the District Court in this case. On reflection, I am not so sanguine as to be sure that a District Court is blindly required to follow one of this Court's decisions which has been nullified by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, change in the Florida Constitution or laws, or perhaps even in a situation where obsolescence has eroded away the judicial force and vitality of a decision of this Court. Not all of our precedents have the saving grace of infallibility, as we have learned from the experience of their being overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States and our progressive penchant for receding from them when we find them no longer meaningful. There is no supremacy clause in the Florida Constitution as there is in the Federal Constitution (Article VI). District Courts have final appellate jurisdiction (Johns v. Wainwright (Fla.1971) 253 So.2d 873, 874) except as otherwise provided in the Florida Constitution. Consequently District Courts must decide appeals according to the justice of the cause in keeping with controlling law from whatever source.

Under Article V's appellate scheme conflict of decision vis-a-vis the Supreme Court and the District Courts as well as between District Courts inter se is not abjured ab initio. The Supreme Court only has the power to quash a conflicting decision.

ADKINS, Justice (dissenting):

I dissent.

In my opinion, where a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant's negligent conduct, a plaintiff should be allowed to maintain an action and recover damages for such physical consequences to himself regardless of the absence of any physical impact.

In applying this principle, I refer only to a situation in which a defendant's wrongful act, absent any physical impact, causes a mental disturbance which operates internally to produce 'definite and objective physical injuries of an ascertainable nature.' It does Not apply to an action for recovery for mental or emotional disturbance unconnected with a resulting physical injury.

The leading case for the proposition that there can be no recovery for physical results of mental anguish without impact is the old English case of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 8 E.R.C. 405 (P.C.1888). By a negligent act of the defendant, a collision with a railway train at a level crossing became imminent, but the actual collision was avoided. A nervous shock or mental injury, caused by fright at the occurrence, was held too remote a consequence of the defendant's act to be a ground for damages. One of the questions to be decided by the Court was whether proof of impact was necessary in order to entitle plaintiff to maintain the action. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Richard Couch who stated:

'They (Lordships) are of opinion that the first question, whether the damages are too remote, should have been answered in the affirmative, and on that ground, Without saying that 'impact' is necessary, that the judgment should have been for the defendants.' (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 409)

The case of Coyle or Brown v. John Watson, Ltd., (Eng.) (1915) AC 1 (House of Lords), had the effect of overruling the Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, Supra, case. The case dealt with a miner who was ordered to ascend from the pit. He and his fellow workers were kept at mid-landing for an hour and a half until they were able to be raised. The shaft in which they were ascending was the downcast shaft for the air current which ventilated the mine. During the one and one-half hour wait on the landing they were exposed to a cold downdraft and, as a result of this exposure, the miner caught a chill which brought on pneumonia from which he died. The Court held that the death resulted from exposure to the cold air and that there was evidence to support the finding of the arbitrator that the deceased sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Lord Shaw of Dunfermline stated that:

'(C)ountenance appears to be given to the view that the compensatory provisions of the statute cannot be evoked unless injury be caused by 'physical impact'. That is, at this time of day, a most serious and, in my humble opinion, a most disturbing and erroneous proposition.' (Emphasis supplied.) (pp....